1

Understanding the Historical Record

Michael D. Swaine

ANY ATTEMPT TO EXAMINE CRISIS BEHAVIOR and assess the prospect for effective crisis management between the United States and China must begin by defining the term "crisis" and the attributes of crisis management.

KEY TERMS

What Is a Political-Military Crisis?

In most American analyses, a political-military crisis is defined by three factors:

- Key or core interests of the actors are involved,
- Time element or sense of urgency exists, and
- Great advances or threats (or both) to the interests of all sides are possible, including the threat of military conflict and, in the case of major powers, a potential threat to the structure of the international system.[1]

An international crisis begins with a disruptive action or event that activates these conditions for one or more states. Such a precipitating factor could occur accidentally or deliberately; it could be entirely unexpected or emerge unsurprisingly (or seemingly unavoidably) from a long-

standing, tense confrontation. It might also be caused by the actions of a third party or parties. In a full-blown political-military crisis, the parties involved are aware (or believe) that a threat of significant military conflict exists. In a near crisis, there is no realistic probability of such military conflict despite the existence of a conflict of interest and time pressures. Nonetheless, even near crises can significantly damage the political, diplomatic, and economic relationships of the states concerned and, in some cases, increase the probability of a future full-blown crisis.[2] Hence, crises and near crises are viewed as significant events meriting careful management. Of the incidents investigated in this volume, the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954–1955, 1958, and 1995–1996 are regarded as full-blown political-military crises (although many U.S. officials apparently viewed the latter as something less than a crisis[3]); and the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy and the 2001 EP-3 aircraft incident are viewed as near crises.[4] The Korean and Vietnam Wars contained both elements of full-blown crisis behavior and large-scale military conflict.[5]

A crisis (or near-crisis) situation usually presents an apparent threat or an opportunity, or both, for one or more of the states involved. A crisis emerges when neither side is willing to back down in the face of such a perceived threat and/or opportunity. As Alexander George argues, some crises emerge in ways that leave one actor no choice but to counter its adversary. Other crises emerge only because one actor decides to accept a challenge from the other and to oppose it. Still other crises are deliberately initiated by one side in an effort to take advantage of an apparent opportunity and thereby cause a favorable change in the status quo.[6] Many scholars believe that international crises are unusual situations, largely triggered by abrupt changes in the behavior of a foreign nation (or nations) or an external political event. These observers hold that crises cause the disturbance of otherwise stable international relations and usually last for a short period of time.[7]

Many Chinese analysts generally agree with the above definition of a political-military crisis. However, some American (and perhaps a few Chinese) observers mistakenly believe that the Chinese are particularly inclined to view crises as opportunities for gain. To support this claim, they erroneously assert that the word crisis (*weiji*) in Chinese combines the words "danger" (*wei*) and "opportunity" (*ji*). In fact, *ji* does not mean "opportunity" in this context, but rather "a critical or incipient

moment." Hence, for most Chinese, a crisis denotes ". . . a perilous situation when one should be especially wary . . . [and] *not* a juncture when one goes looking for advantages . . ." A crisis is first and foremost a dangerous event that has the potential to produce a range of outcomes, good and bad. In other words, although Chinese analysts recognize that a crisis can—under some circumstances—present both a threat and an opportunity, their basic understanding of the word and the concept is similar to the American understanding.[8] On the other hand, some differences of emphasis and interpretation do seem to exist between American and Chinese analysts regarding certain characteristics of a crisis or near crisis.

For example, some Chinese analysts argue that crises are not qualitatively distinctive or relatively uncommon events. They believe that crises reflect the inherently competitive and unstable nature of international relations and differ from other situations only in the level and intensity of actions and signals. Also, in the view of some Chinese analysts, crises often arise primarily from domestic, not foreign, factors, at least initially. They can also persist over a long period of time.[9] Still, it is unclear that such differences are widely held in China today, or exert a major impact on how Sino-American crises are handled.[10] Both Chinese and American scholars today emphasize that the most critical element of a crisis is the existence of a threat to core interests that can present both a danger of military conflict (or significant diplomatic-political damage) and (in some arguably fewer instances) an opportunity for gain. Moreover, although many Chinese scholars do not necessarily view crises as always distinctive and urgent events, they recognize that such features can occur in certain contexts. Indeed, the historical circumstances of the Sino-American crises examined in this volume suggest that both sides often recognized a sense of urgency throughout each crisis, and viewed each crisis or near crisis as a distinctive event.

What Is Crisis Management?

Attempts at crisis management do not seek to resolve the basic issue that created the crisis. If successful, crisis management merely defuses the crisis and decreases the risks of escalation.[11] Crises differ substantially in

their structure and dynamics, in the importance of what is at stake for each actor, and in the level of risks and opportunities confronting each actor. Crises also differ in the larger diplomatic and military environment and in the domestic and international constraints on (and ultimate motivations of) key decision makers. However, the acute policy challenge posed by every political-military crisis emerges from the inherent tension between the desire to protect or advance key interests and the need to avoid provoking unwanted escalation and conflict. In more specific operational terms, every policy maker in a political-military crisis faces a dilemma: on the one hand the need or desire to signal commitment and resolve in advancing or protecting one's interests without provoking unwanted escalation or conflict; on the other hand the need or desire to signal accommodation or conciliation without conveying weakness or capitulation and, thus, inviting aggression and undesired escalation.[12]

Decision makers, whether deliberately or unconsciously, usually apply one or more specific political-military crisis management bargaining strategies to deal with this policy challenge and to attain other objectives during a crisis.[13] These include both offensive strategies, that is, those that are compellence oriented and intended to alter the situation at the expense of the adversary, and defensive strategies, that is, those that are deterrence oriented and intended merely to prevent or reverse gains.[14] Moreover, such strategies are usually combined or used in sequence during crises. Successful crisis management occurs when the parties involved are eventually able to avoid the worst case and to defuse one or more elements of the crisis—particularly the possibility of military conflict—while also protecting or advancing their core interests.[15]

As Alexander George asserts, such success is highly dependent on the strength of the decision makers' incentives for avoiding war, the opportunities available to decision makers for managing crises, and the level of skill they bring to bear in any crisis management effort.[16] Nonetheless, scholars of political-military crises identify several so-called rules of prudence or requirements for crisis management that can increase the likelihood of a successful outcome.[17] Alastair Iain Johnston has reduced these requirements to eight basic principles, which are adapted below.[18]

1. Maintain direct channels of communication and send signals that are clear, specific, and detailed. Direct communication can reduce

confusion during a crisis and lower the probability of sending unclear signals. This requires trusted, authoritative communication links and a clear understanding by all sides of what constitutes a signal. In addition, many experts believe that crisis communications should contain several specific demands. This allows an adversary to accept some demands and reject others, leading to the possibility of a perceived compromise. In contrast, a small number of vague demands can reduce and narrow the adversary's choices, thus lowering the likelihood of compromise. To send clear and specific signals, political leaders must send unified messages and exercise firm control over communication channels. Moreover, proper signaling requires some understanding of the adversary's policy-making process and history of crisis communication. Crisis decision makers must be able to answer several questions: Who speaks authoritatively in a crisis? What is the specific target and purpose of a given signal? What actions or events constitute signals and what do not? What is meant by specific words and phrases used in crisis signaling? Proper signaling also requires a predictable decision-making apparatus that is reasonably transparent and obedient to the senior leadership.

2. Focus on limited objectives and employ means on behalf of such objectives; sacrifice unlimited goals. In a political-military crisis, both sides should seek to limit the speed of escalation and avoid unwanted escalation. This allows for more careful and effective diplomacy and bargaining and reduces the chance of inadvertent confrontation or conflict. The adoption of limited goals and means helps to control the speed of escalation by lowering the stakes and reducing the risks confronting decision makers. Decision makers find it very difficult to discard unlimited goals if one or both sides believe the crisis presents a solid opportunity to make major gains or regard the stakes involved as high.

3. Preserve military flexibility and civilian control, escalate slowly, and respond symmetrically (in a "tit-for-tat" manner). This very important point is closely related to the previous point. To maximize the chances for success in the bargaining that is central to effective crisis management, each side needs time to analyze the signals from the other side and develop the most appropriate, rational responses. The decision-making process will become overly simplified and destabilizing responses will become more likely if the time between moves is extremely short and the adversary escalates dramatically. To minimize such dan-

gerous consequences, crisis decision makers should escalate slowly, allowing the other side to respond to each move, and eschew major escalatory leaps in favor of incremental, symmetrical, tit-for-tat responses.[19] This principle is very difficult to implement if one or more participants strongly emphasize the need to seize the initiative through sudden, decisive (perhaps preemptive) actions in order to show resolve.

In addition, the movement of military forces and any threats of force must be consistent with one's diplomatic objectives, and the chance of accidental, provocative military moves must be minimized. Moreover, diplomatic-military moves should signal a desire to negotiate a resolution of the crisis rather than to seek a military solution. This requires strict, informed leadership control over military options and the selection, timing, and coordination of military movements and responses.[20] Such a requirement is extremely difficult if the military possesses an offensive operational doctrine; operates under fixed, preexisting plans; and adheres to an overall decision-making process that is somewhat unresponsive or unpredictable.

4. Avoid ideological or principled lock-in positions that encourage zero-sum approaches to a crisis and limit options or bargaining room; do not confuse moral or principled positions with conflicts of interest. To avoid adverse outcomes in a crisis such as war or a major loss of political status within the international system, participants must be willing to negotiate, make trade-offs, and compromise to some degree. These actions are extremely difficult if one or both sides adopt extreme, ideological, or absolutist positions, especially in public. Such a hardline approach tends to view conflict as zero-sum. Moreover, the public display of a hardline approach can turn an issue into a matter of principle in the minds of the public and the leadership alike and, thus, potentially threaten the integrity, and even the legitimacy, of the government. Such situations will inevitably constrain bargaining choices and make it extremely difficult to compromise or back down in a crisis. This can lead to the so-called commitment trap, in which leaders feel compelled to act on commitments or threats, once publicly stated, out of fear that the public will view accommodation or compromise as a sign of weakness and perhaps even betrayal.[21] The public invocation of principles associated with absolutist positions can also encourage the impression that conflict is virtually unavoidable and that efforts to prevent it are there-

fore almost futile. This kind of fatalistic thinking shortens the time frame for diplomacy and negotiation, reduces the acceptability of dissenting views within each society, and creates an almost self-fulfilling outcome.

5. Exercise self-restraint, and do not respond to all provocative moves. Sometimes the best way to limit the speed of escalation in a crisis is by not responding to the adversary's provocation. Refraining from a response allows decision makers to observe the evolution of their opponent's strategy. When the senior leadership is highly risk acceptant or prone to the commitment trap, such self-restraint is difficult. This kind of an adverse decision-making style is more likely to appear when hard-liners or leaders who do not accept opposing views dominate the decision-making process. An adverse decision-making style also appears when leaders believe the crisis presents a closing window of opportunity.

6. Avoid extreme pressure, ultimatums, or threats to the adversary's core values; and preserve the adversary's option to back down in a "face-saving" manner. In a tense political-military crisis, the use of ultimatums, intense pressure, and dire threats can be extremely dangerous. These tactics are especially risky if the adversary believes it is unable to retreat without suffering even greater damage or humiliation and if the threats and ultimatums are designed to compel (rather than deter) behavior. Such measures can lead the adversary to feel desperate and become more risk acceptant. This, in turn, may cause the adversary to employ preemptive military or diplomatic actions designed to convey resolve or to deny the opponent the capacity to make good on its threats. The dangers of such a situation are especially acute if the adversary has adopted unlimited objectives or a principled stance, or both, and believes that one or both have come under threat. Alexander George notes that the player with superior military power in a crisis often overlooks the potentially compensatory effects of the weaker party's motivation to overcome such aggressive behavior.[22] Thus, the stronger power is often tempted to apply these inadvisable measures in the mistaken belief that its power will ensure compliance.

7. Divide large, integrated, hard-to-resolve disputes into smaller, more manageable issues, thereby building trust and facilitating trade-offs. A successfully negotiated crisis usually requires the prior creation of a certain level of mutual trust. Such trust often emerges on the basis

of a history of a successful resolution of disputes through direct negotiations. These successes create a habit of cooperation that can lead both sides to believe the other is at least a potential long-term bargaining partner. Such an outcome is more likely if adversaries first attempt to reach agreement on smaller issues of contention. Thus, in a crisis, both sides should attempt to divide difficult, integrated issues into smaller, more manageable parts. Such a strategy would be particularly difficult if crisis behavior were subject to the kinds of conditions that weaken observance of many of the preceding principles. In particular, the invocation of ideological lock-in positions, the existence of extremely high stakes, and threats to the core values of one or both sides would create challenges for this divide-and-conquer strategy.

8. Think ahead about the unintended consequences of one's actions. Effective crisis management requires careful strategic thought. In particular, decision makers must consider how the adversary will likely act and react over several moves. The pressure-laden atmosphere of a political-military crisis makes it extremely difficult for leaders to think through all the possible unintended, negative consequences of a move or countermove, especially over several iterations. This problem is compounded by the tendency of crisis decision makers to underestimate the negative effects of their actions on the adversary and overestimate the positive effects. This is particularly true of more tough-minded, aggressive, or antagonistic leaders (so-called hard-liners). Such individuals often suffer from a variant of the so-called "fundamental attribution error." This refers to the tendency of an actor to attribute another actor's bad behavior to that actor's disposition and that actor's good behavior to pressure from the first actor, while also attributing its own good behavior to its disposition and its bad behavior to the situation the other actor has created. In other words, hard-liners tend to downplay or ignore the interactive, feedback relationship between their tough behavior and the tough behavior of the other side, and overemphasize the role of personality and a leader's "preexisting subjective disposition" in explaining crisis behavior.[23] This produces a tendency toward wishful thinking and generally weakens the effort to accurately think through moves and counter moves in a crisis.

These eight principles suggest that certain types of crisis bargaining behaviors or strategies are less risky than others. For example, as Alexander George points out, attempts at limited probes and the controlled, gradual

application of pressure give a challenger a good opportunity to monitor and control risks. In contrast, efforts at blackmail or moves to establish faits accomplis are based on the assumption that the adversary will be too intimidated or insufficiently motivated to resist, or that the adversary will not respond with military action because it has made no prior commitment to do so or lacks the capacity to react. Because these strategies allow little opportunity to monitor and control risks, war might rapidly follow if such assumptions are incorrect. A strategy of slow attrition might initially entail low risks but could force the adversary to escalate greatly as it is damaged to the point where it is prompted to undertake a major provocation.[24] Strategies of coercive diplomacy and limited escalation are also significantly risky. The latter strategy works only when accompanied by effective deterrence of counterescalation by the opponent—a difficult undertaking.[25] George adds, "Coercive diplomacy is a particularly beguiling strategy for strong powers that suffer an encroachment from a weaker state because it seems to promise success without bloodshed or much expenditure of resources." Proponents of this strategy, however, "often fail to consider whether a weaker opponent's strong motivation will compensate for its inferior capabilities" by leading it to counter vigorously attempts at coercion. This strategy is also "highly problematic" if it is combined with "stringent demands that strengthen the opponent's motivation to resist."[26]

Although the eight crisis management principles (and the most closely associated low-risk strategies for crisis bargaining) clearly offer some benefits by reducing the possibility of conflict, they might also produce serious disadvantages in a crisis. Alexander L. George suggests, for example, that an exclusive commitment to accommodationist, low-risk strategies might ultimately fail by preserving peace at the expense of core state interests. Moreover, such strategies might prove to be entirely ineffective or, worse yet, convey an image of weakness to the adversary that emboldens it to apply coercion or force. This suggests that success in crisis management is extremely context dependent and reliant on subjective assessments of the overall costs and benefits presented by a particular situation. Even under the most optimal conditions, crisis management can still produce adverse outcomes.

