



# Taiwan Contingencies



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## Sino-American Crisis Management and the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Challenges and Implications

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### *Introduction*

**O**ver the past half century, the United States and China have experienced a number of crises or near-crisis, including the Korean War; the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954, 1958, and 1995–96; the 1999 Chinese embassy bombing incident; and the 2001 EP-3 incident. These incidents, and the processes leading to their eventual resolution, reveal the propensity for serious confrontation between the United States and China and the shortcomings of each country's crisis management approach. As Chinese power and influence grow, mutual sensitivities and suspicions between Washington and Beijing are likely to accumulate. This may increase the likelihood of severe political-military crises and perhaps even conflict.

Such events could have an enormous impact on the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japanese security, and Japan's position in Asia. Japan has great economic and political significance for the United States, China, and the Asia-Pacific region. Hence, Japan could greatly influence the emergence, development, and outcome of a future Sino-American political-military crisis. A Sino-American crisis would undoubtedly pose major consequences for Tokyo, given the vital importance of both the U.S. and China to Japan's prosperity and security. It could further develop conditions for a new Cold War in Asia and fundamentally reorder the security and economic environments in the region.

Given this potentially dangerous situation, we must deepen our understanding of the ability of China and the United States to manage a future political-military crisis and assess the implications for Japan and the U.S.-Japan

alliance. This paper first defines “political-military crisis” and “crisis management.” It then identifies several key principles of successful crisis management, assesses the degree to which Washington and Beijing are willing or able to implement these principles, and examines the difficulties involved in applying such principles to a Sino-U.S. crisis over Taiwan in particular. The paper concludes with some observations on the implications of this analysis for the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japanese crisis behavior and offers some recommendations.



### **What is a Political-Military Crisis?<sup>2</sup>**

In most Western analyses, a political-military crisis is defined by three factors:

- It involves the key or core interests of the actors involved.
- There is a time element or sense of urgency.
- There is a possibility of greatly advancing and/or threatening the interests of both sides, including the threat of military conflict, and in the case of major powers, a potential threat to the structure of the international system.<sup>3</sup>

An international crisis begins with a disruptive action or event, which activates the above conditions for one or more states. Such a precipitating factor could occur accidentally or deliberately, unexpectedly or unsurprisingly. It might also be caused by the actions of a third party or parties, such as another nation-state. In a full-blown political-military crisis, all three factors exist. In a “near-crisis,” there is no realistic probability of military conflict. Nonetheless, even near-crises can significantly damage the political, diplomatic, and economic relationships of the states concerned, and in some cases, increase the probability of a future full-blown crisis.



### **“Rules of Prudence” for Crisis Management**

In operational terms, every policy-maker in a political-military crisis faces a two-sided dilemma: the need to signal resolve in advancing or protecting one’s interests without provoking unwanted escalation, versus the need to signal accommodation without conveying weakness and thus inviting undesired escalation.

Decision-makers usually apply specific crisis management “bargaining” strategies, both offensive and defensive, to deal with this policy challenge.<sup>4</sup> Such strategies are usually combined or used in sequence. Successful crisis

management occurs when the parties involved are able to defuse one or more elements of the crisis — particularly the possibility of military conflict — while also protecting or advancing their core interests.<sup>5</sup>

Scholars of political-military crises identify a range of so-called “rules of prudence” for crisis management that can increase the likelihood of a successful outcome.<sup>6</sup> Iain Johnston has reduced these requirements to eight basic principles:<sup>7</sup>

- Maintain direct channels of communication and send signals that are clear, specific, and detailed
- Preserve limited objectives and limited means on behalf of such objectives; sacrifice unlimited goals
- Preserve military flexibility, escalate slowly, and respond symmetrically (in a “tit-for-tat” manner)
- Avoid “ideological” or “principled” lock-in positions that encourage “zero-sum” approaches to a crisis and limit options or bargaining room; do not confuse moral or principled positions with conflicts of interest
- Exercise self-restraint, and do not respond to all provocative moves
- Avoid extreme pressure, ultimatums, or threats to the adversary’s core values, and preserve the adversary’s option to back down
- Divide large, integrated, hard-to-resolve disputes into smaller, more manageable issues, thereby building trust and facilitating trade-offs
- Think ahead about the unintended consequences of one’s actions



### **The Historical Record: Are Washington and Beijing Good “Crisis Managers”?**

From the perspective of these eight rules, what does the historical record tell us about the ability of the United States and China to manage a political-military crisis, especially with each other?

**Communication:** The absence of direct communication between Beijing and Washington, combined with distorted and hostile images regarding the motives and outlook of the other side, exacerbated the Sino-American crises or near-crises of the 1950s and 1960s.<sup>8</sup> By the 1990s the establishment of diplomatic relations and the creation of a hotline between the political leaders of both countries had created more direct communication. The two countries had also learned certain lessons regarding the meaning of various signals from experiences like the Korean War.

Still, many problems continue to exist that could greatly complicate signaling and undermine future crisis management.<sup>9</sup> For example, although the intensely hostile climate of the Cold War has dissipated, both sides continue to distrust one another. Each tends to view the other as potentially hostile and to view itself as intrinsically peace-loving.<sup>10</sup> This disparity distorts communication and undermines the credibility of any signals. A negative state of bilateral relations prior to a crisis can adversely affect the way in which signals are intended and interpreted, as in the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis and the 1999 embassy bombing incident.<sup>11</sup> Finally, mutual suspicion reinforces a tendency to rely more on memorized talking points during crisis negotiations than on frank, spontaneous exchanges.<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, no obvious, direct channels of communication exist between responsible civilian and military leaders below the level of the president. In past crises, key high-level officials responsible for establishing and advancing contact with the other side could not open communication with their counterparts or in some cases even identify them. In some instances, crisis decision-makers were unsure whether the other side's top leaders were receiving their signals.<sup>13</sup> Senior leaders are generally hesitant to establish direct, inter-governmental links between subordinate civilian and (especially) military operatives in a crisis, due to concerns over command and control issues and the emergence of inconsistent signals. Such hesitation seems particularly strong, however, in the Chinese case. This is perhaps due in part to the absence of sufficient communication channels across major governmental agencies in China, particularly between the military and the civilian apparatus.

