INTRODUCTION

CONFRONTING TERRORISM, CONSOLIDATING PRIMACY

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ABSTRACT

The U.S.-led war on terrorism is likely to remain one of the central issues facing U.S. grand strategy in Asia. The Bush administration entered office determined to secure U.S. primacy amid the emergence of major power centers in Asia, such as China, but the September 11 attacks forced the administration to confront a worldwide Islamist insurgency. On balance, the United States has managed these interlocking challenges with partial success. Important improvements to the United States' long-term international position have been offset by the failure to make the exercise of U.S. primacy more palatable to the international community and by setbacks in the war on terrorism. Although Washington's pursuit of Al Qaeda and its global affiliates has recorded notable successes in Asia, U.S. strategy so far has been unable to reduce the global ranks of disaffected Muslim sympathizers. The United States needs to wage a war on terrorism that not only destroys Al Qaeda and stabilizes Afghanistan and Iraq, but also addresses the roots of sprawling anti-American sentiment in the Middle East.

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Introduction

The U.S.-led war on terrorism has become the defining feature of President George W. Bush's term in office. It is likely to remain, directly or indirectly, one of the central issues facing U.S. grand strategy in Asia and beyond for at least this decade, if not longer. This chapter evaluates the Bush administration's war on terrorism within the larger geo-political challenges facing the United States. The new era of peace and prosperity that America sought after the the Cold War appeared to have materialized, at least on the surface, during the 1990s. Although, in retrospect, it became clear that the most dangerous transnational terrorist group ever to threaten the United States—Al Qaeda—set about organizing itself and developing roots in over 60 countries during this period, neither its activities nor the extent of the threat it posed to U.S. security was clearly perceived by policymakers or the public at large.[1] Despite the violent previews of Al Qaeda capabilities provided through the embassy bombings in East Africa, U.S. foreign policy for much of the last decade of the twentieth century focused primarily on managing the humdrum problems of international security such as humanitarian crises, ethnic conflict, minor inter-state rivalries, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which, although occasionally onerous, did not threaten U.S. survival.

For most part, the challenges facing foreign policy at this time seemed to revolve around mastering a novel reality: a global order that had survived the most remarkable power transition in modern history—the collapse of a principal pole in the international system without major war.[2] In response, numerous scholarly and popular articles proclaimed the obsolescence of major conflict, the transformative potential of international institutions, the promise of cooperative security and global engagement, and the diminishing relevance of alliances.[3] In such a universe, having a good foreign and strategic policy almost bordered on the optional, as even the major challenges of the time—ethnic conflicts, state failure in peripheral countries, the prospect of major pandemics, the corrosiveness of environmental problems, and minor interstate conflicts—were not viewed as undermining what was a basically peaceful international system.

The Bush administration, despite many internal differences, came into office fundamentally suspicious of this liberal vision of global order.[4] Although welcoming the unipolar moment as deeply desirable from the perspective of the United States, it recognized that U.S. preeminence did not entail either an obliteration of competitive international politics or a suspension of "the general law of the dynamics of international relations," namely, "the uneven growth of power among states."[5] Therefore, Washington had to quickly confront the possibility that the unipolar moment

represented just another phase in the cycle of rising and falling powers, and that even while U.S. primacy was already becoming a magnet attracting dissatisfied state and non-state actors, the larger processes of economic growth—and, increasingly the science and technology diffusion visible in Asia[6]—were creating new power centers such as China that could over time challenge the preeminence of the United States.[7] These realities implied that U.S. preeminence, far from being permanent, could turn out to be merely transient if it was not carefully tended as part of a conscious grand strategy. The objective of such a strategy would be to preserve American primacy for as long as possible by a variety of economic, military, and strategic means—all while creating a set of international institutions and norms that, by reflecting U.S. interests, would help minimize the cost of repeatedly applying coercive power.[8]

The Bush administration, then, viewed maintaining U.S. dominance as a major, consequential task. Far from being an outcome that would subsist automatically, the administration set out to preserve U.S. preponderance through a conscious multi-dimensional strategy that involved:

- Transforming the armed forces by exploiting the revolution in military affairs and new basing arrangements to create an agile and lethal expeditionary force capable of effective global operations with the smallest possible footprint.[9]
- Reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy in order to minimize the incentives of other state and non-state actors to acquire them, while simultaneously working to contain future weapons of mass destruction (WMD) diffusion through a new approach that emphasized smaller nuclear forces, nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and strategic defenses.[10]
- Revitalizing traditional alliances, among other things through enlargement, to deal with both the traditional problems of international security and a range of new challenges.[11]
- Creating new partnerships with key countries that, despite not being formal allies of the United States, would collaborate with Washington through various "coalitions of the willing" to deal with emerging threats to peace and security.[12]
- Enlarging the liberal international economic order through greater economic integration and access to new markets in order to increase national prosperity, wealth, and power through a steady outward shift of the global production frontier.[13]

Even before George W. Bush took over as President, his election campaign had abundantly indicated that a Republican administration would

pay careful attention to managing the central challenge facing the United States: creating a durable preponderance capable of warding off any threats that may issue from rising powers in the future. The administration's early months in office focused on slowly putting myriad pieces of this strategy into place. These efforts, however, were violently eclipsed by the shocking events of September 11, which shifted overnight President Bush's focus on preserving U.S. primacy to directing a new global war on terrorism. Over the next three years, this war would take the form of a massive campaign led by the United States and conducted by a sizable coalition of willing, hesitant, and sometimes even reluctant states, aimed at:

- *Defeating* terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries, leadership, command, control, and communications, material support, and finances.
- *Denying* terrorist groups sponsorship, support, and sanctuary by ensuring that states accept their responsibilities to take action against these threats within their sovereign territory.
- *Diminishing* the underlying conditions that terrorist seek to exploit by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on the areas most at risk.
- *Defending* the United States and its allies by both protecting their homelands and extending their defenses to identify and neutralize the terrorist threat as early as possible.[14]

The formulation of this "4D strategy" against global terrorism soon found its main focus in the greater South Asian region, though it quickly implicated a vast arc of Asia, stretching from Southeast Asia to Europe and the Middle East. This effort required the comprehensive use of diplomatic, economic, information, law enforcement, military, financial, intelligence, and other instruments of power, all oriented toward degrading the terrorist threat. These multifarious efforts became so encompassing that before long the administration's initial focus on positioning the United States to handle the challenges of global geo-politics had all but disappeared from public view, to be replaced by a new, almost pervasive, emphasis on the war on terrorism.

In reality, the situation was more complex. Although the rhetoric might have suggested that winning the campaign against terrorism was the sole national objective, the administration prosecuted this effort while simultaneously pursuing those issues critical to preserving American primacy. In fact, it is to the administration's credit—and remains an achievement that has gone unrecognized in the current controversies over Iraq—that, de-

spite its preoccupations with terrorism and the twin wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it initiated those vital and far-reaching strategic policy changes referred to earlier—innovations that will be critical to the successful maintenance of U.S. preponderance over the long term.[15]

While innovations relating to the long-term preservation of U.S. power have enduring consequences, in that they buttress U.S. safety and prosperity over the distant future, their immediate effect on the lives of ordinary Americans is at best indirect. In contrast, U.S. actions relating immediately to the war on terrorism, whatever their consequences for the global power balance over time, affect one thing that matters enormously to the body politic in the here and now: the physical safety of Americans at home and abroad. The events of September 11, 2001, were so catalyzing precisely because they assaulted this fundamental sense of security in a way that Americans had not experienced since Pearl Harbor. In many ways, they were distinctly worse. Unlike Pearl Harbor, which involved a military operation directed primarily at military targets on a distant periphery, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington represented an assault on civilians and on highly focal symbols deep within the metropolitan center. They also involved the use of instruments that hitherto had only routine and peaceful connotations. Finally, they were inordinately costly, brutal, and shocking to the country, not to mention being executed in front of a mass national audience in real time. September 11, then, represented a return to *experienced*—as opposed to *notional*—vulnerability, a helplessness palpably felt by millions of Americans.[16]