Finally, most if not all of the above eight principles might be entirely inappropriate if the objective of a leadership is to "win" a crisis (that is, to get the other side to back down unilaterally). In other words, the

above principles and associated strategies might actually weaken a leadership's bargaining power if one sees the crisis as essentially a win/lose situation. Therefore, the principles of crisis management are not always consistent with some of the core principles of the application of military power. Moreover, as suggested in the above discussion of the third crisis management principle, it is important for civilian leaders to be aware that the operational impulses and standard operating procedures of militaries might not be consistent with crisis management.[27]

VARIABLES AND ISSUES INFLUENCING CRISIS BEHAVIOR

A wide range of cognitive, structural, and procedural variables influences how states will behave in a crisis and, in particular, their ability and willingness to apply the above eight principles of effective crisis management. One can identify at least six basic sets of variables that influence crisis behavior:

- Elite perceptions and beliefs,
- Domestic politics and public opinion,
- Decision-making structure and process,
- Information and intelligence receipt and processing,
- International environment, and
- Idiosyncratic or special features.

The following section examines each of these areas in some detail, beginning with a summary of the general relevance of each area to crisis behavior on the basis of the scholarly literature. This is followed by a detailed assessment of the specific crisis-relevant features of each variable in the Chinese and U.S. cases, based largely on past Sino-American crises. The latter undertaking places particular emphasis on the observations by the authors of the chapters contained in this volume as well as the remarks of participants at the 2004 Beijing conference.

Elite Perceptions and Beliefs

The scholarly literature relating to crises and crisis management tends to focus to a very large extent on elite perceptions and beliefs as critical

variables that influence the cause, evolution, and consequences of political-military crises. Elite views precede a crisis and provide the framework within which diplomatic and military interaction occurs. Elite views color the expectation of compromise, confrontation, or conflict that is likely to emerge during a crisis. Elite views also largely determine the level of trust to be anticipated in crisis negotiations.[28] The literature on this subject focuses on four major sets of issues:

- Basic elite images of one's own country and one's adversary that influence the motives and objectives employed in a crisis, along with general elite beliefs regarding the nature of political-military crises (including crises between China and the United States);
- Elite views on the value or use of coercion or force, accommodation, and persuasion, including efforts to explain and justify a position and communicate appropriate assurances of one's limited objectives during a crisis[29];
- Elite views toward risk taking, the requirements of crisis stability, and the best means of controlling escalation and maintaining deterrence in a crisis;
- Elite views toward crisis signaling, especially the best way to signal resolve without provoking dangerous responses or to signal accommodation without conveying weakness.[30]

Elite images, views, and beliefs of relevance to these four sets of issues can vary greatly, at least in theory. On one extreme are those hypothetical individuals who tend to view crises in largely zero-sum terms and assume that the adversary is aggressive, while they are fundamentally peace-loving though highly determined to defend their vital interests. This viewpoint also believes that escalation is highly controllable and inadvertent war is highly unlikely or impossible. These ideal types of leaders favor either faits accomplis or strong, decisive, coercive actions over incremental strategies. They believe that war results from insufficient resolve or excessive efforts at accommodation or persuasion and that some types of conflict might produce major benefits (or be better than the alternative) under certain circumstances.

On the other theoretical extreme are those individuals who tend to assume that crises can be positive-sum events. Such leaders may assume

that they and their adversary operate from largely or exclusively defensive motives. This viewpoint believes that escalation control is extremely problematic if one puts even a modest stress on coercion. It favors incremental strategies and shuns war at virtually all costs. Hence, such leaders generally assume that conflict results from the escalatory spiral that is triggered by coercive moves instead of from a failure to show resolve. This approach stresses accommodation and crisis prevention over management or give-and-take bargaining.[31] In reality, of course, most if not all political-military leaders fall somewhere between these idealized extremes, and in some cases combine both hardline and accommodationist views.

Studies of Chinese and U.S. leadership attitudes and Sino-American crisis interactions have produced a wide range of findings relevant to the above issues.

SELF-IMAGE AND MOTIVES. Much of the American and Chinese literature suggests that the leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC) views their nation as an aspiring yet nonaggressive great power, increasingly confident yet also acutely sensitive to domestic and external challenges to its stability and status. China's leaders, and many ordinary Chinese citizens, possess a strong memory of the nation's supposed historical victimization and manipulation at the hands of stronger powers.[32] There is also a prevalent belief among China's citizens and leaders that stronger foreign powers are especially inclined to prey upon China when the country is facing internal weakness or disarray.[33] Thus, in past crises, Chinese leaders have been prepared to go to significant lengths to avoid the appearance of being weak and giving in to great-power pressures or of engaging in overtly predatory or manipulative behavior themselves.

Chinese leaders have also at times evinced a very strong commitment to specific basic principles and core interests. They have been especially concerned with those issues associated with the defense of China's territorial integrity and sovereignty, both of which are closely related to national dignity and recovery from past humiliations.[34] In particular, Chinese observers have generally viewed PRC behavior during most post-1949 territorial crises as a totally justifiable kind of preventive deterrence action designed to prevent the erosion of the territorial status

quo accepted by China's leaders in 1949. Chinese observers believe that such crisis behavior was designed to either ward off imminent or existing threats to critical border areas or to defend against more ambiguous attempts to intimidate China, "test" its resolve, or ascertain the stability of its leadership.[35]

China has also displayed a strong impulse to view the triggering issue in past crises as a clear matter of principle or basic values, such as right and wrong or fairness and unfairness. These principles or values are often associated with permanent beliefs regarding sovereignty, interstate relations, and behavior that is in general deemed just or moral.[36] For some observers, this has at times led to a tendency by Chinese leaders to view crisis confrontations in zero-sum terms, involving the defense of moral principles against unjust acts.[37] This tendency has been augmented by a sense of vulnerability when confronting a superior power. Thus, in past crises, China has often believed it was compelled to act because the other side would not heed warnings and recognize its unjust behavior or because the other side bullied China or carried out an unjustifiable use of force that required a counter.[38]

Many current Chinese observers of Beijing's crisis behavior—including many authors of the case studies in this volume—insist that under the influence of the "opening up" policy to the outside world and with the emergence of the post–Deng Xiaoping leadership, China's leaders are becoming less "absolutist" and increasingly attentive to international law and international mechanisms when they evaluate crises (or near crises) and assess their responses.[39] In other words, as one Chinese participant at the February 2004 Beijing conference stated, "While moral principles and values still matter greatly, they neither exist in isolation nor automatically outweigh other considerations."[40] The extent to which principles or basic values might dominate elite thinking can vary greatly, depending on the specific features of the crisis in question.

As suggested above, many analysts of Chinese crisis behavior argue that early PRC leaders such as Mao Zedong often viewed crises as opportunities to achieve foreign policy objectives. In particular, crises arguably were used to consolidate support from potential friends and allies during periods of potential threat, to probe an adversary's intentions, and to cause difficulties between an adversary and its allies. Crises have also been used to weaken an adversary's resolve and internal sup-

port for its policies or simply to deter or compel an adversary, hopefully leading to a beneficial change in the political-military situation.[41] As with the role of moral principles in crises, many of today's Chinese scholars emphasize that this Chinese approach toward crises has changed significantly under the reforms and particularly since the end of the Cold War. These scholars believe that, in a fundamental sense, China's leaders now perceive crises as primarily disruptive events that interfere with their domestic and international agendas and thus contain very few if any opportunities for gain. Consequently, China now attaches more importance to avoiding or resolving crises early on. These observers argue (correctly, in my view) that China's behavior during political-military crises in the 1990s was generally reactive and contingent, involving limited and for the most part flexible demands.[42]

Finally, Chinese leaders have often been very attentive to the larger international environment—and not merely bilateral interactions—when confronting a crisis. During the Sino-Indian border crisis of 1962, for example, Beijing became extremely sensitive to Indian attacks along the border in part because of fears of possible Soviet collusion. Chinese officials were also concerned that a weak Chinese response to India might embolden the United States to support Nationalist Chinese attacks on the mainland during a period of domestic economic decline and social turmoil. Mao feared the creation of a Moscow–New Delhi–Washington alliance of sorts against China.[43] During the lead-up to Chinese intervention in the Korean War, Mao and other Chinese leaders were concerned that U.S. military intervention reflected a broader effort by the United States to pressure China in other areas, such as Taiwan (Republic of China, or ROC) and Southeast Asia.[44]

Most American scholars agree that the U.S. leadership views the United States as the sole global superpower, with critical regional and global interests and responsibilities involving the maintenance of the security of key friends and allies, the preservation of peace and stability, and the advancement of prosperity in key regions of the world. U.S. leaders also view the United States as a crucial force for democratic change and a protector of political freedoms and human rights worldwide. In the western Pacific, the United States sees itself as an indispensable security partner and broker. This position requires the United States to maintain access and freedom in the economic, technological, and mili-

tary realms and to prevent the emergence of any hostile power in the region. As a result of these responsibilities, U.S. leaders have a strong stake in maintaining the credibility and authority of Washington's words and actions as well as its superior military and economic capabilities and its political relationships in Asia and beyond.[45]

The United States has viewed its behavior during past political-military crises (and particularly those occurring in Asia) as a response to clear threats to these key interests and responsibilities. In each instance, U.S. leaders have tended to view themselves as seeking to manage a crisis with caution and restraint while showing enormous resolve when necessary. In particular, U.S. leaders have often viewed crises as exceptional and usually negative events largely thrust upon them by circumstances or the aggressive designs of other powers and almost always threatening peace and stability or other U.S. interests.[46] U.S. leaders believe that crises usually require management through negotiation and, in many instances, compromise. Ideally, the two sides will reach an explicit agreement or understanding on each side's responsibilities, rights, and interests under the postcrisis situation. During this process, the United States views itself as naturally seeking to protect its most vital interests as well as generally avoiding adoption of an absolutist approach if compromise is seen as a possible and useful means of resolving the crisis. In other words, the objective in a crisis is often to attain an optimal—sometimes positive-sum—resolution under the existing circumstances while key U.S. interests are preserved. Moreover, U.S. leaders have generally viewed themselves as attempting to resolve a crisis on the basis of international law and in accordance with accepted international norms.[47]

Many scholars at the same time note that Washington has not shied from leveling coercive threats or employing armed force to communicate resolve and protect its vital interests during a crisis. Indeed, as discussed in greater detail below, U.S. leaders have often viewed U.S. coercion and even a limited use of force as indispensable means to the successful resolution of a crisis, especially when confronting a non-nuclear power. They have even at times leveled nuclear threats of various types against non-nuclear adversaries in a conflict or crisis. Such confidence derives to a great extent from the belief that the United States since World War II has enjoyed escalation dominance in such confrontations as a result of its superior military power. In addition, U.S. leaders have

at times invoked absolutist principles such as the defense of justice, freedom from oppression, and democracy to justify their crisis behavior, thus qualifying to some extent their commitment to optimal, positive-sum resolutions.[48]

Finally, it is certainly the case that past U.S. leaders, like most leaders, have also at times viewed political-military crises as opportunities to achieve specific foreign policy objectives. Thomas J. Christensen, for example, argues that Harry Truman, in order to generate greater public support for his grand strategy of the late 1940s, attempted to use the Korean War to strengthen his larger effort to advance a public crusade against communism.[49] On the other hand, one can argue that U.S. leaders have confronted greater domestic problems than their Chinese counterparts in manipulating crises in this manner, given the obstacles presented by the legal system and popular and congressional opinion.[50] Moreover, there is little evidence to indicate that U.S. decision makers have deliberately *created* serious political-military crises in order to attain political or strategic objectives.

These beliefs suggest that U.S. leaders might assume the United States would enjoy a distinct advantage in a crisis with a weaker—albeit nuclear-armed—power such as China. The U.S. commitment to preserving its credibility and its dominant position in the western Pacific, along with its superior conventional and overwhelming nuclear capabilities, indicate to some observers that Washington could communicate resolve and deter undesired behavior more effectively than Beijing in a situation such as a confrontation over Taiwan.[51]

IMAGE OF THE ADVERSARY. Most of the literature on Chinese views toward the United States in areas relevant to crises presents a consistent picture. China views the United States as constantly striving to maintain its system of global and regional dominance, usually through a reliance on superior economic and military power. In recent years, Chinese observers have stressed the view that the United States has often acted without international (that is, United Nations) approval. In particular, Chinese scholarly sources and Chinese participants at the 2004 Beijing conference suggest that Washington is willing to violate unilaterally what China regards as vital international principles—such as the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states—in order to achieve its national

objectives. Many Chinese detect an excessive sense of self-importance among U.S. leaders.[52] Moreover, many Chinese believe that the United States is a hegemonic and antisocialist power and, consequently, views China as a significant and growing strategic threat to its dominant global position. Hence, the United States is often seen as offensively oriented, seeking in many ways to constrain China's increasing power and limit its options internationally. In the past, these efforts have allegedly included attempts to use other powers such as Nationalist China, South Korea, and Japan as proxies. Today, the United States is often viewed as seeking to constrain China's rise by preventing the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland or by encouraging Taiwan independence.[53] Moreover, the Chinese perceive the United States to be a hypocritical power that claims to promote democracy and human rights, while actually pursuing its own national interests. This image is particularly important because it adds a strong emotional element to anti-American images in China and throughout the world.[54]

Despite all this, most Chinese analysts also view the United States today as desiring, for largely economic and political reasons, at least workable (if not fully cooperative and amicable) relations with China. This U.S. interest has deepened considerably since the advent of the global war on terrorism and the worsening of the slow-motion nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. Many Chinese analysts believe that these two events have forced Washington not only to divert its attention, at least temporarily, from the long-term strategic challenge posed by China's rise but also to collaborate more closely with and depend on Beijing to address these and other more pressing concerns.[55] Many in China believe that U.S. leaders could easily adopt a more hostile stance toward China if the strategic environment were to shift again, allowing U.S. suspicions and animosity toward Beijing to return to the forefront.[56]

Given these basic views, many Chinese analysts believe the United States has at times precipitated or manipulated political-military crises to reaffirm or preserve its dominance. The United States may also want to test the resolve of potential adversaries, especially major powers.[57] Xia Liping argues in this volume that U.S. leaders often regard crisis management involving a small or medium-sized nation as a process by which the United States can win by forcing its adversary to concede and thereby can advance its own interests. In such instances, the objective of crisis

management is to force the enemy to make the greatest concession possible while itself making the smallest concession possible. When the United States deals with a more powerful state, however—such as a nuclear power—the Chinese see Washington as defining crisis management as "the process of 'winning' a crisis while at the same time keeping it within more tolerable limits of danger and risk to both sides."[58] In this case, the goal is to resolve the crisis on U.S. terms without the use of force.[59]

This general image of the United States as aggressive and potentially threatening in political-military crises is to some extent qualified by yet another perception: some Chinese analysts view the United States as vulnerable or deterrable in specific types of crises, such as a confrontation with China over Taiwan. Chinese observers clearly recognize that the United States has superior power and a large variety of means it can call on to manage a crisis, including economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, military encirclement, and the mobilization of allies and perhaps the United Nations (UN). However, many in China also view the United States as constrained in a political-military crisis by a fear of casualties, prolonged conflict, and economic cost. In contrast, many in China—and some Western scholars—view Beijing as less deterred by such factors, especially in crises involving vital interests such as territorial integrity.[60] Moreover, many Chinese firmly believe that the United States will most likely have less at stake in a crisis with China over Taiwan, given the critical importance of the island to Beijing as a territorial and sovereignty issue.[61] Indeed, many think the loss of Taiwan could result in the collapse of the Chinese government.