There is apparently some hesitation, especially by the Chinese, to utilize the existing high-level leadership hotline during a crisis. In recent crises, the Chinese did not answer repeated phone calls from the White House. This hesitation might stem in part from the need for the senior Chinese leadership to reach a consensus before responding authoritatively and directly to the United States. It might also reflect a concern that hotline messages from either side will be misunderstood, given the absence of clear working procedures for the use of the hotline and the overall lack of adequate crisis management mechanisms between Beijing and Washington.<sup>14</sup>

Both sides share considerable uncertainty about the specific meaning and intent of the signals they receive. This reflects an inadequate understanding of each other's decision-making apparatus and the role of domestic considerations in a crisis, and disagreement on the meaning of specific terms used by both sides.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, a greater number of individuals and organizations are now involved in crises, especially in China, thus increasing the possibility of inconsistent signals.<sup>16</sup> The media are more diverse and politicized in both countries and potentially open to access or manipulation by a range of governmental and non-governmental participants.

For China, in particular, an increasingly complex and fragmented decision-making process and a stove-piped intelligence structure have apparently slowed reaction time and distorted both the assessment of information and clear signaling in a crisis.<sup>17</sup> Public opinion and leadership politics have also significantly influenced the content of signals, especially in recent years. Difficulties in identifying and deciphering signals from the other side have at times resulted in a dangerous reliance on preexisting assumptions or so-called "mirror imaging."<sup>18</sup>

Of course, it is impossible to entirely eliminate communication and signaling problems. Moreover, decision-makers sometimes deliberately use ambiguity and inconsistency in signaling as part of crisis bargaining.<sup>19</sup>

**Limited goals and means:** In past crises, both the United States and China have frequently utilized limited means to attain limited objectives. This potentially slows escalation and reduces the chance of inadvertent conflict. The Chinese concept of "*youli youli youjie*" stresses the need to maintain realistic objectives and to avoid overreaching in a crisis.<sup>20</sup> The three Taiwan Strait crises, the embassy bombing incident, and the EP-3 incident all involved attempts by Beijing to achieve limited objectives through carefully delineated military and non-military means. These objectives were usually political and sometimes domestic.

Likewise, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. President John F. Kennedy deliberately leveled very limited demands and deployed limited means to convey his resolve at virtually every step.<sup>21</sup> During the more recent EP-3 incident, Washington sought to regain its aircrew and aircraft through negotiations, without provoking a full-blown hostage crisis and without issuing an apology for mistakes it did not commit.<sup>22</sup> In both instances, Washington pursued pragmatic, limited objectives, designed to defuse the situation without compromising the U.S.'s vital interests.

On the other hand, both China and the United States hold vital national interests and images that make it extremely difficult to maintain limited objectives and means in certain types of crises. For Beijing, concepts such as territorial integrity and national sovereignty are treated as cardinal principles that are closely associated with regime legitimacy and leadership survival.<sup>23</sup> Hence, crises that are closely related to such concepts — and are clearly recognized as such by the Chinese people — can involve extremely high stakes for the Chinese leadership.

Arguably, no issue presents such high stakes for the United States, other than a direct military threat to American citizens and territory. Perhaps the closest functional equivalent is the credibility of Washington's word as a global and regional superpower, particularly as it affects the attitude of close allies.<sup>24</sup> During the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s Washington threatened the use of tactical nuclear weapons to deter Beijing from seizing the offshore islands

and also presumably to reinforce American credibility.<sup>25</sup> It is highly unlikely, however, that Dwight D. Eisenhower was prepared to actually use such means to resolve those crises.

**Incremental, symmetrical escalation:** China and the United States display a mixed record of compliance with this principle of crisis management. On the conceptual level, “*youli youli youjie*” stresses incremental escalation and symmetrical responses to an adversary’s behavior. Accordingly, China has utilized “tit-for-tat” moves, punctuated by pauses and diplomatic signaling.<sup>26</sup> Yet, China has also utilized sudden, rapid, asymmetrical escalations that are sometimes designed to establish a virtual “*fait accompli*.”<sup>27</sup> The Chinese most often employed such asymmetrical escalations to counter situations their leadership perceived as major threats to their survival (such as the Korean War), to defend core principles like territorial integrity, or to avoid a much larger conflict. The purpose of asymmetrical escalations was often to shock the opponent into reversing its behavior. Moreover, Chinese leaders apparently believed that such shocks would not escalate to war if certain elements of the *youli youli youjie* concept were observed.<sup>28</sup>

Chinese observers insist that rapid, asymmetrical crisis escalation was more typical of the Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping eras, reflecting their more “militant” style, less risk-averse behavior, and total dominance over the decision-making process.<sup>29</sup> They argue that today’s Chinese leadership is extremely cautious and consensus-oriented. Hence, it is unlikely to undertake provocative escalation or employ high levels of force unless core national interests are at stake, other non-coercive approaches are exhausted, and China faces extreme provocation.<sup>30</sup> In contrast, some Western scholars argue that Chinese leaders throughout history have favored offensive approaches to crises and value displaying resolve and seizing initiative.<sup>31</sup> Other observers argue that present-day Chinese leaders are just as likely to engage in provocative crisis behavior as Mao and Deng because they are more susceptible to growing popular nationalistic pressure and less able to recover from charges that they failed to exhibit sufficient resolve in a crisis, particularly if the adversary is viewed as a superior “bullying” power.<sup>32</sup> On balance, however, many studies indicate that while the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao regimes have sometimes engaged in provocative rhetoric during crises, they have also generally avoided sudden, escalatory actions. Their regimes have usually sought to delimit and “soften” their actions. Whether this approach will hold true in future crises is unclear.

