

Measuring Progress in the 13 Steps

GUIDE TO GRADING

- ⊘ Actions/words negate 13 Steps process
- ▼ Actions/words unhelpful to 13 Steps process
- N.A. not applicable
- ▲ helpful, but not fully compliant
- Meets that particular step milestone
- ? Wide variety of opinions on progress

STEP	U.S.	RUSSIA	CHINA	FRANCE	UK
1. CTBT : Early entry into force of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, without delay and without conditions. ¹	▲ ^e	●	▲	●	●
2. Testing : A moratorium on nuclear testing pending entry into force of a CTBT. ²	●	●	●	●	●
3. FMCT : Necessity of negotiations in the CD of a nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. ³	⊘ ^f	●	▼	●	●
4. CD role on disarmament : Necessity of creating an appropriate subsidiary body in the CD with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. ⁴	▼	▼	▼	▼	●
5. Irreversibility The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear, and other related arms control and reduction measures. ⁵	▼	⊘	?	▲	?
6. Unequivocal undertaking : An unequivocal undertaking by NWS to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI. ⁶	⊘ ^g	⊘	⊘	⊘	⊘
7. START II, III, ABM The early EIF and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions. ⁷	⊘	⊘	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

COMMENTS

e. The Obama administration has said it will immediately and aggressively pursue CTBT ratification, under an effort led by Vice President Joseph Biden. It will also pursue diplomatic efforts with other states whose ratification is necessary for the treaty to enter into force.

f. The Obama administration has said it will pursue an effectively verifiable FMCT, which is a shift from the Bush administration position on verification.

g. In a speech on April 5, 2009 in Prague, President Obama said, "I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons."

1. The UK, France, and Russia have all ratified the CTBT; the United States and China have signed but not ratified. However, CTBT entry into force requires more than just the ratification by the United States and China because it requires 44 states in Annex 2, including India, Iran, and North Korea, among others.

2. Although India and Pakistan are not party to the NPT, India has committed to a testing moratorium. Their adherence to this, as well as adherence by Israel and North Korea, is critical.

3. The United States proposed a draft FMCT treaty in 2004 that did not contain verification measures, a setback from its adoption of the 1995 Shannon mandate that called for effective verification. China and Russia insisted for many years on linkage between outer space, disarmament and FMCT; China still insists on linkage with outer space negotiations. To get negotiations going, India, Pakistan, and Israel will also have to agree to a negotiating mandate.

4. As described above, China has insisted on linkage among disarmament, FMCT and PAROS; Russia, France and the United States have traditionally opposed a subsidiary body but now appear open to an informal group with would discuss, not negotiate. It is not clear what "deal with disarmament" means.

5. The Moscow Treaty is a seen by many as setback for irreversibility in strategic arms control; France's actions to dismantle its fissile material production facilities are positive. Unclear how to measure UK and China. China is modernizing its nuclear forces and the UK will replace existing Trident submarines.

6. It is difficult to measure an "unequivocal undertaking," but no state has completely matched actions with statements supporting a world free of nuclear weapons.

7. The U.S. abrogation of the ABM treaty in 2002 effectively nullified START II. While the Moscow Treaty (or SORT) drew down operationally deployed weapons to between 1700 and 2200 by 2012, it contained no verification provisions and is reversible. The United States and Russia intend to negotiate a follow-on agreement to START I, which expires at the end of 2009.

Measuring Progress in the 13 Steps (continued)

STEP	U.S.	RUSSIA	CHINA	FRANCE	UK
8. Trilateral Initiative The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, Russia, and the IAEA. ⁸	▲	▲	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
9. Steps by all nuclear weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament					
a. Further unilateral reductions. ⁹	●	⊘	⊘	●	●
b. Increased transparency. ¹⁰	●	⊘	⊘	●	●
c. Further reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons. ¹¹	▲	▲	⊘	N.A.	N.A.
d. Concrete agreed measures to reduce operational status of nuclear weapons. ¹²	▼ ^h	⊘	▲	⊘	▼
e. Diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies. ¹³		⊘	⊘	⊘	⊘
f. Engagement by all NWS in process, as soon as appropriate. ¹⁴	N.A.	N.A.	⊘	⊘	⊘
10. Excess fissile material under verification. ¹⁵	●	●/▼	⊘	⊘	●
11. Reaffirmation that ultimate objective in nuclear disarmament is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. ¹⁶	●	●	●	●	●
12. Regular reports, within the framework of strengthened review of the NPT and recalling the 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ. ¹⁷	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲
13. Verification development for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world. ¹⁸	●	●	▼	⊘	●

COMMENTS

h. Although Obama campaign literature stated he would reduce the hair-trigger alert status of nuclear weapons, not much has been said on this topic since he took office.

8. The Trilateral Initiative ran from 1996 to 2002. Although definite progress in verification was made, this does not constitute completion or implementation.

9. The United States, UK, and France have all announced unilateral reductions, although through 2008, U.S. reductions seem to be in deployed weapons, rather than stockpiles.

10. China and Russia have not provided greater information about nuclear weapons.

11. Although the United States and Russia have drawn down nsnw, it is not clear that there have been further reductions since 2000. The US and NATO have lowered some alert levels, but alert levels of U.S. ICBMs are still a problem.

12. China argues that its readiness and no-first-use policy constitute lower operational status, but this is not an agreed measure.

13. The United States argues that the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review demonstrated a diminished role for nw in its security policy but this is not entirely clear.

14. It is not clear when it will be "appropriate" to engage all other nws, but the outlook seems more positive now than before.

15. The United States declared 174 tons of HEU and 52 tons of plutonium, a small portion of which has been declared eligible for IAEA safeguards inspections. Russia declared "up to" 500 tons of HEU and "up to" 50 tons of plutonium that "becomes available through the disarmament process," which is not safeguarded. The UK declared 4.4 tons of plutonium excess, which is safeguarded by EURATOM.

16. All NWS rhetorically support nuclear disarmament within context of appropriate security conditions, although it is likely that few officials believe general and complete disarmament is possible or even desirable. The question of effective international control is rarely broached.

17. All have provided regular reports during the preparatory committee meetings since 2000, although the content of those reports is not standard. The 1996 ICJ opinion has been disputed by at the least the United States.

18. U.S. and Russian efforts under the Trilateral Initiative have helped here, as well as UK plans to hold verification workshops related to a nwf world; Chinese activities on CTBT could also fall in this category.