For all these reasons, many Chinese observers believe the United States can in most instances more easily choose to avoid a territorial crisis with China that involves the use of force. Many Chinese think the United States would view armed conflict, particularly prolonged armed conflict, as unnecessary and too costly. This suggests to some in China that the United States would be more easily deterrable in such a crisis than would China or, at least, that a military clash could be avoided. That is, China could forcefully deter Taiwan independence without risking a war with the United States.[62] The Chinese are not sanguine on this point, however. Many also assert that the United States would not easily concede positions in a crisis with China over Taiwan, given what they believe is the arrogance of American power.

Another factor that can influence China's basic image of the United States is the level of hostility ascribed to Washington at a particular point in time. Beijing often designates other powers as friendly, hostile, or neutral toward China.[63] Such a designation is apparently a quasi-formal label (*dingwei*) that can heavily influence assessments and recommendations produced by Chinese elites and advisers and, thus, can significantly shape Beijing's crisis behavior. A power is more likely to be treated as an adversary in a crisis if overall bilateral relations are in a state of hostility or obvious tension, or simply if friendly relations are not predominant in the relationship (that is, a condition of "neither friend nor foe" [*feidi feiyou*] prevails).[64]

Until at least the early 1970s, China's leaders clearly regarded the United States as a hostile power and, hence, as an archenemy of "New China." Since the opening up period in the late 1970s and early 1980s and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, the Chinese government has relabeled the United States as neither friend nor foe but has generally sought to avoid characterizing Washington as an adversary or enemy.[65] Indeed, participants at the 2004 Beijing conference insisted that China's leaders sincerely hope to develop a long-term, stable partnership of constructive cooperation with the United States by expanding areas of mutual interest between the two countries. These areas include economic cooperation, regional stability, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, antiterrorism, and environmental protection.

U.S. images of China that are of relevance to crisis interactions have changed significantly since the height of the Cold War. For most of the period from the late 1940s to the late 1960s, many U.S. national security elites viewed Maoist China as a militant, fanatical, and aggressive regime despite its power limitations. They also saw China as a surrogate for (and servant of) Soviet expansionism. Hence, U.S. leaders perceived China to be a dangerous security threat to areas along its periphery, including many U.S. allies and friends.[66] At the same time, before Chinese intervention in the Korean War in late 1950, U.S. leaders viewed their Chinese counterparts as heavily distracted by the need to restore domestic stability and rebuild the economy after World War II and the Chinese civil war and, hence, unwilling to undertake an armed conflict with the vastly superior U.S. military. As Allen Whiting notes in this

volume, these faulty assumptions led U.S. leaders to believe that China should not have any concerns about U.S. military involvement in the Korean conflict. U.S. decision makers reached this incorrect conclusion because they believed the Soviets did not seem interested in intervening on the peninsula unless China was attacked directly, and Washington had publicly reassured Beijing that it had no intention of undertaking such an attack.

The massive Chinese intervention in the Korean War and the large loss of life accompanying forced collectivization and the Great Leap Forward during the late 1950s confirmed to many U.S. leaders that China's Communist Party leadership was extremely cruel and aggressive. U.S. leaders concluded that Chinese leaders were often willing to sacrifice large numbers of soldiers and citizens to achieve their domestic and foreign objectives.[67] U.S. leaders believed the basic objective of China's foreign policies during the 1950s–1960s was the establishment of Chinese hegemony in the Far East (and perhaps beyond) as part of a larger effort to overthrow the advanced capitalist states and eject the United States from Asia. They characterized China's approach to international politics as a kind of guerrilla warfare. U.S. leaders primarily conceived of Chinese foreign and security policies in terms of conflict rather than negotiation. They believed China's policies were marked by a zero-sum approach to allies and enemies.[68] U.S. intelligence analysts attributed Chinese perceptions and postures to communist ideology and the leadership's experience during the struggle for power. U.S. intelligence analysts also attributed Chinese behavior to traditional Chinese feelings of arrogance and superiority over other peoples and to modern-day nationalist and hegemonic beliefs.[69]

As a result of their supposed arrogant self-confidence, revolutionary fervor, and distorted view of the world, China's leaders were perceived by U.S. observers to be prone to seriously miscalculating risks in a crisis. In an apparent contradiction, however, most National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) of the 1950s–1960s also generally recognized that China's actual foreign policy behavior was quite cautious and calculative, not highly irrational or risk acceptant. Since the conclusion of the Korean War, China had emphasized indirection, political maneuver, and subversion and had avoided any direct confrontation or clash with the United States. Overall, Washington saw Beijing as unlikely to employ military

conquest to gain its objectives, although it believed Beijing was quite willing to use limited amounts of force to defend its borders. The NIEs explained this gap between words and actions almost solely in terms of China's relative inferiority in terms of power. In particular, China was largely restrained by U.S. military dominance across Asia. Thus, some NIEs of the late 1950s and early 1960s asserted that nuclear weapons, once acquired, would increase China's willingness to engage in provocative or high-risk behavior, especially along its periphery.

Such an assessment of China's security views left little room for the possibility that the Chinese leadership might be motivated more by insecurity than by confidence, and more by a desire to protect and preserve a somewhat precarious domestic order than to expand its revolutionary power and influence at every available opportunity. There was little indication that beliefs associated with Chinese nationalism and a sense of victimization might predominate over communist fanaticism.[70]

By the early 1970s to the middle of that decade, NIEs finally dropped much of the Cold War imagery and language regarding PRC perceptions and motives. Although the NIEs noted that China continued to display verbal hostility and latent aggressiveness, they saw no Chinese desire to use military force to threaten or attack other states, and they found no indications that Beijing was moving toward a policy of expansionism or even higher risk taking. The NIEs described China's policy regarding the use of force as "generally cautious" and limited to defense against real and imminent threats to Chinese territory or vital interests. In general, NIEs of this period saw China as having moved from its previous intransigence to a "more flexible approach" involving attempts to play on Soviet fears of a Sino-American rapprochement. These NIEs saw China as acting primarily to deter external threats from a position of weakness.

U.S. intelligence analysts also by this time accepted the view that nuclear weapons would likely produce greater caution in the Chinese leadership, especially regarding a possible direct confrontation with the United States or the Soviet Union, because Chinese leaders would be aware that their possession of a small nuclear weapons arsenal made a preemptive nuclear strike against them more likely.[71] At the same time, the U.S. leadership clearly recognized the obvious willingness of China's government to employ low levels of conventional force against a supe-

rior nuclear-armed power, as illustrated by the Sino-Soviet border clash of 1969. In contrast with earlier assessments of Chinese restraint in the face of superior power, U.S. analysts explained China's aggressiveness toward the Soviet Union as deriving from a desire not to show weakness when confronted with Soviet intimidation. They also cited a parallel Chinese desire to control risk by not positioning large People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces close to the Soviet border or engaging in any massive buildup.[72]

The U.S. image of China shifted markedly during the 1980s, largely as a result of Beijing's abandonment of Maoist values in favor of an opening up policy driven by market-led economic development and the emergence of a Sino-American coalition aimed at countering Soviet power. U.S. leaders saw their Chinese counterparts as pragmatic, cautious, and largely conflict averse. By the period of the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, a growing minority of U.S. observers began to express serious concern over the implications for the U.S. position in Asia of a rapidly growing, reform-oriented China with interests expanding beyond its borders. They regarded China as an emerging great power that would eventually translate its growing economic and technological prowess into military capabilities and influence and thereby possibly challenge U.S. predominance in the Asia Pacific region. Yet, until at least the mid-1990s, most U.S. defense observers and elites still viewed the Chinese military as backward. It lacked any significant power projection capabilities in maritime Asia and still possessed only a very small, retaliatory, counter-value-oriented nuclear force. Beijing was also highly focused on domestic stability and development.

By 2000–2001, however, a significant number of U.S. observers came to identify China as America's major post–Cold War strategic threat. These observers saw China as a rising power potentially hostile to U.S. interests over the medium to long term and a possible initiator of armed aggression against Taiwan over the near to medium term.[73] This viewpoint emerged largely in response to indications in the late 1990s that Beijing was succeeding in resolving a range of deficiencies in the defense arena and acquiring new (largely naval and air) capabilities of concern to the United States, especially in the context of a potential military crisis over Taiwan.

Despite this possibility, the long-term strategic attention of the United States since September 11, 2001, has no longer focused on how to deal with a rising China, but rather on how to work with the major powers—including China—to combat terrorism. This outlook has quieted voices of alarm regarding China in the U.S. government and defense circles. It has led to a greater stress by defense officials on the enhancement of dialogue and cooperation with China and the basic need to avoid a confrontation over Taiwan. At the same time, U.S. observers view China as increasingly determined to acquire the military capability to defend or advance its interests regarding Taiwan and increase its overall influence in Asia. As a result, although they still perceive China as cautious and constrained by its outward-oriented, market-centered reform agenda, some U.S. analysts nonetheless see China as capable of miscalculating its political, military, and economic leverage and interests in a possible crisis with the United States over Taiwan or other issues. For some U.S. observers, this means that China's increasing power—combined with a belief in China's superior level of commitment to the issue—might eventually lead Beijing to precipitate a major crisis over Taiwan by using military force to communicate its unshakeable resolve or to compel a resolution of the issue on its own terms.[74]

VIEWS ABOUT COERCION, ACCOMMODATION, AND PERSUASION. Several Chinese scholars argue in this volume that Chinese leaders have seemed overall to follow the maxim "on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint" (*youli, youli, youjie*) in assessing how and when to use coercion or force, accommodation, and persuasion in a crisis. This principle, used often by Mao Zedong during China's struggle against Japan during World War II, comprises three points:

- Do not attack unless attacked. Never attack others without provocation, but, once attacked, do not fail to return the blow. This is the defensive nature of the principle.
- Do not fight decisive actions unless sure of victory. Never fight without certainty of success, unless failing to fight would likely present a worse outcome. Utilize contradictions among the enemy. Apply your strong point(s) and reduce the enemy's strong point(s). Be prag-

matic and aware of the limited nature of objectives and strength. With a strong power, set appropriate war objectives; do not exceed capabilities. Know when to stop, when to counter, and when to bring the fight to a close. Stop when the goals are attained; rethink if you cannot obtain your objectives. This is the limited nature of struggle.

• Do not be carried away with success. This is the temporary or contingent nature of each struggle.[75]

China adhered to this *youli, youli, youjie* maxim during the Korean War, the Sino-Vietnam Border War of 1979, and the Sino-Indian clash of 1962. Each crisis exhibited four phases. First was an initial diplomatic response to a sudden incident or development. Second, China conducted further analysis of the situation and decided on its bottom line for military action. Third, China sent early-warning signals to the opponent and undertook military preparations. Finally, if its opponent did not heed the warnings, China took military action, usually according to its original plan.[76] According to some Chinese observers, during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the most crucial step in the Chinese strategy was to establish a red line for military intervention. From the Chinese perspective, preserving defensive lines at the 38th parallel in Korea and at the 17th parallel in Vietnam determined a secure distance for avoiding direct conflict between Chinese and U.S. armed forces.[77] China sent warning signals when U.S. forces approached these lines.

The *youli, youli, youjie* maxim suggests that Chinese leaders have usually used force only in response to force and have leveled coercive threats in response to threats. Many American scholars argue, however, that China has often *initiated* coercive threats or the use of force in a crisis as an effective political and psychological tool. In fact, some data, such as explored by Alastair Iain Johnston, show that during the Cold War China was more inclined than most of the other major powers to use limited levels of force, especially as an integral element of crisis bargaining.[78]

Several observers suggest that China has displayed a greater inclination to actually employ force as a political tool in a crisis than merely to threaten the use of force (as a form of deterrence), as is often the case in the West.[79] Specifically, in past political-military crises, such as those involving Taiwan, China's use of force was often intended to shape, deter, blunt, or reverse a crisis situation; probe or test intentions; and

prevent escalation.[80] China has often used force to show resolve, a commitment to principle, and a corresponding refusal to submit to coercion or intimidation. China has also used force to produce psychological shock and uncertainty. This has sometimes occurred as part of a larger strategy designed to seize the political and military initiative via deception and surprise. At other times, China has used force to intimidate an opponent and, thus, to elicit caution and possibly concessions from the other side.[81] Moreover, as Thomas Christensen argues, the Chinese have "on several occasions . . . used force to affect and shape long-term political and security trends in the region and at home, not to resolve security problems permanently."[82] In this manner, from the Chinese perspective, a limited use of coercion or force under certain circumstances can prevent a much larger conflict, strengthen the foundations of peace, or achieve narrower Chinese objectives.[83]

According to many analysts, the amount and frequency of force applied by China, once initiated, is often calibrated to support the existing political situation and objectives and to accord with the prevailing balance of power. One U.S. analyst has observed, on the basis of a review of the existing (largely American) literature on China's use of force, that in past crises, Chinese leaders have often followed an initial overwhelming—albeit often limited—application of force with a pause. Chinese leaders may initiate this pause to lull an adversary into thinking China is backing down before China eliminates the threat through a subsequent strike. Chinese leaders may also initiate a pause to present an opportunity for the adversary to reconsider and back down or to avoid a serious escalation of the situation. At the same time, Beijing seeks to convey the impression that significant escalation is possible and acceptable, even though its focus remains on political objectives.[84] As this suggests, in some instances, a self-perception by China of overall weakness, not strength, can motivate the use of force as a deterrent. That is, China seeks to convey resolve and shock a stronger adversary into more cautious behavior.[85] Such a use of force usually demands sensitivity to the balance of power in the geographic area of the crisis and to problems of escalation and control. In line with this approach, the Chinese use of force in past crises was often followed by signs of accommodation or efforts at persuasion, at least privately, to avoid escalation, and to secure at least minimum gains.