The United States has escalated responses both incrementally and rapidly during various crises. Like the Chinese, U.S. leaders seem to recognize the importance of the use of tit-for-tat escalation. In practice, the United States has at times displayed the most caution and flexibility in crises involving well-armed adversaries, such as China and the former Soviet Union. But even

against such powers, U.S. policy at the height of the Cold War emphasized threats of massive, possibly nuclear, retaliation and deliberately attempted to deter potential aggression by cultivating uncertainty in the mind of its opponents.<sup>33</sup> U.S. policy during the Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations utilized a more symmetrical approach that stressed a more flexible response, clearer signaling, and incremental escalation. However, a strong emphasis remained on the need to communicate strong resolve against “crisis-mongering” by communist or totalitarian powers, often through the use of superior military force. This sometimes translated into dramatic escalations and serious threats, especially against weaker states. U.S. leaders apparently believed that small steps can be seen as timid and invite counters and that conflict often results from the failure to demonstrate clear resolve early on.<sup>34</sup> For U.S. decision-makers, the obvious dangers of such behavior could be mitigated by the use of accurate intelligence and clear communication, close control over military forces through strict rules of engagement, and the overwhelming deterrence effect of superior conventional and nuclear U.S. military power.

U.S. and Chinese leaders share some troubling similarities regarding escalation. Both place a very strong emphasis on the need to show resolve in certain types of crises and are willing to do so via sudden or dramatic (sometimes military) escalations. While this is arguably more the case for today’s American leaders than for China’s post-revolutionary leaders, the inclination on the Chinese side is reinforced by other Chinese attitudes toward crises relevant to the next two principles.

This common emphasis on displaying resolve through decisive action is particularly dangerous in a serious Sino-U.S. crisis, because it creates the belief, on both sides, that effective deterrence might require very strong threats or applications of force. The danger is compounded by offensive military doctrines at the operational, campaign, and tactical levels. Military forces might become more assertive in a crisis than civilian leaders prefer, thereby undermining coordination between diplomatic and military moves. Such an outcome is even more likely if there is poor coordination between civilian and military leaders in the overall decision-making process. Some Western observers believe the Chinese government suffers from this problem.<sup>35</sup>

**Avoidance of zero-sum positions:** Both countries have invoked supposedly immutable principles or strong ideological perspectives during crises in ways that made compromise extremely difficult. China has sometimes associated the issues at stake with core beliefs regarding state sovereignty and inter-state relations. China has also drawn on its beliefs regarding “just” or moral behavior, such as the principle that smaller or weaker nations have a right to be free from the “bullying” of larger, stronger powers. This suggests China has approached certain crises in zero-sum terms, involving the

uncompromising defense of moral principles against unjust acts.<sup>36</sup> Indeed, in various ways, China has very publicly utilized such terminology in almost every political-military crisis in which it has been involved over the past five decades, thus potentially creating a commitment trap that can constrain bargaining choices.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, the pressures of such a commitment trap have arguably increased in recent years as a result of leadership change and the emergence of a more vocal, nationalistic public.

Several studies suggest that the United States has also viewed many crises in highly ideological or principled terms. During the height of the Cold War, the United States viewed crises as involving an uncompromising struggle against global communism in defense of the free world. Such views, sometimes reinforced by intense domestic political pressure from conservative anti-communists, arguably contributed to risky behavior, such as nuclear threats, and reduced the inclination to compromise.<sup>38</sup> Similar rhetoric and viewpoints arguably exist in present-day U.S. thinking, although now the uncompromising struggle in defense of freedom is waged against terrorists and “rogue states.” Such views may be at least partly responsible for “high risk” U.S. behavior during the recent crisis with Iraq over weapons of mass destruction, resulting in a protracted conflict toward highly uncertain ends.

Yet, absolutist rhetoric and internal social pressure have not always resulted in limited choices and uncompromising actions. Both countries have sometimes displayed very pragmatic behavior. During the Mao and Deng eras, the power and prestige of the paramount ruler was generally sufficient to permit him to compromise on principle when necessary without admitting he was doing so, as when Mao deescalated the Sino-Soviet confrontation of the early 1970s under intense Soviet pressure.<sup>39</sup> While post-Deng leaders arguably operate under greater pressure and constraints, the enduring concept of *youli*, *youli*, *youjie*, combined with the option of a “face-saving” retreat, has provided sufficient justification for elites and the larger public to support compromises that did not appear to violate core principles during recent crises. Moreover, many Chinese observers argue that post-Deng leaders have reduced further the influence of abstract moral principles by placing an increasing emphasis on international law and mechanisms.<sup>40</sup> In the United States, moral principles like anti-communism rarely prevented eventual compromise during a serious Sino-American crisis, although they sometimes produced tough rhetoric and actions. Nonetheless, absolutist principles — such as the defense of freedom and sovereignty — could still exert significant influence during certain Sino-American crises.

**The use of self-restraint:** Several factors weaken self-restraint. Both countries are inclined to display strong resolve and seem highly confident about their ability to control escalation.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, the two countries’ leaders

face the temptation of the commitment trap, particularly on an issue that generates significant public pressure and involves questions of principles or vital interests. To some extent, an excessive adherence to strategies like the “tit-for-tat” approach can undermine self-restraint by causing decision-makers to imprudently respond to every escalation by the adversary.

Leaders in both countries have, however, exercised significant levels of self-restraint *at crucial moments* in past crises. This was arguably the case during all three Taiwan Strait crises, the embassy bombing incident, and the EP-3 incident, despite often highly heated rhetoric and sometimes aggressive behavior. But much depends on the leadership’s general image of the adversary, approach to crisis bargaining, and sense of the stakes involved in each particular crisis. During the height of the Cold War, Chinese and American leaders held very antagonistic, hard-line views toward one another. In the United States, however, opposing views were nonetheless expressed and even accepted, particularly after the searing experience of the Korean War. Still, there is little doubt that a major overall downturn in Sino-American relations could make U.S. leaders more receptive to hard-line views within society and the elite in a future crisis.