The September 11 attacks thus called into question the fundamental effectiveness of the government's ability to provide security for its citizenry. Consequently, it explains both why the administration's inability to prevent the terrorist attacks have become a matter of such controversy after September 11, and why its immediate response to the attacks—the global war on terror—would receive the kind of attention that would almost obliterate public interest in all its other initiatives connected with preserving America's primacy over the long term.

Confronting Terrorism Amid Rising Asian Power

The war on terrorism began and continues amid the backdrop of initiatives aimed at consolidating the preeminence of the United States in global geopolitics. It persists in an environment that is witnessing the slow and steady rise of new power centers in different parts of the world, but especially in Asia. The U.S.-led war on terrorism has by no means replaced the larger tectonic movements in international politics. Rather, it is overlaid upon them and may even pale in comparison with the other tectonic shifts—the chang-

ing character of state sovereignty, the continuing breakthroughs in science and technology, the socio-economic and political disruptions caused by globalization, and the transformation associated with the information revolution—currently underway in the international system.[17]

By all indicators, the great transformation, which began in the postwar period and involves the shift in global power to Asia, continues unabated. Asia remains poised to become the new strategic center of gravity in international politics.[18] And the problems associated with that development have by no means disappeared.

The continent still faces consequential power alterations among the major states. As Michael Swaine and Walter Andersen respectively highlight, China and India continue to gain economic and political power even as they struggle to use their separate involvements in the war on terrorism to resolve problems of critical importance to their national interests. Russia still muddles along, but the dream of recovering great power status has not died. Rather, as Stephen Hanson points out, it is buffeted by a deep ideological debate within the Russian elite about the meaning of that status.[19] At long last, Japan today shows signs of economic recovery, even as significant changes in its international political profile are underway. As Mike Mochizuki notes, a "new Japanese orientation" is emerging after a decade of political, security, and economic uncertainty, making Tokyo "more nationalistic, more willing to discuss openly and assert its national interests, and less reluctant to engage international security challenges."[20] And the Korean Peninsula still remains a region where complex opposites remain locked in a precarious balance fraught with risk. Victor Cha finds South Korea conflicted "between remaining 'anchored' within the U.S. alliance framework or cutting 'adrift' in the direction of a continental accommodation with China," while North Korea in contrast exhibits sharp strategic clarity in its "objective of regime survival through economic reform *and* nuclear weapons."[21] This antinomy, as Nicholas Eberstadt elucidates, could lead to a variety of—mostly unpleasant—outcomes in the Korean nuclear crisis. Most unfortunately, Eberstadt concludes, "there is as yet all too little evidence that careful consideration has been accorded to the alternative futures for the North Korean nuclear crisis that still lie before us—not by American policy analysts, and certainly not by U.S. decision-makers"[22]

Asia also remains witness to continuing transformations in leadership and elite attitudes in key countries. As Mochizuki points out, Japan's political leadership is committed to transitioning out of the country's pacifist restraints and making Japan "normal" again; it has already relaxed the existing legal constraints on the Japanese Self-Defense Forces participating in UN Peacekeeping Operations, and could pursue amending Article 9 of

the Japanese constitution within the next few years. The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, notes Swaine, is more determined than ever to consolidate the market revolution at home, but is struggling to assure continued political primacy even as it becomes more rigid in respect to managing the national reunification problems of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Tibet. Andersen acknowledges that the return of the Congress Party to power in India has raised new anxieties about the future pace of economic reform. He also stresses that the stability of the current military leadership in Pakistan, a key U.S. ally in the war on terrorism, remains unsettled and, as many Pakistani analysts themselves have pointed out, General Pervez Musharraf's campaign for "enlightened moderation"[23] in Islam could create more problems than it solves if his rhetoric is accompanied, as it often is, by inaction.[24] Graham Fuller, in his chapter on the war on terrorism in the Middle East, drives home the point that the Muslim world in general and Arab states in particular remain deeply suspicious of the United States, and while the leaderships in key countries have woken up to the challenges posed by radicalized Islam to their own regimes, their ability to deal with this problem remains uncertain. Shades of this problem find reflection as far away as Southeast Asia where, as Sheldon Simon laconically states, "U.S. public diplomacy will have to overcome a significant deficit in Southeast Asian countries with large Muslim populations."[25]