Much of the above scholarly analysis of Chinese leadership percep-
tions regarding the use of coercion or force, accommodation, and per-
suasion in a crisis derives from the Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping
eras. During those periods, Chinese leaders displayed a low threshold
for the use of limited amounts of force, sometimes seemingly regardless
of the human or economic cost involved and in some cases against a
clearly superior adversary such as the Soviet Union. This tendency ap-
parently derived primarily from a high level of confidence on the part of
Mao and Deng in their ability to control escalation and their strong
belief that a limited application of force was necessary to avoid a larger
conflict or to defend core principles.[86] On the other hand, some Ameri-
can scholars argue that Chinese leaders have held offensive military ap-
proaches to crises during both modern and premodern periods of Chi-
nese history (as part of an overall "hard" realpolitik approach to politics);
these scholars emphasize China's need to show resolve and seize the
initiative, often through preemptive attack.[87]

Post-Mao leaders continue to stress the need to show resolve and
seize the initiative in a crisis. It is likely, however, that their willingness
to use force in a crisis (especially high levels of force at an early stage of
a crisis) has declined significantly. Indeed, many Chinese analysts, in-
cluding many participants at the February 2004 Beijing conference, in-
sist that China's approach to the use of force has changed markedly
since the Mao and Deng eras. These observers believe that China's lead-
ers no longer regard force as an effective tool for achieving limited po-
litical gains in a crisis. Hence, Chinese leaders have displayed an excep-
tional degree of caution in international confrontations since at least the
end of the Cold War. These analysts assert that China has ruled out the
use of force as an option in dealing with neighboring countries on terri-
torial or border disputes and now proposes instead that such disputes be
solved through negotiation on the basis of international law or shelved
until the time is ripe for ultimate resolution.[88] In general, this viewpoint
asserts that the Chinese leadership today regards the use of force in a
foreign policy crisis as a last resort, to be considered only if core national
interests are at stake, other (increasingly available) alternative approaches
are exhausted, or China is faced with extreme provocation.[89] As a broad
statement, this is probably accurate. The challenge, of course, is to de-
termine when such conditions prevail.

According to Chinese participants at the 2004 Beijing conference, this viewpoint also applies to the Taiwan problem despite its status in Chinese thinking as a domestic issue.[90] The high stakes involved in the Taiwan issue and the accompanying Chinese need to convey a strong level of resolve have obviously resulted in decisions to engage in coercive military displays or threats, as during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–1996. The Niu Jun chapter in this volume indicates that during that crisis China's leaders were determined to use military means to make a "powerful response" to what they viewed as "diplomatic provocations" by Washington in order to force the United States to "really realize the seriousness of the issue" and deter Taiwan separatists. Beijing hoped to contain the scope of the crisis by not attacking Taiwan directly and by avoiding any conflict with the United States.[91]

According to many analysts, the United States has used coercive threats of force or actual military force quite frequently since the end of World War II. Many such instances were attempts to influence the course of an existing political-military crisis or conflict in order to advance or protect what the United States sees as its great-power responsibilities and interests. In general, the use of force (as opposed to coercive threats) has been most closely associated with efforts to alter the material situation on the ground as a means of resolving a conflict or crisis on favorable terms. The United States has most often used actual military force in crises against considerably weaker powers. It has, however, leveled coercive threats or signaled a willingness to use force for both deterrence and compellence purposes against both weak and strong nations, including nuclear-armed powers or large conventional powers. Indeed, in general, the United States has employed or threatened the use of force in political-military crises more often than any other power, including China.[92] Equally significant, the United States has also leveled nuclear threats on several occasions during past crises, especially against China. In addition, the United States has also used its armed forces for political objectives (such as to maintain the authority of a foreign regime).[93]

To a large degree, the frequent use of force or coercion by U.S. decision makers reflects a high level of confidence in the efficacy of force and the ability to control escalation. Presumably, this confidence stems from the superior military capabilities of the United States, an assumption that military forces are tightly controlled by the civilian leadership,

and the apparent belief that most adversaries in a political-military crisis are best deterred or compelled by such means.[94] Most U.S. uses of force have emphasized speed, power, precision, minimal casualties, and maximum disruption. Similar to China, the amount and frequency of force applied by the United States have usually been calibrated to support the existing political situation and objectives, and in consideration of the prevailing balance of power. U.S. constraints on or caution toward the actual use of force can be considerable if the opponent has significant capabilities.[95]

In general, U.S. leaders regard the military as only one of several possible coercive instruments. Other coercive instruments include economic, political, and diplomatic sanctions and pressure. Moreover, U.S. leaders often seem to assume that they can finely calibrate the level of military coercion via alerts and deployments and that the adversary can detect such signals. During the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, for example, although the United States deployed two carrier battle groups to the vicinity to convey resolve, the second group never approached Taiwan apparently because the United States did not want to severely damage Sino-American relations. It is unclear whether the Chinese government understood this distinction.

Several of the Chinese participants in the 2004 Beijing conference argued that the use of force has occupied a more salient position in U.S. foreign policy overall than in the Chinese case. They remarked that Washington has resorted to the use of force very frequently since the end of the Cold War, thus confirming its importance to the U.S. national security strategy. Finally, they stated that, although concerns with casualties have at times constrained the scale of the use of force, the United States has been willing to pay a high price in terms of casualties if its fundamental interests were at stake. Clearly, the Chinese participants viewed the United States as far more likely than China to use force in an international political-military crisis today.

VIEWS ABOUT RISK TAKING, CRISIS STABILITY, AND ESCALATION CONTROL. These Chinese views toward crises and the use of force and coercion suggest that Chinese leaders believed—at least during past crises—that once a crisis began they could minimize risks and control unwanted escalation as long as they observed certain requirements largely

associated with the *youli, youli, youjie* maxim. In particular, coercive threats or the use of force in past crises usually required the prior attainment of local superiority, strong control over one's armed forces (marked by very clear rules of engagement [ROE] and the coordination of military with political-diplomatic moves), and efforts to seize and maintain the initiative, often using tactical surprise and deception. The successful use of force or coercion also required a sense of knowing when to stop the political and military actions, and it required the use of pauses and tit-for-tat moves. Furthermore, successful use of force or coercion required clear and appropriate signals, including demonstrations of a low intent to escalate in a major way through the absence of obvious alerts or large-scale mobilizations. In most instances, providing a way out for both sides was emphasized. Many of these features are illustrated in the case studies presented in this volume as well as in past studies of Chinese crisis behavior.[96]

Several of these notions are broadly similar to the rules of prudence contained in the general literature on crisis management[97] and summarized in the eight principles presented above. However, for Chinese leaders (as for U.S. leaders), conveying firm resolve through words and actions is also a major requirement of crisis bargaining and escalation control. In political-military crises during the Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping eras, Chinese leaders frequently communicated resolve by showing a clear willingness to sustain significant military costs or economic costs, or both. From an American viewpoint, this often involved the risk of significant escalation and excessive damage for what were usually limited objectives. From the Chinese perspective, the willingness to put major assets at risk in a crisis was (and probably remains) essential in order to prevent an even larger conflict and to attain or uphold core objectives or principles. Equally important, Chinese leaders tended to believe that a strong show of resolve was necessary in part to compensate for relative weakness.[98]

When combined with attempts to maximize constraining influences on the adversary (such as via attempts to influence elite and public opinion in other countries), Mao and Deng apparently believed that observance of the conditions associated with the *youli, youli, youjie* concept would decrease the risks involved in showing strong resolve and make deterrence more effective. This would limit escalation, largely by mini-

mizing the likelihood of miscalculation or of a preemptive attack by the adversary. This would be especially true for those crises involving the use of military force to attain limited, primarily political objectives.[99] Such a risk acceptant viewpoint toward the use of force and escalation control apparently also held against a superior (including a nuclear-armed) foe, particularly if vital interests were at stake for China and if delay was seen as more dangerous than action.

According to Chinese observers, many of these requirements for effective crisis management remain relevant today. Moreover, these observers strongly insist that the Chinese commitment to absolute principles does not necessarily lead to uncompromising, zero-sum behavior or excessive risk taking in crises. In fact, according to the chapter by Wang Jisi in this volume, the Chinese government has employed elements of the *youli, youli, youjie* maxim in recent Sino-American crises or near crises as a rationale for compromise.[100]

On the other hand, adherence to the *youli, youli, youjie* maxim does not guarantee success in a crisis. As Allen Whiting notes in this volume, China's attempts at deterrence failed totally during the Korean War, in part because of faulty or ambiguous signaling and the distorted images held by each side toward the other. According to many American scholars, Beijing's attempt at compellence largely failed during the Sino-Vietnam Border War of 1979 as well, again in part because of ambiguous signaling and the use of pauses. During this crisis, there were also clear limits on the ability of China to level credible escalatory threats, primarily because of Soviet pressure. Beijing's experience during the border war with Vietnam illustrates the difficulties created by the effort to prevent unwanted escalation while conveying strong resolve in a crisis.[101]

In addition, excessive confidence in the *youli, youli, youjie* maxim arguably resulted in dangerous risk taking in the past. Many American scholars believe, for example, that in 1969 Mao Zedong took enormous risks when he initiated military conflict against the Soviet Union along the Ussuri (Wusuli) River. Mao apparently instigated and manipulated this crisis in order to distract from the failures of the Cultural Revolution and to convey resolve or defiance against what he saw as a superior bullying power.[102] He apparently believed that China's observance of the above maxim, and hence of many of the eight requirements for crisis management would limit escalation. However, the Soviet Union con-

sidered launching a major (possibly nuclear) strike on China after the Chinese attacks. Some American scholars believe that the Soviet Union ultimately escalated its pressure to the point that Mao was eventually compelled to negotiate against his will to avoid any further escalation.[103] In contrast, some Chinese scholars, including some participants at the 2004 Beijing conference, believe that further escalation of the crisis (presumably to all-out war) was avoided largely because of Mao's uncontested supremacy over the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the military. In any event, it is unlikely that the current and future Chinese leadership will be so bold as to initiate crises or use force against an overwhelmingly superior power in an effort to attain the above objectives, and with full confidence in the controlling effects of the *youli, youli, youjie* maxim.

U.S. leaders have clearly recognized that control can become problematic in a tense political-military crisis, especially one between two large nuclear powers such as Beijing and Washington. Since the Korean War, the United States has strongly emphasized avoiding direct military conflict with Beijing.[104] Like the Chinese, U.S. leaders seem to recognize the importance of many of the same prudent approaches to crisis management, yet they also believe firmly in the need to display resolve in unmistakable terms. U.S. leaders apparently believe that undesired conflict often results from the failure to demonstrate such resolve early in a major crisis. U.S. decision makers minimize the inherent tension between these two sets of requirements (and hence the danger of undesired escalation in a crisis) by placing great confidence in accurate intelligence and clear communication, close control over military forces (involving strict ROE), and the deterrent effect of the overwhelming superiority of U.S. military power, both conventional and nuclear.

As indicated above, however, such confidence—when combined with an image of the opponent as a "crisis-mongering" aggressor—has at times led U.S. decision makers to downplay prudence in favor of conveying resolve through extremely strong coercive (including nuclear) threats and military alerts or displays. U.S. decision makers have engaged in dramatic escalations over incremental, tit-for-tat exchanges, thus arguably increasing the potential for instability.[105] As the chapter by Robert Suettinger in this volume indicates, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President Dwight D. Eisenhower threatened China with the use of

tactical nuclear weapons during the 1954–1955 Taiwan Strait crisis. Dulles also threatened the use of high levels of force (perhaps including nuclear weapons) during the second Taiwan Strait crisis in September 1958.[106] In a threat of a much lesser order, the United States also sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to Taiwan to show its resolve during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and thus engaged in significant vertical escalation.[107] Such a calculus has probably not changed significantly since then and suggests that U.S. leaders may be inclined to act preemptively or escalate dramatically in certain kinds of future crises.

Two distinctive viewpoints are apparent in U.S. decision-making circles regarding the type of dramatic escalation Washington should bring to bear in a crisis. One viewpoint favors the use of military bluffs and even nuclear threats over the avoidance of bluffs or conventional threats. This position reflects confidence in U.S. nuclear superiority (and hence escalation dominance) and a fear of loss of direct civilian control over specific actions if conventional (as opposed to nuclear) forces are used to signal in a crisis. Another viewpoint favors the opposite approach and seeks to avoid bluffs and nuclear escalation threats. This stance stresses the use of conventional force, in some cases to establish a "non-nuclear *fait accompli.*"[108]

Some U.S. analysts such as Abram Shulsky argue that, regardless of their form, dramatic U.S. military escalations are particularly necessary in Sino-American crises because China is not deterred by lower-level threats or deployments, given the positive view Chinese leaders hold toward such actions as tools in crisis management.[109] Chinese scholars completely reject this argument. They point to the greater restraint that is evident in Chinese thinking toward crises and the use of force today.[110]

Although U.S. decision makers are arguably more inclined than other leaders to level strong coercive threats, they have displayed considerable caution toward the actual use of force against capable opponents. Indeed, some U.S. participants at the 2004 Beijing conference remarked that context is extremely important in assessing risk in a crisis. One participant insisted that Washington would not automatically assume that Beijing must be the weaker and more vulnerable party in a crisis. China's relative capabilities and the level of risks confronting the United States would depend on the circumstances of the particular crisis. Un-

der some circumstances, one U.S. observer remarked, China might have capabilities equal or even superior to those the United States could apply to the situation. This suggests that a significant gap between U.S. words and actions might emerge in a crisis. Whether true or not, this could reinforce the view, held by some Chinese, that the United States could be somewhat easily deterred in a crisis over Taiwan.

VIEWS ABOUT AND FEATURES OF CRISIS SIGNALING. The form, type, timing, and context of signals have greatly influenced the course of past political-military crises between China and the United States. The application of preexisting interpretations or images to crisis signals has also been particularly important.

Several of the case studies in this volume indicate that the absence of credible, private, and consistent lines of communication has produced significant problems during Sino-American crises. During the Korean War, China's warnings to the United States not to cross the 38th parallel were dismissed in part because they were indirect, oral, and conveyed by an individual—Ambassador K. M. Panikkar of India—whom U.S. decision makers such as Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk did not regard as credible.[111] During the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954–1955 and 1958, Beijing and Washington communicated largely through press conferences, radio and TV speeches, and public media. This situation impaired each side from understanding the other's goals, actions, and domestic politics.[112] Likewise, during the Vietnam War, Beijing sent messages to the United States through Edgar Snow (an American writer), President Muhammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan, and the British chargé d'affaires stating that China would not provoke a war but would fight back if the United States attacked China or threatened the existence of North Vietnam.[113] The lack of a trusted, direct channel of communication meant that neither side could clarify the meaning of a signal with a high degree of reliability.[114]

Even after full diplomatic contacts were established between Washington and Beijing, the two sides continued to lack a trusted channel of communication. Suettinger points out that during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–1996 Washington felt that, despite direct contacts, China was not candid about its goals and intentions, largely because of the extensive PRC use of "standard memorized talking points."[115] Accord-

ing to at least one participant at the 2004 Beijing conference, U.S. decision makers also did not know for sure whether their messages and signals were being accurately received by the top Chinese leadership because their primary direct channel of communication was via a subordinate official who served as the head of the State Council Foreign Affairs Office. Moreover, during the subsequent EP-3 incident of 2001, China and the United States were unable to establish contact quickly. Washington became extremely frustrated by Beijing's initial lack of response despite repeated U.S. calls to Chinese officials.[116] Much of the delay was apparently due to the fact that many senior leaders were in the countryside planting trees as part of a holiday observance when the incident occurred. According to Zhang Tuosheng, this problem reflected the fact that the two sides lacked adequate channels of communication during emergencies.[117]

Finally, Chinese misreadings of U.S. gestures or signals have occurred because of a lack of complete information, presumably resulting in part from an absence of direct contact. Participants at the 2004 Beijing conference noted, for example, that the Chinese side misinterpreted Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright's letter of apology to China following the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 as the final, official word on the subject. In fact, it was not.