During the Mao and Deng eras, it was likely more difficult for opposing views favoring more cautious approaches to gain a complete hearing during crises. In some instances, as with the Chinese reaction to Vietnam’s seizure of Cambodia, the Chinese leadership believed it was facing a closing window of opportunity, which further undermined self-restraint. Within Chinese leadership circles, it is usually safer domestically to present a tough stance toward foreign adversaries, especially if principles are involved. However, the post-Deng leadership is arguably more open to diverse viewpoints, given the more diffuse distribution of power at the top of the system and the greater openness of Chinese society in general.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, although all Chinese leaders are intensely suspicious of the United States and undoubtedly feel the need to display enormous resolve when the stakes are high, their behavior during recent crises and their overall approach to relations with Washington suggest that the decision-making process is not dominated by aggressive, risk-taking hard-liners. Yet, issues like Taiwan could certainly increase the attractiveness of hard-line arguments.

**Avoiding ultimatums:** The Chinese intervention during the Korean War violated this very obvious principle of crisis management. U.S. leaders applied extreme pressure to the Chinese leadership and threatened their core values, without being entirely aware that they were doing so.<sup>43</sup> Since then, Chinese and U.S. leaders have generally avoided the use of ultimatums and extreme pressure during crises, with the major exception of Eisenhower’s threats to use nuclear weapons during the two Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s.<sup>44</sup> Yet, these threats were conveyed in a somewhat ambiguous manner, intended to deter (not

compel) and not linked to any specific ultimatum. More broadly, both countries have generally upheld the notion of preserving a “way out” for an adversary, in theory and practice.<sup>45</sup>

This principle is more likely to be violated in crises that involve the core interests of one or both sides, occur in the context of worsening bilateral relations, and seem to present a closing window of opportunity. Given the great emphasis both countries place on the need to show resolve, often through military means, and the possibility that the United States believes it would enjoy escalation dominance in a serious crisis with China, future Sino-American crises may not be immune to the application of extreme pressure and ultimatums.<sup>46</sup> The use of offensive doctrines that could generate extreme pressure by the two countries’ militaries and the possibility that the decision-making process might not always ensure effective control over efforts to exert pressure increase the possibility that the two sides will violate this principle. Problems with communication and signaling might result in unintended pressure.

*Dividing disputes into manageable issues:* Chinese and American leaders did not deliberately adhere to this principle during many past crises, particularly during the Cold War era. The lack of direct communication and the presence of hostile, ideological viewpoints on both sides made it extremely difficult to build trust and facilitate crisis bargaining by intentionally breaking disputes into more manageable issues. After the establishment of diplomatic relations and the end of the Cold War, each side arguably became more open to such behavior. The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, the embassy bombing incident, and the EP-3 incident involved some elements of a more direct, problem-solving crisis negotiation that focused on resolving smaller issues. This was made possible by the nature of these crises, which were essentially diplomatic disputes over very specific incidents that required intensive discussions and a face-saving resolution. But such an approach was also possible because these post-Cold War crises did not involve integrated, hard-to-resolve disputes as did the Korean and Vietnam wars and the earlier Taiwan Strait crises.

Despite the changes brought by the end of the Cold War and the leadership transition, however, many of the basic images held by both sides today suggest that their leaders might find it difficult to adhere to this principle in a future crisis. A major crisis over Taiwan could involve the kind of high-stakes, indivisible issues that would prevent efforts to build trust by breaking the dispute into manageable parts.

*Thinking ahead:* It is difficult to identify with a high level of certainty the degree to which Chinese and U.S. decision-makers have adhered to this principle. In some instances, particularly in China, the record of internal leadership deliberations is incomplete or missing altogether. But the existing historical record suggests that Chinese and American leaders have not often

attempted to think through the possible negative consequences of their decisions over several steps, despite their sensitivity to the larger international and strategic environment. In general, leaders tended to underestimate the negative effects of their actions on the other side and overestimate the positive effects, particularly during the Cold War era.

Scholarly analysis suggests that U.S. Cold War decision-makers, such as Eisenhower and Johnson, were more focused on responding to immediate issues, coping with internal political pressures, and resolving disputes within the top leadership and the bureaucracy than in systematically considering the possible consequences of their actions.<sup>47</sup> These leaders often made critical decisions in an unsystematic, subjective manner. In the earliest years, this rather ill-organized process reflected not only the personal proclivities of each president, but also the underdeveloped nature of the national security decision-making system. By the Bill Clinton era, crisis decision-making had become more systematic and formalized.<sup>48</sup> As a result, more recent crisis decision-making has presumably involved greater attention to unintended consequences. However, factors such as time constraints and bureaucratic differences, as well as the inevitable influence of strong-willed and subjective personalities, no doubt obstructed efforts to think through the situation. Moreover, there are some indications that “wishful thinking” and “mirror imaging” also undermined adherence to this principle.

We know very little about the internal deliberations that produced specific crisis decisions by the Chinese leadership, particularly in the post-Mao era. What little we know about Mao’s interactions with his colleagues during crises suggests that his enormous self-confidence and his perception of U.S. motives and beliefs as an imperialist power heavily influenced his calculations of the consequences of his decisions. Along with Mao’s apparent confidence in his ability to control escalation, these factors perhaps tended to create a level of wishful thinking that weakened objectivity when thinking through a situation. Presumably, the relatively weaker, more consensus-driven, and arguably less confident post-Mao leadership is more inclined to objectively examine the consequences of their actions. A tenuous bilateral political environment could lead to the emergence in both countries of more hard-line views, which tend to downplay the feedback relationship between each side’s tough behavior.