Some participants at the 2004 Beijing conference remarked that Chinese signals can also be misinterpreted today because the Chinese system is less monolithic than in the past. Hence, somewhat different messages can emerge from different individuals and organizations. During the Maoist era, strong centralized control usually guaranteed a single message. Today, a much more complex and amorphous process—which involves much more internal consultation and the possibility that different messages exist—can slow down reaction time and distort signaling. Chinese participants at the 2004 Beijing conference noted, however, that the United States is arguably even less monolithic than China and thus faces more problems in this respect. The Chinese participants contended that the nature of the U.S. system often gives rise to mixed messages that alternate between clarity and vagueness. They argued that in many cases China's messages have been much clearer than those of the United States.

Many signaling problems also occur regardless of the presence or absence of a reliable and speedy communications channel. The political

and cultural context has heavily influenced the sending and the reading of specific signals. Chinese participants at the February 2004 Beijing conference noted that the Chinese leadership tended to believe the worst about U.S. signals during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis because bilateral relations had worsened considerably beforehand. This negative environment led Chinese leaders to conclude, incorrectly, that Washington was probing China's bottom line when it *inter alia* reversed its stance and granted a visa to the then-president of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, allegedly refused to work with Beijing to lessen the consequences of the decision, and then deployed what Beijing viewed as an excessive amount of force (that is, two carrier battle groups) to the Taiwan area.[118] Similarly, according to Wu Baiyi, during the 1999 embassy bombing crisis, the two sides did not talk for several days primarily because of a lack of political trust. At one point, moreover, Chinese officials delayed a direct dialogue between the two sides because of the fear that it would produce a "negative conversation" between President Bill Clinton and President Jiang Zemin, thus resulting in an impasse. According to Wu, the United States incorrectly saw this refusal to hold a direct conversation as a hostile signal.[119] In addition, Chinese crisis signals have often lacked specificity or have been cloaked in ideological phrases, thus potentially creating misunderstanding.[120]

Some American observers believe that misunderstandings have occurred in past crises because of mirror imaging. In particular, China's adversaries have interpreted certain signals or moves by Beijing as they themselves would have intended them. Shulsky, for example, argues that China's use of restrained rhetoric, absence of military deployments, and pauses in military attacks during crises have at times led adversaries to conclude incorrectly that their own resolute rhetoric and actions were deterring Chinese behavior. Often Beijing was instead attempting to regroup, infiltrate, draw the adversary in deeper, or simply communicate restraint and prudence on its own initiative.[121]

Sometimes Beijing's apparent preference for less convincing verbal warnings over what might arguably be seen as more credible overt military deployments or alerts reflected the tactics of an inferior power in a crisis. During the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet border clash, for example, China's leaders apparently avoided the use of overt military signals in order to maintain the element of surprise. They also hoped to permit the concentration of a superior force at the enemy's point of

weakness, in preparation for the possible failure of deterrence or compellence.[122] Such behavior often prompted the adversary to assume, incorrectly, that China was irresolute.[123] Of course, at times, military signaling is entirely inappropriate. According to Wu Baiyi, during the EP-3 incident, the Chinese government intentionally increased the diplomatic rank of those sending messages to Washington—from Wang Yingfan to Tang Jiaxuan to Hu Jintao—in order to show the United States the seriousness of the situation.[124]

Finally, some American analysts have argued that China's crisis signaling is an expression of a more offensively oriented crisis bargaining approach as opposed to a more prudent crisis management signaling of the type outlined above. These analysts argue that Chinese crisis signals are primarily designed to convey warnings and to prepare the ground for decisive moves and eventual military conflict if the adversary does not comply. They believe that Chinese crisis signals are not primarily designed to negotiate the resolution of a crisis or to avoid a conflict via prolonged diplomatic signaling and negotiation.[125]

Chinese participants at the 2004 Beijing conference strongly rejected this argument, however, even for the Mao and Deng eras. They insisted that even though China's leaders might have already relinquished much hope that the crisis could be resolved when they issued their signals, in most cases, Chinese signals were nonetheless intended to de-escalate the situation.[126] In fact, neither argument is correct as a general proposition although both contain elements of truth. On the one hand, Chinese signaling has often consisted of deterrence-oriented warnings that, when ignored, often resulted in escalation. On the other hand, the ultimate purpose of such warnings was usually to de-escalate the crisis, if possible. Whether such behavior is more or less offensively oriented depends on whether Chinese warnings were intended as serious ultimatums. The record is unclear on this point.

The United States, like China, has used a wide variety of signals during political-military crises. These signals have been public and private, diplomatic and military, clear and ambiguous, and highly threatening and restrained.[127] Although the type and timing of signals has often depended on the nature of the crisis, the larger political context, and the preferences of the president, the United States has generally strongly emphasized the use of military alerts or deployments to convey resolve

in a major crisis. U.S. leaders have usually also seemed to prefer clear, decisive signals and direct, timely communication with the other side over more ambiguous, incremental moves and indirect or delayed communication. This approach to signaling derives to a significant extent from a confidence in U.S. military superiority and the belief that clarity, directness, and timeliness in signaling are important components of successful crisis management.[128]

Exceptions to this general rule have occurred at times. Suettinger, for example, argues in his chapter that Eisenhower intentionally used ambiguity to his advantage during the Taiwan Strait crisis. Moreover, some of the Chinese participants at the 2004 Beijing conference argued that the United States has employed vague and inconsistent signals to an even greater degree than China. This is sometimes connected with alleged inconsistencies or contradictions in U.S. diplomacy. For example, the United States claims to be indifferent toward the outcome of the Taipei-Beijing imbroglio as long as it is peacefully resolved. On the other hand, it arms Taipei and supports Taiwan's democratic development in ways that, for many Chinese, encourage greater movement toward independence, thus suggesting a U.S. preference for that outcome.

Domestic Politics and Public Opinion

The domestic political and social environment within which crisis decision makers operate can significantly condition crisis behavior and leadership attempts to manage a crisis successfully. The domestic political and social environment, for example, can limit or shape options, increase rigidity, slow response times, and distort signals in a crisis. The literature on such domestic factors focuses primarily on two areas: (1) the impact of leadership politics (including the specific distribution of power and personal relationships among the senior national security elite as well as their individual political objectives) and (2) the influence of the media, public opinion, and other forms of popular pressure on the government.[129]

In most states, crisis decisions that affect national security and potentially involve the use of military force, whether indirect or direct, are highly controlled by a small number of senior political and military

leaders. The concentration of power among the senior elite and the way they interact to determine, implement, and revise key crisis decisions can vary significantly, however. In some cases, there is a relatively high concentration of power among sharply competitive elites who operate through largely informal processes. In other cases, there is a relatively diffused level of power among less competitive elites who operate on the basis of primarily formal institutions and procedures.

Crisis behavior within authoritarian regimes often reflects the views, personalities, and interests of the paramount leader and, to a lesser extent, the most senior military and civilian colleagues of that leader. In the case of tightly controlled totalitarian states dominated by a single, often charismatic autocrat, the supreme ruler often makes critical crisis decisions alone, with little if any meaningful input from other senior leaders.[130] Moreover, within such highly centralized regimes, the opinion of ordinary citizens rarely, if ever, exerts a significant, independent influence upon such decisions. The paramount leader or the leader's subordinates generally manipulate the views of the public and the media, when relevant.

Some analysts believe that authoritarian leaders at times create or exacerbate crises to distract public attention from internal problems, to bolster their prestige and authority among the masses, to mobilize popular support for specific policies, or to combat challenges by other senior figures.[131] Dominant authoritarian leaders may also be more able and willing to take risks during a crisis than their less powerful counterparts because of the absence of any meaningful internal checks on their authority and the high possibility that such individuals possess an inflated sense of their own power and intelligence. Dominant leaders of authoritarian states can arguably also make decisions more quickly and perhaps more efficiently in a crisis, which can be an advantage under certain conditions.

In more mature, less tightly controlled authoritarian regimes, crisis decisions can involve a greater degree of genuine consultation among senior leaders, advisers, and implementers. In some instances, genuine collective decision making can occur in which the senior leader must obtain the tacit or explicit consent of colleagues on all key crisis decisions. In addition, within authoritarian regimes the dynamics of power competition among the senior leadership can have a great influence on

crisis behavior because of the highly personalized nature of power within such states and the absence or scarcity of clear procedures and institutions for mediating conflict and resolving political succession. In other words, to an even greater degree than might occur in a regime dominated by a single extremely powerful leader, one or more leaders can manipulate a crisis to generate support among the public or to attack rivals for power. Such looser authoritarian regimes are at the same time more open to outside contact and permit greater freedom of movement and social, economic, and cultural activity among the populace. Under such circumstances, individuals or groups outside the senior elite can possess the motivation and the means to express attitudes or even to pressure the government on various national security–related issues and, therefore, to influence the course of a crisis.[132]

Crisis behavior within nonauthoritarian, liberal democratic regimes is also largely dominated by a small number of senior political and military leaders. In fact, within the senior elite, it is arguably the case that a president or prime minister exerts more power over key crisis decisions than does a counterpart within a loose authoritarian system. A president or prime minister possesses formal authority as commander in chief, head of the executive branch, or creator of the governmental cabinet. In contrast, an authoritarian leader, as the first among equals, holds a relatively weaker political and institutional position within a less formal and often highly competitive leadership structure. In a democracy, the media and public opinion can exert a significant, ongoing influence over senior elected leaders during a crisis, particularly a prolonged crisis. Remarks by highly-respected news commentators and media coverage in general can significantly influence the level of public support for the president or prime minister and the administration during a lengthy crisis. Such support can in turn influence legislative positions toward both the crisis and other policy actions taken by the government and can affect the political fortunes of the chief executive and the chief executive's party in future elections.[133]

These political and social factors can significantly influence decisions made by a nonauthoritarian government during key stages of a crisis. At the same time, the type of influence they exert can vary widely, depending in part on the subjective views of senior decision makers regarding the acceptability and importance of public opinion.[134] Under some cir-

cumstances, political concerns can intensify the so-called commitment trap discussed above, locking leaders into aggressive courses of action. Therefore, some analysts argue the commitment trap strengthens the credibility of coercive threats by democratic leaders, given the potentially high cost involved in retreating from a stated position.[135] However, similar threats by leaders of totalitarian regimes might be viewed as equally credible, given these leaders' ability to ignore popular or elite counterpressures. Some scholarly studies also argue that leaders of democratic systems at times use crises for domestic political ends, such as to gain support for a grand strategy.[136]

Domestic factors are often critically important for both China and the United States in a political-military crisis. In some instances, they may be more important than external factors. In fact, some observers of Chinese crisis behavior, including some of the Chinese participants at the 2004 Beijing conference, believe that domestic interests always trump foreign policy interests in a crisis. Still, little is known about the critical details regarding the specific manner, degree, and conditionality of such influence, especially in the Chinese case. In addition, each government displays a woefully inadequate understanding of how domestic factors influence the other side's crisis behavior.

The Chinese experience largely confirms the above theories concerning the behavior of both tight and loose authoritarian regimes. Crisis decisions in China have been undertaken by a small, leading nucleus of civilian and military figures led—or, in some instances, entirely dominated—by the paramount leader. The paramount leader has often performed a unique role as initiator, shaper, guider, and implementer of crisis decisions. The views, authority, prestige, specific institutional power, personal contacts, and decision-making style of the paramount leader have thus likely exerted decisive influence over Chinese crisis decision making. The specific pattern of control and level of influence over the decision-making process exercised by the paramount leader has varied significantly over time, however. This variation is largely due to differences in the personality and power of the paramount leader and the broader evolution of the Chinese political-military leadership structure from a charismatic-revolutionary regime to a more mature, institutionalized authoritarian system.[137]

Mao Zedong was clearly the dominant decision maker in all major crises or near crises from the 1950s until the early 1970s. Although the senior party leadership as a whole (usually consisting of the Politburo Standing Committee) often debated and analyzed crisis situations, in every instance Mao shaped or determined the leadership's basic assessment of the precipitating crisis and influenced the formulation and evaluation of possible crisis options. He either directly made the decision to use force or guaranteed that a formal organization over which he presided would make the decision. Mao also played a major role in supervising the implementation of crisis decisions and led the effort to evaluate and adjust crisis behavior over time. Often, Mao's superior authority allowed him to strike compromises in a crisis that less powerful leaders might have been unwilling or unable to make for fear of being attacked by their rivals.[138] In carrying out these activities, Mao was assisted by one or two senior colleagues responsible for critical diplomatic-political or military activities.[139] Together, these leaders constituted a type of informal leadership nucleus in charge of all key crisis decisions in the area of national security crisis management. In many crises, lower-level officials were almost completely left in the dark regarding a particular decision. Nonetheless, they would implement the decision according to established policies provided from above. As a result, the Mao era crisis decision-making process usually produced a single decision with a single message.

The basic leadership dynamics of the crisis decision-making process remained essentially the same during the Dengist era from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. Deng Xiaoping dominated decision making before and during crises such as the Sino-Vietnam Border War of 1979.[140] Deng, however, was arguably more compelled than Mao to consult during crises and compromise with his senior colleagues, especially those retired or semiretired cadres of the revolutionary generation.[141]

The role of the paramount leader in political-military crises has changed in more significant ways since Mao and Deng. Although Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have apparently exercised considerable power over major crises or near crises, their ability to shape or influence, much less control, crisis decision making has been considerably less than that of Deng and certainly of Mao.[142] This is largely because individual leaders

of the post-Mao–post-Deng era command far less authority and prestige than their predecessors and have fewer personal contacts among a narrower range of institutions.[143] Thus, to govern effectively, the paramount leader must seriously consider the views and actions of senior colleagues within the Politburo Standing Committee. These views and actions may, at times, constrain the paramount leader. Moreover, in crises that potentially involve the use of force, the paramount leader must also no doubt pay particularly close attention to the views of senior military leaders.[144] In short, the decision-making process has to some significant degree become more collective in nature since the Deng era.[145] As a result, the bureaucratic and political interests and views of civilian and senior leaders (including differences between hard-liners and soft-liners) can exert a significant influence over Beijing's behavior in a political-military crisis. For example, according to some Chinese observers, China's top leaders especially need to explain and justify themselves to those internal forces that advocate a tougher line against Taiwan.[146]

The limited evidence available suggests that the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis reflected the more complex leadership dynamic in place in China today.[147] Overall, Jiang Zemin apparently played a central role in each major crisis decision because of his authority as party general secretary and chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) and because of his position as director of the CCP's Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group, a critical policy coordination body for China's Taiwan policy.[148] As CMC chairman and CCP general secretary, Jiang approved all the military exercises and missile "tests" undertaken during the crisis, although it is highly unlikely that he supervised, much less directed, military operations as Mao and Deng had done.[149] Like Mao and Deng, Jiang also had to consult with his colleagues during each stage of the crisis. At one stage, Jiang had to present arguments against a direct confrontation with the United States.[150] In carrying out this leadership role, Jiang acted as first among equals, directing a largely collaborative—albeit at times contentious—policy process.[151]

As predicted by the theoretical literature, some scholarly studies have also shown that Chinese leaders such as Mao have attempted to use crises to bolster internal authority or support for their political positions through distraction or mobilization. In general, the effort to use

external crises to mobilize populations for political purposes or to develop national power has been more evident in China than attempts to use crises as a means of diverting domestic dissent during periods of internal unrest.[152]

Little concrete evidence is available on the extent to which the media and public sentiment have influenced the Chinese decision-making process during specific political-military crises. The paramount leader and senior colleagues have primarily used the Chinese media to build domestic and foreign support for their actions and policies, to control public reactions to unfolding crises, and to convey specific messages to foreign governments as part of Beijing's overall efforts to influence adversaries during a crisis. In recent years, the government has also used the media to both stimulate and dampen nationalist public reactions to the actions of adversaries.[153]

In general, during the post-Deng era, the propaganda apparatus and the media have become less subservient to the views and decisions of the senior leadership. The propaganda apparatus tends to be more conservative than other institutions (and perhaps some leaders) and is primarily oriented toward domestic audiences. The broader media are more diverse in their viewpoints and are often dominated by younger individuals. The broader media sometimes both direct and reflect public sentiment, thus creating an avenue for more independent pressure on the leadership during a crisis.[154] However, one Chinese participant at the 2004 Beijing conference stated that, since the embassy bombing of 1999, the Chinese government has greatly strengthened its control over the media, especially the mainstream media.

Public views and actions did not play a significant independent role during the major political-military crises of the Maoist and Dengist eras. Moreover, although some public anger toward President Lee Teng-hui and the United States was evident during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, there is no solid evidence that such sentiments directly influenced the perceptions or specific actions taken by the leadership at that time. During these crises, Chinese leaders generally did not need to worry about or play to specific public views or pressure.[155] This situation has changed notably since the late 1990s, however, as nationalist sentiments have become more openly and stridently expressed among the populace and criticism of the U.S. government has grown by leaps and bounds.

The internet and cell phones in particular have become particularly important—in Chinese cities—for the rapid receipt and dissemination of news and information and the expression of public views, and for the organization of demonstrations, with and without government permission or encouragement. Nationalist, anti-U.S. sentiments and protests were very evident in the Chinese response to the Belgrade embassy bombing and the EP-3 incident.[156] More recently, large numbers of Chinese protestors conducted angry, anti-Japanese protests in several Chinese cities, fueled by internet and cell phone communications.[157] Some Chinese participants at the 2004 Beijing conference stated that public pressure in crises with the United States has become a far more serious issue for Chinese leaders than for U.S. leaders.[158]

More evident nationalist feelings among the public and the growing complexity of some issues that are confronted during a crisis require much greater levels of coordination within the government and, at times, a much greater level of solicitation of views from nongovernmental experts than has occurred in the past.[159] The public expression of (sometimes extreme) nationalist views and sentiments challenges the ability of the Chinese government to maintain a balanced and prudent course of action in a crisis, rather than to be led by more extremist viewpoints. Such public expressions can greatly reinforce the desire of China's leaders to avoid appearing weak, irresolute, intimidated, or not fully in control of events during a confrontation with a foreign power, especially the United States. The Chinese leadership apparently fears that efforts to suppress ultra-nationalist demonstrations might provoke a severe public backlash that could undermine the legitimacy of the regime. That said, it is difficult to assess exactly how nationalist sentiments among the populace influence the crisis behavior of the Chinese government. Such public views could prompt senior leaders to become either more risk acceptant or more risk averse, depending on the circumstances. Leaders might create or aggravate popular nationalist sentiments for their own political purposes. Alternatively, strong public sentiments could pressure leaders to resolve a crisis quickly without further escalation, perhaps because of the fear that angry protests might eventually turn against the government. This probably means that Chinese leaders will attempt to use nationalist sentiments to their advantage in a crisis. This could prolong or intensify the event in many instances. On the other

hand, Chinese leaders will also endeavor to maintain strong control over public behavior and resolve the incident before nationalist pressures become excessive. The timing and form of this delicate balance will depend greatly on the nature of the crisis and the apparent success of the Chinese government in handling it to the satisfaction of the public.

The Chinese government obviously sought to channel, control, and perhaps manipulate popular views and behavior during recent crises such as the Belgrade embassy bombing and the EP-3 incident.[160] Kurt Campbell argues that, following the embassy bombing, Chinese authorities—for reasons that are not entirely clear—initially permitted large public protests outside U.S. diplomatic facilities. Beijing may have sought to use the public protests to strengthen its hand in negotiations with Washington by showing that the crisis was extremely volatile and required careful handling (and perhaps U.S. concessions) to avoid a major deterioration in relations.[161] Beijing may have also sought to use the protests to strengthen its domestic legitimacy by showing publicly that it sympathized with the Chinese people's righteous indignation.[162] In any event, according to Wu Baiyi, the Chinese government soon attempted to manage—and then dampen—these protests. Both Kurt Campbell and Wu Baiyi suggest that Beijing eventually decided to suppress the protests in large part because of concerns that they might seriously damage relations with the United States. Beijing was also concerned that public sentiment might turn against the Chinese government if the demonstrations were allowed to continue, thus confirming, in this instance, the above hypothesis.[163]

Overall, the Chinese participants in the 2004 Beijing conference insisted that Chinese leaders no longer need to use crises to build popular and elite support for the government because China's top priority today is no longer Maoist "class struggles at home and abroad." Instead, Chinese leaders seek economic development, which requires a peaceful and benevolent international environment. Chinese participants pointed out that the Chinese leadership sees popular nationalism as a double-edged sword that provides no reliable foundation for political legitimacy in the long run. In addition, some Chinese participants recognized that the voices of both the general public and the news media in China will become increasingly independent over the long run. They also stressed that the Chinese government adamantly believes that on some subjects

the Chinese public has extremely strong views that the government cannot ignore. Perhaps the most notable example of this, in their view, is the public's opposition to Taiwan independence.

Domestic factors have often played a critical role in how the U.S. government has handled crises with China. The U.S. president today probably possesses more power in a political-military crisis than does the president's Chinese counterpart. On the other hand, it is also undeniably true that the media and public opinion can shape the perceptions and actions of a U.S. president in an intense political-military crisis, even when the president is inclined to downplay such factors. This is especially the case if the crisis is prolonged.[164] Such domestic factors can exert both negative and positive influences, intensifying the so-called commitment trap while also increasing the credibility of U.S. signals of resolve.

Broader domestic political considerations can also influence presidential calculations in a crisis. The preexisting balance of political forces in Congress is particularly important, as is the overall public mood toward the adversary in a crisis. Several of the chapters in this volume suggest that pressures created at the time by the U.S. Congress and the public have played more of a role than concerns over how the handling of a crisis might affect a leader's future reelection chances. Allen Whiting, for example, argues that Congress and the public complicated the calculations of President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson during the lead-up to the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, especially regarding whether to attack China or withdraw from Korea. In particular, the two leaders faced considerable pressure from the Republican right and Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.) as well as from the public via the media.[165]

Suettinger remarks that President Eisenhower's perceptions and actions during the 1954–1955 and 1958 Taiwan Strait crises were most likely influenced by congressional sentiment and public opinion, albeit in different ways. In the earlier crisis, Eisenhower had a freer hand in confronting China because of strong anticommunist views among the public and members of Congress. Congress in particular was heavily influenced by the China lobby, which supported Chiang Kai-shek and his government on Taiwan. This gave Eisenhower considerable freedom of action despite the stark division of the Republican Party be-

tween ultraconservatives and moderates. In contrast, Eisenhower faced far more opposition in 1958 from the Congress, which by then had a Democratic Party majority, and a public that was deeply concerned with the administration's nuclear threats.[166]

Domestic politics also played a particularly important role in influencing presidential decisions during the subsequent 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. Suettinger argues that President Bill Clinton faced a hostile Republican Congress that opposed many elements of his Taiwan policy and supported Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell University. Public opinion had not fully recovered from the 1989 Tiananmen incident. Moreover, in the mid-1990s there were fewer strategic reasons to maintain positive relations with China. In contrast, public support for Taiwan, which was democratizing, was high. Taiwanese lobbying was particularly effective in gaining congressional support.[167] Ultimately, Clinton was forced to grant Lee Teng-hui a visa to visit Cornell—despite a clear awareness among many senior officials of the dangers involved for Sino-U.S. relations—to avoid having Congress pass a binding resolution that could diminish the president's control over foreign policy. Moreover, subsequent U.S. actions during the crisis, including the deployment of two U.S. carriers to the Taiwan area, were taken in part to mollify congressional pressure for more hard-line actions.[168]

Concerns about public opinion were also important to U.S. crisis management during the EP-3 incident. Former commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, Dennis Blair, indicates in this volume that U.S. officials felt pressure to quickly release a statement regarding the incident in order to avoid press reports based on leaks and rumors and to avoid charges of a "cover-up."[169] U.S. government officials did not want the Chinese decision to hold the EP-3 crew on Hainan Island to be portrayed as a hostage crisis that bore similarities to the Iranian hostage crisis. They feared that a public perception of a hostage crisis could greatly damage both Sino-American relations and the power of President George W. Bush.[170] Analyst Paul Godwin argues that throughout the crisis the Bush administration faced pressure from right-wing Republicans and conservative media commentators such as William Kristol to take a hard-line stance toward China.[171]

Finally, one major factor to consider regarding the role of domestic pressure on both U.S. and Chinese leaders during a crisis is the effect of

such pressure on the other side. Does the presence of strong domestic public pressure on a crisis decision maker increase his or her leverage vis-à-vis the adversary by increasing, for example, the credibility of appeals by the former for caution or restraint by the latter? Alternatively, does it undermine such leverage, because the adversary does not understand the role of domestic pressure on the other side, for example, or because such domestic pressure complicates signaling? This issue will require further research.[172]

Decision-Making Structure and Process

The American literature on political-military crises places a great emphasis on the impact of the formal and informal structure and processes of the decision-making system upon leadership perceptions and behavior. The mechanism for making decisions shapes the ultimate content of those decisions. The literature suggests that the most important issues include the influence of intragroup dynamics (especially between the senior leader and the leader's top advisers); the effect of interbureaucratic competition (the so-called "bureaucratic politics" model), and the excessive reliance by decision makers on limited sources of intelligence or information provided by the bureaucracy.[173] Another particularly important issue is the fact of time constraints and the resulting reliance on preexisting organizational perspectives and processes (including standard operating procedures or preexisting military plans).[174]

These factors can directly influence critical components of crisis behavior such as threat perception, the speed and efficiency of decisions, the availability of options, the quality and type of intelligence received, and the level of central control over aspects of implementation. These potential problems may be more present within well-established regimes with highly institutionalized patterns of governance. Such regimes rely on more complex, deeply ingrained patterns of decision making than less institutionalized, more personalized systems of rule. It is not surprising, therefore, that the literature on this subject largely focuses on crisis decision making within the U.S. political system.

In China, the importance of organizational structures and processes in crisis decision making has apparently increased as the Chinese political system has become more bureaucratic and functionally specialized.

The increasing dependence of China's senior leaders upon complex structures to collect and process critical information, implement policies, and generate support for specific decisions has also raised the importance of organizational structures and processes. That said, not enough information is available in the historical record to draw reasonably reliable conclusions about how organizations and related bureaucratic and policy-making procedures have specifically shaped, constrained, or even perhaps undermined the perceptions and actions of China's paramount leader and his senior associates during a political-military crisis. Nonetheless, some general observations can be made on the basis of existing literature and new information and insights contained in the case studies presented in this volume.

During the Mao Zedong era, political and military organizations served largely to facilitate and strengthen Mao's exercise of decision-making power vis-à-vis his senior colleagues and over the system as a whole. Specifically, upper-level policy organs such as the CCP Central Committee, Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee, CCP Central Military Commission, central work conferences, party plenums, and the government council (the precursor to the State Council) were used by Mao to

- Discuss a crisis situation and assess the pros and cons of various possible policy actions;
- Identify those who supported or opposed a particular policy action (especially actions favored by Mao);
- Persuade or co-opt the majority of the senior leadership into ultimately supporting Mao's preferred course of action, which presumably made it more difficult to level blame against Mao and his closest associates in the event of policy failure while it also strengthened the paramount leader's overall authority within the system;
- Approve formally the implementation of decisions and recommendations taken by subordinate organs; and
- Legitimate actions and decisions taken by Mao and his senior associates in the eyes of the larger political and military elite.

Lower-level bureaucratic organizations served primarily as instruments for intelligence and information collection and processing and for policy

coordination and implementation, sometimes under the direct command of Mao or Premier Zhou Enlai. Participants at these meetings sometimes formulated and presented specific action recommendations to Mao and the senior leadership during a crisis. Special organizations—sometimes regional in orientation—were at times formed to facilitate the use of military force during crises involving armed conflict.[175]

Very little solid information is available on the types and purposes of specific organizations used during crises that took place during the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin eras. Yet organizational and procedural factors undoubtedly grew in complexity and importance during these periods. As the absolute power of individual leaders has declined in China, the level of bureaucratic and technical specialization of the elite has increased and become more compartmentalized. The potential use-of-force situations leaders face during crises have arguably become more complex and technically demanding. As a result, the leadership's dependence on more sophisticated organizations and formal procedures has grown. These organizations may also be more independent or assertive. In particular, Chinese leaders during political-military crises have almost certainly become more reliant on specialized expertise held by members of organizations such as the military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and by experts attached to a wide (and growing) range of government institutes.

The dearth of information regarding the increasingly important organizational and procedural context of the post-Mao era is perhaps best explained by two simple facts: First, crises during the Deng and Jiang eras have been less momentous than crises (such as the Korean War) during the Maoist era and hence have been examined in less detail. Second, the Chinese government regards more recent crises as highly sensitive events that cannot be openly examined. Nonetheless, some partial and tentative observations on the role of organizations and the procedures in the decision-making process can be made from the limited information obtained by the author, including information provided in this volume.