### ***Managing a Crisis over Taiwan: A Dubious Proposition?***

The Taiwan issue presents very high stakes for both governments. For China’s leaders, Taiwan is unquestionably associated with issues of territorial sovereignty, regime legitimacy, social and political order, and personal and

political survival. In addition, Taiwan is a high-stakes issue for Chinese elites, because it resonates significantly with a large segment of an increasingly nationalistic public. While the Taiwan issue does not involve such vital interests for the United States, it is clearly associated with issues of alliance credibility and defense of freedom. Washington has held a strong, longstanding policy commitment to a peaceful resolution of the issue and faces clear obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act and the three communiqués with China. U.S. elites regard Taiwan as a high-stakes issue, because it is closely associated with political debates over the “China threat,” the overall state of U.S.-China relations, and the mission of protecting freedom and democracy.

These factors suggest that leaders would feel a very strong incentive to communicate enormous resolve in a major crisis over Taiwan in ways that could make it difficult to set or sustain limited objectives, exercise self-restraint, and maintain flexibility.<sup>49</sup> The Chinese government would likely feel very strong pressure to resist any actions that might suggest capitulation to U.S. pressure or a weakening of China’s claim to sovereign authority over Taiwan. For example, Beijing would likely find it extremely hard to adopt a tit-for-tat approach or trade closer cross-Strait political contacts for even a perceived loss of sovereignty. Similarly, Washington would want to avoid any behavior that might reflect a weakness in determination or capacity to uphold U.S. commitments. Each side would be strongly inclined to view the issue in uncompromising “zero-sum” terms. This tendency would make it difficult for either side to accept even short-term losses via initial or partial concessions.

Such rigidity could be accentuated by China’s apparent belief that Washington is more likely to back down in a Taiwan crisis than Beijing, especially if confronted with the prospect of a long, bloody conflict. This could lead China’s leaders to mistakenly believe that they might prevail in a showdown over Taiwan by communicating their allegedly stronger resolve clearly and credibly through major threats. Alternatively, American decision-makers might accept the view that China must eventually concede to U.S. military superiority, thus justifying efforts at coercive diplomacy. Overall, this situation could increase the chances that one or both countries, especially China, would adopt a zero-sum approach to the crisis and fall into a classic commitment trap.<sup>50</sup>

Once in a serious crisis over Taiwan, China and the United States might have great difficulty controlling escalation into larger war. China might use relatively high-risk strategies, including extreme coercive pressure or the use of ultimatums, because of its desire to communicate a high level of resolve and its sense of relative weakness vis-a-vis the United States. Worse yet, China might attempt to establish a military-political *fait accompli* through a rapid decapitation attack on Taiwan. The dearth of non-military means to show

resolve and imperfect knowledge of U.S. military capabilities also increase risk. The United States would find it difficult to reverse a Chinese attack on Taiwan without escalating the crisis to the point of all-out conflict. This scenario would provide little opportunity for either side to pause, assess options, or engage in careful negotiations. Such actions might become particularly likely if China needed to compel Taiwan to alter its behavior, rather than to deter actions that had not yet taken place. Of even greater concern, China’s leaders might decide to initiate major military action, even with high risks, if they believe that the opportunity to control or resolve the Taiwan situation is disappearing, or if they view the United States as acquiescing in efforts by Taiwan to provoke the situation to intolerable levels.

The fear that China might dangerously intensify the crisis early on to demonstrate resolve or preempt a U.S. attempt to assist Taiwan, combined with American confidence in escalation dominance, could result in rapid, decisive military moves by the United States to deter or shut down Chinese coercive actions. The tendency to escalate early and rapidly might increase U.S. decision-makers’ belief that Chinese leaders assume the United States is less committed. The tendency to quickly escalate might also increase if deterring China requires a significant display of military superiority, as some U.S. analysts argue. Vigorous U.S. actions could contribute to an escalatory spiral, particularly in the absence of clear and credible communication between the two sides. For example, China might view strong U.S. military assistance to Taiwan in the opening days of a crisis as equivalent to a “first shot” escalation that requires a vigorous response. Even more serious, in an escalating crisis, China might interpret limited U.S. attacks on key Chinese command and control facilities or military assets relevant to the PLA’s prosecution of strikes against Taiwan as a threat to Beijing’s larger conventional and strategic capabilities and thus might respond accordingly.

The offensive orientation of both militaries and the internal complexities of the civil-military decision-making process further increase the dangers of this situation. The involvement of the military as a key player in an intense Taiwan crisis could distort diplomatic or political options, thus affecting escalation control.

The government and citizens of Taiwan, a third party with independent interests and policy options, also make a major crisis over Taiwan particularly difficult to manage. The involvement of autonomous actors like Taiwan could produce significant instabilities and misperceptions, possibly resulting in unwanted escalation. For example, Taiwan’s political leaders might send provocative diplomatic signals to Beijing that undermine U.S. attempts to deescalate an emerging crisis. Of even greater concern, in the early stages of an intense political-military crisis, Taiwan might employ offensive weapons



to retaliate against a mainland attack without the consent of the United States. Such a response might be mistaken by China as a U.S. strike, and would thus invite retaliation against U.S. forces, regional bases, or even the U.S. mainland. Conversely, China might miscalculate the risks involved in a Taiwan crisis by assuming that it could apply pressure on Taiwan to deter U.S. military intervention.

Despite the difficulties of managing a major Sino-American confrontation over Taiwan, one should not assume that such a crisis is highly likely to occur, or that once initiated, it would almost certainly lead to a large-scale military conflict. Other factors argue against initiating or escalating a major Taiwan crisis. The position of China and the United States as nuclear powers would instill an enormous level of caution on both sides, especially concerning any decision to cross the threshold and initiate direct military action against the other. There is little evidence that elites in either country today view their nuclear arsenal as a safeguard against attack and hence a license to escalate dramatically. To the contrary, the existence of considerable uncertainties regarding each side's nuclear use doctrine and the vulnerability of Chinese strategic assets to a U.S. conventional attack suggest that the threshold between conventional and nuclear weapons use might be less clear than some might think. This would induce enormous caution in any leadership.