Although the same type of high-level organizations apparently served much the same function during crises in the Deng era as they did in the Mao era, there were some differences. During the Sino-Vietnam Border War of 1979, for example, regular and enlarged meetings of the Polit-

buro, the Politburo Standing Committee, central work conferences, and a party plenum deliberated over and formally adopted key decisions regarding the use of force against Vietnam. In partial contrast with the Mao era, these organs (or at least the Politburo Standing Committee) probably served more as foci for genuine deliberation and decision making than as mechanisms to facilitate or legitimate the paramount leader's positions and strengthen his authority. Still, Deng's role in shaping (and hence dominating) the actions taken by the bureaucracy remained critical.[176]

Little information is available on the role played by lower-level organizations during crisis decisions in the Deng era, but it appears that their role was similar to what it was during the Maoist period. The CMC, for example, was critical in assessing the military situation. Deng was apparently more directly involved in these deliberations than Mao, who usually assigned Zhou Enlai to supervise such meetings on his behalf. Moreover, in 1979 Deng created a northern front under the command of Li Desheng to defend against a possible Soviet attack and a southern front under the command of Xu Shiyou to organize the attack on Vietnam. Beijing later created the Eastern Xinjiang Military Region to strengthen the defense against the Soviet Union.[177]

During the Jiang era (and probably during the Hu Jintao era as well), many of these same upper-level and lower-level organs were involved in the crisis decision-making process.[178] The chapter by Wu Baiyi suggests that the MFA was the most important ministry-level organization during the embassy bombing crisis of 1999. It provided critical advice to the senior party leadership and took the lead in implementing leaders' decisions while it shaped and coordinated the activities of other organizations.[179] At the same time, there is no question that the number and sophistication of the bureaucratic actors and specialist advisers involved in all aspects of Chinese policy making have grown significantly since at least the early 1990s.[180] According to well-informed Chinese observers, senior leaders are increasingly dependent upon subordinate functional bureaucracies (and in some cases outside experts) for the receipt of important information and analyses and the formulation of proposals during a political-military crisis or foreign policy incident. Thus, it is virtually certain that state and party organs and related policy-making procedures—as well as government-related scholars—have increasingly

influenced the crisis perceptions and actions of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and other members of the post-Deng senior leadership. The more complex and institutionalized nature of the decision-making process suggests that the senior leadership, particularly the paramount leader, is less able to dominate some aspects of decision making such as intelligence and policy implementation. Moreover, despite efforts to place operational control in the hands of the MFA, more diverse messages almost certainly emerge from the Chinese government during a crisis today. This reflects the involvement in various aspects of the decision making or implementation process of a larger number of more relatively autonomous actors and perhaps the lack of clear procedures for managing crises. This more complex and diverse process could slow reaction time and distort signaling.[181] Thus, overall, the Chinese system today is no doubt increasingly prone to the organizational influences on crisis behavior that are evident in more institutionalized political systems.[182]

The Chinese military deserves particular attention for its role in the crisis decision-making process. During the Maoist era, senior military leaders enjoyed considerable prestige and were well known by their colleagues within the civilian apparatus, many of whom were former military leaders themselves. Hence, individual military leaders could, and sometimes did, vigorously advocate their views. They even questioned Mao's viewpoint at times. If the decision in question involved military deployments, Mao would have to listen carefully to their views. Yet, the military did not in any sense check Mao's decision-making power. Moreover, even though military commanders had considerable freedom in implementing the orders given to units in the field, Mao usually issued such orders, was informed of the movement of all major units, and at times personally directed their movements. He also ensured the observance of strict ROE in political-military crises.[183]

Today, military leaders do not have such close personal ties to civilian leaders. The relationship between civilian and military heads is largely professional and is shaped by the functions of their respective institutions. Some personal links do form at senior levels as a result of the personnel promotion process and frequent contact during policy meetings. However, the high level of personal familiarity, close interaction between senior civilian and military leaders, and significant authority of senior military leaders within upper decision-making circles evident

during the Maoist era no longer exist. Senior civilian leaders today have little knowledge of military affairs and must carefully consider the views of military leaders during a crisis if relevant. In some instances, this means that civilian leaders must essentially depend upon the professional views and judgment of their military colleagues regarding technical military issues. However, as in the Maoist era, military leaders cannot veto or dictate decisions of civilian leaders.[184] Indeed, according to several Chinese participants at the 2004 Beijing conference, the party leadership continues to exercise total control over the military, especially during crises.

That said, as in other political systems, the information supplied to the senior Chinese leadership by military sources and the operational plans and procedures of the military can significantly shape the perceptions and options of senior civilian decision makers in a crisis. For example, some U.S. observers believe that military reports on the aircraft collision during the EP-3 incident were the sole source of information provided to the senior leadership and could not be independently confirmed by the leaders. Some of the U.S. participants at the 2004 Beijing conference related that, as the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis evolved, China's senior leadership apparently never reexamined an already approved operational plan for exercises and missile firings that had been drawn up by the military.[185]

Several Chinese participants at the 2004 Beijing conference stated that, since the embassy bombing incident, task forces or coordinating mechanisms have been established at both the decision-making and working levels to improve the handling of domestic and foreign crises. The senior leadership has established the National Security Leading Group to handle national security issues. However, the detailed functions and responsibilities of these groups and their relationships with one another and with the top leadership are unclear. In particular, the relationship of the National Security Leading Group to supreme decision-making bodies such as the Politburo Standing Committee cannot be determined.

The United States has been the focus of most of the general Western literature on the influence of the decision-making system upon crisis behavior. This literature indicates that the U.S. crisis decision-making apparatus has also evolved over time—although probably not as much

as in the Chinese case—as part of the broader evolution of the national security decision-making process. Relatively well-defined structures and procedures for national security decision making were first established in response to the outbreak of the Cold War and the emergence of the so-called national security state in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Organizationally, this system centered on the National Security Council (NSC), created in 1947 under President Harry S. Truman to address domestic, foreign, and military policies in the context of U.S. national security. The NSC originally comprised the president, the vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, and other officials from the executive and military branches who were included at the president's discretion, such as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The NSC also had a staff headed by an executive secretary, who was appointed by the president.[186] The function of the NSC and associated groups and their importance to the president in the overall national security policy process has differed somewhat in each administration.[187] The power of the NSC as a whole and the influence of the NSC adviser and the adviser's staff have also evolved over time.[188]

In general, the U.S. decision-making system during political-military crises has centered on the president (sometimes assisted by unofficial close personal advisers), the president's national security team (which includes many of those posts that originally constituted the NSC as well as the now powerful national security adviser, who is supported by the NSC staff), and several relevant implementing civilian and military bureaucracies. Although fairly formal in structure and function from the outset, this system became increasingly institutionalized over time in tandem with the evolution of the NSC structure according to the preferences and foibles of each president. Most bureaucratic participants eventually acquired very well-defined lines of authority and responsibility during the crisis decision-making process that were focused primarily upon the production of intelligence, information, and analysis and the provision of options and recommendations for the president. The military in particular has played a critical role in many U.S. political-military crises through its implementation of the senior leadership's decisions, provision of critical intelligence, or the direct involvement of its top officers in decisions.

Even in its early post–World War II years, the U.S. crisis decision-making system was probably relatively more formalized, predictable, and transparent than its Chinese counterpart. In the implementation phase, it was perhaps less subject than in the Chinese case to the direct control and intervention of the paramount leader, the president. Over time, the U.S. crisis decision-making system has most likely become more efficient and systematic than has the Chinese system, eventually adapting procedures established for the standard interagency process that governs day-to-day policy deliberations.[189] Although the U.S. crisis decision-making process undoubtedly remains prone to the potential problems or features mentioned at the beginning of this section, some U.S. participants at the 2004 Beijing conference stressed the increasing role that area specialists have played in the U.S. crisis decision-making process.[190] Even more than in the Chinese case, in the United States a wide variety of individual and bureaucratic actors can influence high-level decisions at various stages of the process.

Several of these factors influenced U.S. behavior during Sino-American crises. Allen Whiting's analysis of the Korean conflict indicates that divisions among senior officials who advised President Truman about military actions such as military retaliation against Chinese territory, the use of Nationalist Chinese troops, and the imposition of a naval blockade resulted in deferred decisions and calls for further study at critical points in the escalating conflict. These divisions distracted Truman from "the problem of managing MacArthur."[191] Similarly, Suettinger argues that the crisis decisions of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles during the 1954–1955 Taiwan Strait crisis "occasionally came as a result of focused efforts to resolve internal U.S. government bureaucratic problems, rather than as well thought-out efforts to resolve the foreign affairs issue."[192]

Suettinger also shows how differences between Eisenhower and the U.S. military influenced both Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s. Even though Eisenhower needed the support of the military to implement his policies during the crises, for example, he resisted giving them independent control over decisions to use tactical nuclear weapons, and he often disregarded their specific policy recommendations "either because they represented the fractured and parochial interests of the different services, or because he disagreed with their aggressive advocacy of the use

of American military power."[193] Overall, Suettinger criticizes the crisis management process used by Eisenhower during both crises despite the president's strong use of the recently strengthened NSC system.[194]

Whiting argues that President Lyndon B. Johnson relied far less on any formal, regularized procedures and structures to make critical crisis-related decisions during the Vietnam War. Johnson rarely convened the NSC as a body to address the escalation of war in Vietnam and the resultant possibility of Chinese ground force intervention. The most critical decisions involved an informal Tuesday Lunch Group of varied membership. As a result of Johnson's reliance on unofficial, informal procedures and groups, it is difficult to determine when and under whose advice Johnson made his key decisions.[195] This also makes it extremely difficult to assess how the decision-making process itself might have influenced behavior. Whiting does offer one example of such influence: apparent inattention to specific ROE for U.S. aircraft flying over or near North Vietnam in early 1965 arguably resulted in an unintended air clash with PLA fighters over Hainan Island. This could have precipitated unwanted escalation, and it led to a belated stress on aspects of the ROE that precluded hot pursuit over the territorial sea or airspace of the PRC.[196]

Suettinger's analysis of the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis suggests that crisis decision making under President Clinton had become more inclusive, institutionalized, and systematic.[197] Yet, as in the past, the entire process was under the control of the president, who made all major decisions.[198] At the same time, many participants at the 2004 Beijing conference stressed that time management and policy distractions posed problems during this crisis. According to one knowledgeable participant, every member of the senior national security apparatus, except for Secretary of Defense William Perry, was completely preoccupied with other policy issues at the time. It is unclear exactly how this problem affected specific decisions.

The same features of the Clinton decision-making process were evident during the subsequent embassy bombing and EP-3 incidents. These near crises arguably involved in important decisions an even wider range of individuals and agencies as part of the intergovernmental negotiating process. According to Campbell, decision making during the embassy

bombing incident was centered at the NSC. An interagency group comprising representatives from the White House, the State Department, and the Defense Department advised Clinton and other NSC members, but China experts played a very limited role in the decision-making process.[199] During this incident, bureaucratic actors produced significant complications for crisis management as did time constraints on senior decision makers. Campbell notes, for example, that the U.S. response was sluggish because of other preoccupations of senior U.S. decision makers and the reluctance of Defense Department officials to share information at high-level interagency meetings. Furthermore, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) guidelines limited the speedy release of information regarding the details of the incident. The Defense Department evinced a "distinct lack of enthusiasm" for the State Department's effort to convince the Chinese leaders that the bombing was accidental. The resulting problems of coordination and communication impeded the U.S. response and might have caused suspicious Chinese officials to attribute the debilitating tensions in Washington to more malicious factors.[200]

The EP-3 incident also involved a wide range of actors, including the U.S. embassy in Beijing, the Pacific Command, the Defense Department, the State Department, the White House, and intelligence agencies.[201] An interagency group headed by the State Department initially conducted negotiations for the release of the crew and airplane although the White House and the Defense Department remained involved. U.S. Ambassador Joseph Prueher and Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong met approximately twice daily for several days. They agreed on the framework for resolving the overall crisis and ultimately produced the letter to Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan that procured the U.S. crew's release.[202] After the release of the crew, the Defense Department headed the negotiations for the return of the aircraft.[203]

The fact that the State Department and the Defense Department each managed different stages of negotiations with China perhaps increased the complexity of the interactions with the Chinese. This may also explain the abrupt change toward a more hard-line negotiating approach after the release of the crew. Zhang Tuosheng suggests that the U.S. decision-making process was not as highly centralized as China's.[204]

Information and Intelligence Receipt and Processing

Effective crisis management requires the receipt of a wide range of accurate, timely intelligence and information.[205] These data often incorporate, when necessary, a variety of perspectives and interpretations. They can provide pre-crisis warnings and information relevant to the situation, offer a running narrative of the development of the crisis, and identify possible contingencies that may occur as a result of the crisis.[206] In addition, intelligence and information can also influence the basic images of the adversary and other assumptions that decision makers bring to a crisis and thus shape all aspects of perception and behavior.

Scholarly analysis of this critical element of crisis decision making suggests that leaders often do not receive high-quality information and intelligence. Stan A. Taylor and Theodore J. Ralston identify four sets of problems:

- Communication problems occur when decision makers do not receive information in a timely and unbiased manner. This may arise because information is overcompartmentalized and thus not shared with teams that brief senior policy makers. At other times, information overload prevents analysts and decision-makers from examining and conveying all key reports.
- Bureaucratic problems occur when research on a particular topic of great relevance is not given high priority and consequently not granted funding or when intelligence agencies must compete for the opportunity to share their findings with the proper decision makers. On other occasions, routine bureaucratic procedures can delay the reporting of information to policy makers in a time-sensitive situation.
- Psychological impediments can include biases in interpreting new information owing to existing beliefs or pressure to adhere to policy assumptions. The need to incorporate piecemeal intelligence under tight time constraints and the stress caused by a crisis can also create obstacles.
- Ideological and political obstacles occur when intelligence analysts change, exclude, or present without analysis their intelligence in order to satisfy the views of the policy makers who receive it or to

further the interests of those who report it. At other times, policy makers may signal that they are receptive to only certain kinds of information.[207]

In addition, adversaries can deliberately manipulate intelligence and information through information warfare.[208] Such activities can disrupt crisis management by distorting the signals sent by each side and disrupting the communication channels between military and policy officials. Information warfare may also reduce the search for alternative actions to a few, desperate measures and distort views of each other's intentions and capabilities. Adversaries presumably employ information warfare to gain advantages in a crisis, but it can provoke unwanted escalation. Information warfare is particularly dangerous if the adversaries possess nuclear weapons, as would be the case in a Sino-American crisis.[209]

Many of the problems associated with intelligence and information are no doubt evident in Chinese decision making. Very few solid examples exist, however, of how such data have influenced specific crisis decisions made by the Chinese leadership. This dearth of examples is largely because the Chinese government regards intelligence and its use in the decision-making process as highly sensitive and, consequently, does not allow scholars to conduct research or publish on these topics. Almost none of the chapters by Chinese scholars appearing in this volume refer to specific items of intelligence or other forms of information received by Chinese leaders during the crisis decision-making process. Nonetheless, this section offers some general observations and hypotheses based on research and interviews conducted over many years as well as the few observations contained in this volume.

The amount and quality of intelligence and information provided to senior leaders during a crisis seem to have improved significantly since the early decades of the PRC. The Chinese government today has access to satellite surveillance on a real-time or near-real-time basis. The government utilizes a state-of-the-art, fiber-optic communications system within the country. A growing number of Chinese government agencies and their affiliates are active overseas, and they provide a wide range of intelligence and analysis to the central leadership. Moreover, every day the senior leadership also receives both Chinese and foreign news re-

ports along with intelligence briefings. The Chinese system remains inferior to the U.S. system technically, however, and still exhibits some important deficiencies.

In China, as in other countries, unanticipated events can reduce information flows. According to Wu Baiyi, the Chinese government lacked critical information during the embassy bombing incident largely because the bombing had destroyed communications between Beijing and the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. As a result, intelligence agencies were not able to provide a comprehensive report by the time the senior leadership convened in Beijing to discuss the crisis. This forced the leaders to make decisions with inadequate information. Wu suggests that this situation prevented the rapid formulation of a clear-cut policy.[210]

Even in the absence of such unexpected disruptions, the lack of crisis-oriented structures and processes apparently hampers China's intelligence and information systems. Wu notes that China's government does not possess a structure equivalent to the NSC that could coordinate policy among the various diplomatic, defense, and security agencies during a crisis. As a result, China's processing of intelligence, coordination of simultaneous institutional negotiations, and creation of a consistent response during the embassy bombing incident were deficient.[211]

The stovepipe nature of the Chinese bureaucracy extends into the intelligence system and affects crisis decision making. In particular, the civilian and military intelligence systems are largely separate and self-contained. Although this is to varying degrees the case in other countries as well, many foreign observers believe that China's military intelligence apparatus is particularly insular and secretive, and this even affects the information flow to some senior civilian leaders, which can arguably limit or distort the information provided to such individuals during a crisis. Although some foreign experts believe such distortion occurred during the EP-3 incident, the Chinese participants at the 2004 Beijing conference completely rejected these assertions as well as this paragraph's general point regarding military intelligence. On the other hand, one direct U.S. participant in the negotiations with China, and at least one recent Chinese study, suggest that military control over the intelligence provided to the senior Chinese leadership played a significant—and probably adverse—role in the EP-3 incident.[212]

The United States has a well-developed bureaucratic process designed to bring a wide variety of intelligence and relevant information (such as news broadcasts) to the immediate attention of senior leaders during a crisis. Most of the theoretical literature on the problems associated with intelligence and information in relation to crisis decision making is based on the U.S. example. Moreover, past Sino-American political-military crises provide examples of several of these problems.