Second, the absence of a charismatic and clearly dominant Chinese leader argues in favor of significant levels of caution toward precipitating or escalating a crisis. Unlike Mao and Deng, China's current leadership has less ability to survive major policy errors. Huge economic and social damage could result from a perceived failure to manage a Taiwan crisis, given China's extensive involvement in the global economic order and its heavy reliance on U.S. trade and investment markets to maintain the high growth regarded as essential to China's future stability.

Third, for China, high barriers likely exist to the success of many deterrence and compellence strategies toward Taiwan involving the threat or use of limited force. China would find it extremely difficult to attain clear "local superiority" in a Taiwan crisis, due to the geography of the area and the nature of the adversary. China's tactical and strategic assets are likely to be highly vulnerable to U.S. conventional stand-off weapons. Moreover, the barrier presented by the Taiwan Strait, combined with U.S. command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets, would make it hard for China to achieve deception and denial and hence to act decisively to gain the initiative. It is difficult for China to anticipate the effectiveness against U.S. forces of key weapons such as ballistic missiles or information warfare since they all remain largely untested in combat.

Fourth, for the United States, a major crisis over Taiwan would present enormous uncertainties, despite the likely superiority of U.S. military capabilities in key areas. U.S. decision-makers could not be fully confident that American forces would possess the speed, power, and accuracy to deter or shut down all possible Chinese military actions. Moreover, any serious crisis over Taiwan would almost certainly produce significant damage to U.S. interests in other areas, especially regarding issues like the North Korean nuclear crisis that require cooperative relations with China. Military conflict with China would likely destabilize the entire Asian region and would almost certainly result in a prolonged cold war detrimental to long-term prosperity and stability.

These factors impel both sides to exert their utmost effort to avoid a major crisis over Taiwan. A political-military crisis could, however, be thrust upon both powers by an external event (such as the actions of Taiwan). Crucial contextual factors — such as mutually hostile images, the preexisting state of relations, problems in signaling, incorrect assumptions regarding rules of engagement, improper control over military forces, and the complexities of the decision-making process — could propel both sides into an increasingly dangerous confrontation, despite intentions to the contrary. In short, once begun, even a small-scale crisis over Taiwan could overcome the desire for caution on both sides and prove extremely difficult to resolve peacefully.

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### **Conclusion: Implications for U.S.-Japan Alliance Relations**

On balance, the United States and China would likely confront significant difficulties in managing a future political-military crisis. On the positive side, both countries possess some characteristics that would help them avoid or manage major crises, such as a strong desire to avoid armed conflict, a respect for the other side's resolve in a serious crisis, and a recognition, in theory if not always in practice, of many of the rules of prudent crisis management. Moreover, some negative features of past Sino-American crisis behavior have disappeared or been eliminated over time, such as the intense hostility of the Cold War era, the assertive, dominant role played by supreme rulers such as Mao, and the absence of direct communication between the two sides. Unfortunately, many other negative features have persisted — especially regarding crisis-related perceptions and images — and some troubling new features have emerged. Perhaps most disturbing, these tentative conclusions suggest that a serious Sino-American crisis over Taiwan in particular would probably be extremely difficult to manage.

The above observations also indicate that the management of a political-military crisis between the United States and China could have enormous implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance, depending largely on the seriousness of the crisis and its location. Any major crisis in the Western Pacific, and especially a crisis over Taiwan, would almost inevitably involve vital Japanese interests and pose serious consequences for the stability of the relationship.<sup>51</sup> As a key alliance partner and increasingly important security actor in the region, Washington would want Tokyo to support whatever approach and objectives the U.S. was pursuing in managing a major crisis with Beijing. However, one cannot assume that the U.S. and Japan would perform in lockstep during such a crisis. In the past, Japan has tended toward a strategy of calculated ambiguity and taken a stance as either a neutral proponent of peace or a mediator in disputes involving the U.S. and China.<sup>52</sup> During the EP-3 incident of 2001, for example, Tokyo initially distanced itself publicly from the escalating crisis and called for restraint on both sides. Some Japanese newspapers and regional experts have argued that Tokyo should act to restrain Sino-American competition, partly to gain trust from the region. Some have insisted that Japan take the lead in promoting consultations among the three powers.<sup>53</sup>

Such a Japanese position would probably be less likely in a future crisis, given the serious deterioration that has occurred in Sino-Japanese relations in recent years, the strengthening of U.S.-Japan security ties since the mid-1990s, and the steady expansion of China's presence and influence in the Western Pacific. As a result of these developments, Tokyo and Washington have moved closer together to assume a more common security perspective toward the region, and Japan has sent signals of accepting a larger security role in Asia in support of the U.S. government. The 1996 Joint Declaration of Security by President Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto marked a major revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance.<sup>54</sup> In 1999 Japan and the United States formalized their security agreement when they issued the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.<sup>55</sup> On February 19, 2005, the two countries made the largest adjustment to their alliance since the 1996 statement. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld met with their Japanese counterparts, Minister for Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura and Minister of State for Defense and Director-General of the Defense Agency Yoshinori Ono, and announced twelve "common strategic objectives."<sup>56</sup>

Nonetheless, signals emanating from one or both capitals might undermine efforts at crisis management, especially if consultation between Washington and Tokyo were not very close. For example, without proper coordination and clear signaling, Japan might send confusing or conflicting signals to Beijing during a crisis, especially if it is not entirely supportive of

the U.S. position. In response, Beijing might suspect that Japan is pushing Washington to take a more hard-line stance, perhaps in an effort to force it into a confrontation. This could harden Beijing's stance unnecessarily and also lead the Chinese to attempt to play Washington off of Tokyo in some fashion. This, in turn, could lead to further destabilizing responses by Washington and Tokyo, thus creating a dangerous downward spiral of mutual suspicion and confrontation.

On the other hand, efforts to establish close consultations between Washington and Tokyo could significantly slow down and complicate the management of a Sino-American crisis. Decision making within the Japanese government would most likely involve more internal consultation and coordination than in the U.S. case. Moreover, any attempt at military signaling or deployments — and especially any application of force — would probably produce destabilizing delays or even deadlocks unacceptable to Washington. And even if consultations were relatively smooth and efficient, Tokyo and Washington might still disagree greatly over how to handle a serious crisis with Beijing, given likely differences in national interests, beliefs, procedures, and structures relevant to crisis management. For example, Japan's leaders might not place as high a priority on displaying resolve in a crisis as American leaders apparently do. And they might not be as inclined to utilize military instruments.

This all suggests the importance of establishing beforehand some understandings regarding key diplomatic and military issues and related signals between Japan and the U.S. This would not entirely eliminate some of the above potential problems, although it might reduce their severity considerably, should they arise. Even so, such prior agreement would probably be very difficult to achieve in practice. It is very likely that neither side would want to communicate their specific position and actions during a sensitive crisis with Beijing before the event. Moreover, even with an extensive level of preparation and coordination, Japanese involvement of any kind in a serious Sino-U.S. crisis could heighten China's sense of threat and thereby make it less agreeable to accommodation. Many Chinese leaders might be willing to accommodate Washington but not Tokyo, especially if Sino-Japanese relations were to remain as turbulent as they are today.

Finally, we should stress that management of a Sino-American crisis over Taiwan in particular could have enormous implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance, given the importance of the island to U.S. force planning in such a crisis, its overall relevance to Japanese security concerns, and the implications of the U.S.'s commitment to a peaceful resolution of the issue for the credibility of its commitment to key Asian allies such as Japan. Tokyo would have a vital interest in the evolution and outcome of any such crisis and thus would almost

certainly send signals of various types (both deliberate and unintentional) that could greatly affect crisis management. Maximizing coordination and consultation should be a top priority of both countries. Hence, both leaderships should examine in some detail their respective stance toward the requirements for effective crisis management discussed above, particularly in the context of a Taiwan crisis.

<sup>1</sup> The author is extremely grateful to Ms. Danielle Cohen, Junior Fellow of the Carnegie Endowment's China Program, for her invaluable assistance in preparing this paper.

<sup>2</sup> The following sections are adapted from Michael D. Swaine, "Conclusion: Implications, Questions, and Recommendations," in *Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis*, ed. Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, with Danielle F. S. Cohen, 423-452 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).

<sup>3</sup> See Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2000). For a slightly different definition that stresses the element of surprise in the emergence of a crisis, see Charles F. Hermann, "International Crisis as a Situational Variable," in *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, ed. J.N. Rosenau, 414 (New York: The Free Press, 1969). See also Xia Liping's summary of U.S. definitions of crisis in Xia Liping, "Sino-American Crisis Management: A Comparative Study," in *Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis*, ed. Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, with Danielle F. S. Cohen, 149-178 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).

<sup>4</sup> Alexander George, "Strategies for Crisis Management," in *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management*, ed. Alexander L. George, 379-393 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991). Offensive strategies are those that are compellence oriented and intended to alter the situation at the expense of the adversary. Defensive strategies are those that are deterrence oriented and intended merely to prevent or reverse gains.

<sup>5</sup> Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).

- <sup>6</sup> Alexander George, "Findings and Recommendations," in *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management*, ed. Alexander L. George, 560-561 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991). George remarks that the political and operational requirements of any crisis management approach or theory are not "requirements" in the strict sense of "constituting necessary or sufficient conditions for successful management of war-threatening confrontations." Whether these conditions are adequately met, however, can affect the outcome of a crisis. A failure to adhere to these conditions increases the likelihood of war. Hu Ping, *Guoji chongtu fenxi yu weiji guanli yanjiu* [The analysis of international conflict and research on crisis management] (Beijing: Junshi Yiwen Chubanshe, 1993), 167-173. Hu Ping, a Chinese military scholar, has also systematized a set of general requirements for "successful" crisis management, based primarily on the major Western studies on the subject. See also Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, and works by Daniel Frei, Michael Brecher, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld.
- <sup>7</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, "Eight Principles of Crisis Management" (Lecture to the Strategic Studies Institute, Communist Party of China Party School, Beijing, November 2000). Johnston relied heavily on the work of Hu Ping to develop these principles.
- <sup>8</sup> Allen S. Whiting, "U.S. Crisis Management Vis-à-vis China: Korea and Vietnam;" Robert L. Suettinger, "American 'Management' of Taiwan Strait 'Crises': 1954, 1958, and 1996;" and Zhang Baijia, "Resist America': China's Role in the Korean and Vietnam Wars," in *Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis*, ed. Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, with Danielle F. S. Cohen (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).
- <sup>9</sup> Michael D. Swaine, "Introduction: Understanding the Historical Record," in *Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis*, ed. Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, with Danielle F. S. Cohen, 1-101 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).
- <sup>10</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>11</sup> Swaine, "Introduction;" Wu Baiyi, "Chinese Crisis Management during the 1999 Embassy Bombing Incident," in *Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis*, ed. Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, with Danielle F. S. Cohen, 1-101, 351-375 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).
- <sup>12</sup> Suettinger, "American 'Management' of Taiwan Strait 'Crises.'"
- <sup>13</sup> Swaine, "Introduction."
- <sup>14</sup> Wu Baiyi, "Chinese Crisis Management during the 1999 Embassy Bombing Incident."
- <sup>15</sup> One example is the overused phrase, "We shall not stand idly by," often employed by the Chinese government during crises.
- <sup>16</sup> Swaine, "Introduction."
- <sup>17</sup> Swaine, "Introduction."
- <sup>18</sup> Swaine, "Introduction;" Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, *Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000); Allen Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1975).