The lack of critical information during several Sino-American crises likely contributed to misperception and prompted decisions that greatly aggravated the unfolding situation. As the Whiting chapter suggests, during the Korean War, the absence of crucial intelligence on Chinese intentions and the size of Chinese forces deployed along and across the North Korean border in October–November 1950 contributed to the very high level of risk taking exhibited by General Douglas MacArthur and other U.S. leaders. In the absence of accurate intelligence, incorrect assumptions regarding Chinese views and actions prevailed. These inaccurate views led to a major military blunder.[213] According to Robert Suettinger, the United States lacked reliable knowledge of ROC and PRC intentions during the 1954–1955 Taiwan Strait crisis despite the existence of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs).[214] Unlike during the Korean War, however, neither the lack of such critical intelligence nor the presence of inaccurate intelligence resulted in large-scale military conflict. Although Dulles and Eisenhower made public statements about using tactical nuclear weapons to defend Taiwan, intelligence reports apparently convinced Eisenhower to stop publicly equating nuclear weapons with conventional weapons. In this way, the use of intelligence contributed to the cessation of nuclear threats.[215]

During the Vietnam War, senior leaders continued to make crisis decisions in the absence of critical intelligence regarding Chinese motives or, more notably, in the midst of considerable intelligence debates. Lacking an intelligence consensus on the likely reaction of China to different types of possible U.S. attacks on North Vietnam during the critical escalatory period of 1964–1965, senior decision makers leaned toward analyses that downgraded the likelihood of massive intervention. This situation increased the attractiveness of options for gradual escalation short of ground force operations into North Vietnam that

could test China's reaction. By the end of 1965, however, both intelligence estimates and the senior U.S. leadership had reached a consensus that U.S. intervention on the ground into North Vietnam would very likely produce a significant Chinese escalation. This assessment reinforced the prohibition against hot pursuit over Chinese territory and essentially precluded the option of attacking North Vietnam on the ground during the entire conflict.[216] Allen S. Whiting also suggests, however, that such cautionary intelligence estimates derived primarily from the experience of the Korean War, rather than any contemporary data. Whiting speculates, "Without the Korean precedent, the same factors that prompted miscalculation regarding Korea could very easily have led the United States to invade the North and resulted in a wider war."[217]

According to Suettinger, by the time of the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–1996, the provision of intelligence and other forms of relevant information to senior decision makers had become highly systematic, much more rapid, and far more thorough than in past crises. During the 1995–1996 crisis, the intelligence community "established a twenty-four-hour task force that monitored all-source information, prepared daily situation reports for select policy and intelligence officials, and brought information of special significance directly to the attention of senior policy makers."[218] Suettinger is quick to add that, although the presence of far more (presumably accurate) intelligence on a real-time basis and overall improvements in communication have improved the process of crisis management within the U.S. government, such developments do not guarantee that data will be used effectively. This is largely because senior U.S. officials never have enough time to comprehensively examine intelligence and other information.[219] Moreover, decision making remains a "very human, interactive process, dependent on interpersonal relationships among the president's principal foreign policy advisers."[220] Decision making is also subject to the ideological predispositions and personalities of the players. As a result, the small circle of decision makers involved in crisis decision making can distort the meaning of the intelligence and information they receive.

The bureaucracy can also limit or distort the kind of intelligence senior U.S. decision makers receive. According to the chapter by Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz, the Pentagon leadership during high-level crisis management meetings did not share much information about the embassy bombing incident. This lack of information impeded ef-

forts by an interagency working group to convince China that the bombing was accidental.[221] Most U.S. participants in this near crisis subsequently acknowledged feeling they were making hasty decisions with incomplete information. Campbell, who served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia and the Pacific, quotes a participant: "I do not recall many other times during my tenure in government feeling so frustrated by secrecy and bureaucratic incompetence as during the Chinese bombing incident. It was just a disaster."[222]

International Environment

The international environment within which crisis participants operate strongly influences their crisis behavior. Important factors include:

- **State of relations among relevant powers at the time of the crisis.** Obviously, the general level of hostility and suspicion (or calm) that exists between any major powers with interests at stake in the crisis—regardless of whether such powers are directly involved—influences the calculations of leaders. Contending great powers can attempt to manipulate or even threaten lesser powers involved in political-military crises, especially if such powers are friends or allies of their adversary.
- **General response of the larger international community to the crisis.** The level of opposition of the international community to a specific crisis or to the position taken by one or more of the participants in a crisis can also greatly affect decision makers' perceptions and actions. Leaders might become more hesitant to escalate a crisis or take certain risks that they might otherwise take if the bulk of the international community is opposed to the crisis and favors its speedy and peaceful resolution.
- **Presence of other international crises.** The simultaneous unfolding of several crises can obviously influence behavior in any one crisis, especially if the actors involved are the same or are related in some significant manner.[223]

Past Sino-American crises have provided many examples of the impact of the larger international environment. This impact was most often expressed in the assumptions and beliefs held by senior decision makers as they entered a crisis or attempted to manage it. As several of

the chapters in this volume indicate, during important periods in the crises over Chinese intervention in the Korean and Vietnam Wars and the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s, the larger environment of the Cold War clearly influenced crisis perceptions and behavior in Beijing and Washington. Particularly important factors included the antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States, the level of cooperation between the Soviet Union and China, and the relationship of each power with key allies.

Whiting indicates that, during the Korean War, U.S. leaders wanted to show their determination to oppose the perceived Soviet-inspired aggression, build credibility with U.S. allies in Europe and Asia, and strengthen the UN as a platform for peace. Moscow's outlook and behavior were critical to U.S. calculations of risk because both China and North Korea were allied communist states. Americans assumed that the Soviet Union controlled Chinese behavior.[224] Variations of these factors also played a role in crisis decision making by U.S. leaders during the subsequent Vietnam War despite the emergence by that time of the Sino-Soviet rift. Whiting shows that U.S. leaders considered likely Soviet reactions when they assessed the consequences of escalation at critical periods.[225] As the chapters on the embassy bombing incident by Wu Baiyi and Kurt Campbell indicate, the larger involvement of the United States and NATO in the Kosovo crisis influenced both Chinese and U.S. attitudes toward the incident.[226] Finally, participants in the 2004 Beijing conference remarked that the U.S. government was greatly distracted by the Balkan crisis during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. It is also likely that the Chinese leadership's desire to avoid provoking Asian concerns over an increasingly powerful and aggressive China played some role in Beijing's calculations during that crisis. While this argument is not confirmed by the relevant chapters in this volume, Suettinger does state that some Asian governments advised the U.S. leadership not to let the crisis devolve into an armed conflict.[227]

Idiosyncratic or Special Features

A final set of variables that influences crisis behavior does not fit into any of the above categories. These variables include a range of irregular or largely unpredictable phenomena, including leadership personality,

the impact of stress, weather conditions, the effect of third parties, and unanticipated technical issues.

In all political systems, leadership judgments regarding virtually all of the factors influencing crisis decision making are inevitably filtered through the personalities of the leaders involved. The type and level of influence exerted by leadership personality can traverse a wide gamut, depending on both the nature of the political system and the type of personality possessed by the paramount leader and the leader's senior associates. In particular, tight authoritarian systems can magnify the impact of personality features of supreme rulers to a greater degree than other kinds of political regimes. Personality type can vary widely, from the cool-headed, rational individual to the emotional, compulsive individual. At the extreme are psychotic or near-psychotic individuals who might exhibit paranoia, aggression, or major delusions in perception. Many researchers have studied the role of personality in foreign policy decision making (and thus presumably also in crisis decision making).[228] Additional research has examined the impact of personality on the establishment of decision-making paradigms.[229]

Political-military crises often generate intense psychological stress that can significantly distort perceptions and alter behavior in dangerous ways by causing the decision maker to make poor foreign policy decisions.[230] Researchers such as Robert Jervis argue that crisis decision makers can inadvertently analyze situations in ways that agree with their established beliefs.[231] Others, such as Irving Janis, find that crisis decision makers interpret events in ways that agree with how they wish to see them.[232] The range of poor crisis decision making that can result from stress thus varies widely, from oversimplification to the neglect of critical information.

The influence of third parties during a conflict or crisis can be significant. Unfortunately, most of this literature focuses on third-party intervention in international conflicts or crises by supposedly neutral outside major powers or international bodies, such as the United Nations, and is probably not very applicable to this analysis. Such intervention has rarely occurred in past Sino-American crises and is unlikely to occur in the future.[233]

Of greater relevance to Sino-American crises is the literature on multiactor crises. The literature on activities of smaller powers in rela-

tion to larger allied powers is particularly important. Much of this literature has focused on the involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union during the crises between their respective Middle East allies, Israel and Egypt. During these crises, the two superpowers "experienced a tension between the desire—at times, the necessity—to lend meaningful support to its regional ally and a determination not to allow itself to be drawn into a dangerous, war-threatening confrontation."[234]

The challenges of Middle East crises are not unlike those that might confront the United States in a crisis with China over Taiwan. Phil Williams analyzes the problems that superpowers confront in dealing with smaller allied powers. In particular, he analyzes the danger of a superpower being drawn into a conflict with other superpowers. Williams observes, "States closely allied to the superpowers and conscious primarily of their own needs, interests and objectives could demand a level of support that the superpowers find intolerable." States might also present dangers to the superpower if their leaders are "devious as well as headstrong, and attempt to embroil the superpowers in their conflicts to an unwarranted extent." As a result of such concerns, superpowers must avoid giving "blank cheques" to their allies and "scrupulously try to prevent any moves by the latter entangling them in a position from which it is impossible to extricate themselves."[235] This observation could potentially apply to U.S.-Taiwan relations in a future crisis with China over the island.[236]

Finally, technical issues, such as the failure of weapons or other machines at critical times, and other idiosyncratic factors, such as weather conditions, are poorly defined and relatively unpredictable. Hence, they have not been studied in any systematic manner and can only be cited as factors for crisis decision makers to keep in mind.

One of the most important factors influencing the management of certain Sino-American crises has been the personality of senior leaders. Many studies have found that the outlooks and dominant personalities of individuals such as Mao Zedong and Douglas MacArthur significantly influenced crises such as the Korean War, the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s, and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict.[237] Whiting's analysis suggests that MacArthur's aggressive and self-confident personality created potential instabilities during the crisis over Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Suettinger states that Truman and

Eisenhower, in contrast, were both pragmatic and cautious individuals.[238] These personality traits arguably inclined both men to resist or reject outright the provocative recommendations presented to them by MacArthur (in the case of Truman) and the JCS (in the case of Eisenhower). Although Suettinger also discusses some of the general personality traits of Clinton and his senior foreign policy officials, he does not identify whether and how these traits influenced their decisions during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.[239]

The relative lack of emphasis in this volume's case studies on the impact of leadership personalities on crisis decision making probably reflects the absence of reliable data connecting specific personality traits to crisis perceptions or decisions, and, in the Chinese case, the fact that such analysis is still very sensitive, even for crises of the 1950s–1960s.

The role of stress is underexamined in the general literature on Sino-American crisis decision making and in the case studies contained in this volume. This area deserves further study, given its extensive treatment in the theoretical literature.

In contrast, many scholarly works and several of the chapters in this volume examine, either directly or in passing, the role of third parties in Sino-American crisis decision making. These studies have focused their attention primarily on Taiwan's influence during crises over the island. Taiwan has obviously served as a catalyst of political-military confrontations between China and the United States. During the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s and the 1990s, however, Taiwan played a far more active and direct role in decision making in two major ways.

First, through a very effective lobbying effort in Washington, Taiwan arguably raised the political stakes confronting senior U.S. leaders. Taiwan's lobbyists greatly reinforced, and perhaps created, an image in the minds of many U.S. politicians and a significant portion of the U.S. public of the island as a bulwark of resistance to communism that required determined U.S. backing.[240] In the context of the escalating Cold War of the 1950s, such an image may have increased pressure on Eisenhower and his associates to take a tough stance in the 1954–1955 and 1958 crises. This image was strengthened even further after Taiwan began to democratize in the late 1980s and Beijing reconfirmed its anti-democratic, repressive features during the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident.

Second, during all three Taiwan Strait crises, potential or actual moves and statements by Taipei raised the stakes involved. At times, Taipei's positions threatened to escalate the confrontation beyond levels acceptable to Washington (and perhaps Beijing). As Suettinger's chapter suggests, before and during the 1950s crises, the growing presence and possible employment by Taipei of Nationalist forces on or near the offshore islands arguably compelled Washington to deepen its commitment to defending the islands. At the same time, this had the potential to provoke a dangerous Chinese reaction. Thus, during these crises, Eisenhower had to deter China from launching a major attack on the islands and restrain Chiang Kai-shek from dragging the United States into a deeper confrontation.[241] During the 1995–1996 crisis, Lee Teng-hui directly precipitated, and then arguably escalated, the confrontation. Lee pressed the Clinton administration for permission to visit the United States by eliciting congressional support for such a visit. After arriving in the United States, Lee made provocative public statements.[242] As in the 1950s, Taiwan's behavior increased the risks involved in Washington's ongoing effort to deter Beijing while restraining Taipei.[243]

Another example of third-party involvement is the role of North and South Korea in the crises over Chinese involvement in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. North Korea's military assault on the South precipitated the Korean War. Pyongyang's subsequent successes and failures on the battlefield influenced U.S. and Chinese crisis calculations before, during, and (to a lesser extent) following China's massive intervention in the conflict. Beyond such military factors, Kim Il-sung's urgings in favor of Chinese intervention and the Chinese leadership's commitment to North Korea as a socialist ally undoubtedly reinforced Mao's resolve to intervene in the conflict. Such influence was largely contextual, however, and did not play a decisive or direct role in the crisis interactions between Beijing and Washington.[244] The same can generally be said regarding South Korea.[245] This assessment is reinforced by the fact that the chapters by Allen Whiting and Zhang Baijia in this volume do not present North and South Korea as important actors in Chinese and U.S. crisis decision making.

The UN and U.S. allies such as the United Kingdom did exert influence over specific U.S. decisions of relevance to Chinese intervention and escalation. Opposition by the United Kingdom and other powers

to hot-pursuit air actions over Chinese territory by UN forces at critical junctures resulted in the prohibition of such engagement despite the fact that General MacArthur, President Truman, and Truman's senior advisers all favored them. More broadly, as Whiting states, "U.S. allies and UN members worked assiduously in Washington and New York to restrain what was seen as highly risky behavior by MacArthur and his hawkish supporters in Congress."[246]

North and South Vietnam also played an indirect, contextual role in the decision making between Beijing and Washington regarding the possibility of Chinese intervention during the Vietnam War. Hanoi's successful conduct of the war and Saigon's military failures obviously exerted a significant influence on U.S. decisions to intervene in and escalate the conflict, thereby presenting the danger of Chinese intervention. However, neither North nor South Vietnam determined or decisively influenced specific actions taken by Beijing or Washington regarding Chinese intervention.[247]

CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS

The following chapters provide detailed case studies on past Sino-American crises and broader conceptual observations relevant to Sino-American crisis management. This information, along with the general observations presented in this chapter, provides the basis for the conclusions discussed at the end of this volume.