- <sup>19</sup> Suettinger, "American 'Management' of Taiwan Strait 'Crises.'" For example, Eisenhower utilized such an ambiguous strategy during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1955.
- <sup>20</sup> Mao Zedong, "Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), 426–27.
- <sup>21</sup> Michelle Maiese, "Limiting Escalation/De-escalation," *Beyond Intractability.org*, January 2004, [http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/limiting\\_escalation/?nid=1089](http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/limiting_escalation/?nid=1089); Alexander L. George, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," in *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 31–37.
- <sup>22</sup> Dennis C. Blair and David V. Bonfili, "The April 2001 EP-3 Incident as Seen from the American Point of View," in *Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis*, ed. Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, with Danielle F. S. Cohen, 377–390 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).
- <sup>23</sup> Most of China's past political-military crises have involved issues of territorial integrity and sovereignty, in the form of: 1) small-scale border conflicts; 2) contention for territorial seas and islands; 3) limited hostile intrusions into Chinese territory; 4) punitive attacks or counterattacks; 5) and the increased military presence of potential adversaries near China's borders.
- <sup>24</sup> This concept is perhaps too often invoked publicly by U.S. leaders in political-military crises involving important areas of the globe, such as the Western Pacific. For recent official views that support such generalizations, see George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address by the President" (speech, Washington, DC, January 31, 2006), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/>; and Mike Michalak, "U.S. Views on Asian Regional Integration," (remarks, International Institute of Money Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, January 25, 2006), <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/60355.htm>.
- <sup>25</sup> Suettinger, "American 'Management' of Taiwan Strait 'Crises.'"
- <sup>26</sup> The Taiwan Strait crises and the Vietnam War are examples of the tit-for-tat strategy.
- <sup>27</sup> The Korean War, the Sino-Indian Border Crisis of 1962, and the Sino-Vietnam Border War of 1979 are arguably examples of this type of escalatory behavior.
- <sup>28</sup> Burles and Shulsky, *Patterns in China's Use of Force*; Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence*. Shulsky and Burles state that in crises of the 1950s–1960s, China at times sought to establish a *fait accompli* through quick and decisive action, and to force the adversary to risk significant escalation to reinstate the *status quo ante*.
- <sup>29</sup> Swaine, "Introduction."
- <sup>30</sup> According to several Chinese participants at the 2004 Beijing conference, several factors caused this change in approach. These factors include the passing of the revolutionary generation of Chinese leaders (who were arguably more militant in their outlook toward foreign policy issues and less constrained by domestic factors), the existence of a greater number of non-military levers of influence in crisis management, and the emergence of a new generation of leaders committed to the pursuit of stable and cooperative relations with other powers, as an essential precondition for continued economic growth and domestic stability.
- <sup>31</sup> See Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Alastair Iain

- Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, 216–270 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
- <sup>32</sup> Wang Jisi and Xu Hui, "The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: A Chinese Perspective," in *Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis*, ed. Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, with Danielle F. S. Cohen, 133–148 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006); Swaine, "Introduction."
- <sup>33</sup> Suettinger, "American 'Management' of Taiwan Strait 'Crises.'"
- <sup>34</sup> See Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949–1992: A First Cut at the Data," *China Quarterly*, no. 153 (March 1998); Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1978).
- <sup>35</sup> More positively, American and Chinese nuclear forces are not tightly linked to a war-fighting strategy of mutual assured destruction, as also mentioned in the introduction.
- <sup>36</sup> Xia Liping, "Sino-American Crisis Management;" Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past Present, and Future* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000); Wang Jisi and Xu Hui, "The Pattern of Sino-American Crises."
- <sup>37</sup> Scott Sagan, "The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks," *International Security* 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000): 85–115, discusses the notion of a "commitment trap." James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577–92.
- <sup>38</sup> Suettinger, "American 'Management' of Taiwan Strait 'Crises.'"
- <sup>39</sup> Swaine, "Introduction;" Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Crisis Management: Framework for Analysis, Tentative Observations, and Questions for the Future," in *Chinese National Security Decisionmaking under Stress*, ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, 21–22, 24–25 (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005).
- <sup>40</sup> See Xia Liping, "Sino-American Crisis Management;" Zhang Tuosheng, "The Sino-American Aircraft Collision: Lessons for Crisis Management," in *Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis*, ed. Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, with Danielle F. S. Cohen, 391–421 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). For example, in analyzing Chinese behavior during the EP-3 incident, Zhang Tuosheng argues that Beijing placed considerable stress on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, in addition to the concept of "safeguarding sovereignty" and the prevention of major damage to Sino-U.S. relations.
- <sup>41</sup> Swaine, "Introduction."
- <sup>42</sup> Swaine, "Introduction;" See works on the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis by Suisheng Zhao, Andrew Scobell, Allen S. Whiting, Robert S. Ross, and Michael D. Swaine.
- <sup>43</sup> Whiting, "U.S. Crisis Management Vis-à-vis China."
- <sup>44</sup> Suettinger, "American 'Management' of Taiwan Strait 'Crises.'"
- <sup>45</sup> Swaine, "Introduction."

- <sup>46</sup> Swaine, "Introduction."
- <sup>47</sup> Whiting, "U.S. Crisis Management Vis-à-vis China," Suettinger, "American 'Management' of Taiwan Strait 'Crises.'"
- <sup>48</sup> Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch Johnson, eds., "National Security Advisers: Roles: Editors' Introduction," in *Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 133; David Rothkopf, *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), 4–8; Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, "History of the National Security Council 1947–1997," August 1997, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/NSChistory.htm>.
- <sup>49</sup> A major crisis over Taiwan would presumably involve actions by any side that were perceived by China or the U.S. as altering, or potentially altering, the status quo in unacceptable directions (that is, the crossing of one or more of the so-called "red lines"), thus requiring a vigorous reaction.
- <sup>50</sup> The Taiwan issue is particularly susceptible to hard-line leadership viewpoints, especially on the Chinese side.
- <sup>51</sup> A "major" crisis would be one that presented a real possibility of escalation to the level of military conflict, and/or significant damage to bilateral relations.
- <sup>52</sup> See Gaye Christoffersen, "The Role of East Asia in Sino-American Relations," *Asian Survey*, May/June 2002: 369–396.
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 387.
- <sup>54</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," April 17, 1996, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>.
- <sup>55</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation," <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html>.
- <sup>56</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee," February 19, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm>.