Asia continues to confront complex challenges to internal political and social stability in various sub-regions, continuing inter-state disputes and rivalries, and the ever more progressive diffusion of military capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction.[26] Threats to internal stability are rife in almost every sub-region of the continent. The challenges posed by terrorism intersect with domestic disenchantment, unresponsive governance, economic deprivation, secessionist sentiments, and rapid social change, to repeatedly test, and sometimes overwhelm, the capacity of state power to maintain effective control. Southeast Asia and Central Asia remain good exemplars of these problems. Simon describes the challenges in the former region succinctly when he states that Southeast Asia's security environment may be moving "back to the future," as non-traditional threats such as terrorism, secessionary movements, and transnational crime, dominate state agendas.[27]

Gregory Gleason's chapter on Central Asia elaborates similar issues in a different setting. Linguistic and cultural diversity intersects with politically charged separatist and irredentist demands growing out of a vast set of sub-national—clan, tribal, regional, or even village—loyalties, anemic economic growth, and sclerotic political institutions, which in turn confront various former communist leaders who, quickly donning nationalist

garb, have embarked on determined efforts at political consolidation in these newly independent states. In these struggles, state failure in Afghanistan produced a healthy supply of foot soldiers for various extremist opposition movements, while the war on terrorism that followed empowered local despots to attempt to neutralize both reformist and insurgent opposition with the blessing of the United States.

Even as such internal strife continues to characterize large parts of Asia, militarized inter-state disputes are commonplace as well, with China-Taiwan, North-South Korea, and India-Pakistan remaining the most obvious examples. The growth of Asian economic power traditionally was linked more to export performance and less to indigenous performance in science and technology (S&T). That too may be in the process of changing, as Richard Suttmeier points out in his chapter. In fact, if the Asian states succeed in their S&T ambitions, the continent may witness new patterns of power stratification, particularly if the larger Asian states can successfully complete the process from liberating their S&T sectors from government control. In any event, high levels of economic growth in Asia—whatever its sources—have assisted another significant transformation in recent decades: the maintenance of substantial conventional military capabilities.[28] And, in some instances, even economic failure has not prevented the decision to acquire various kinds of weapons of mass destruction. The latter problem receives extended treatment in Gaurav Kampani's study, which examines the pressures for Asian states to acquire nuclear weapons. He states arrestingly that:

> "Within Asia, *fresh* demand for WMD is concentrated in three subregions: the Middle East, South Asia, and the Korean Peninsula. Hence the intersection of mass destruction capabilities with the rise of religious fundamentalism, political disaffection, economic disarray, and deep inter-state and intra-state conflicts in these subregions, make Asia potentially the greatest human-induced disaster-prone region in the world."[29]

While most intra-Asian conflicts traditionally were rooted in military and political concerns, the rapid economic growth witnessed during the last three decades has brought the competition for natural resources to center stage. As the episodic spikes in oil prices in recent years have demonstrated, continued population growth and economic expansion in Asia will levy growing demands on increasingly scarce petroleum and natural gas sources. With four-fifths of the world's oil reserves lying in politically unstable areas, resource competition could turn into open conflict. Mikkal Herberg's chapter examines how key Asian states are responding to this

potentially looming shortage, and concludes that governments now see the acquisition and protection of energy resources as a national security requirement—possibly one they must be prepared to fight for. As Herberg phrases it, energy concerns for Asian states are "becoming a matter of 'high politics' of national security and no longer just the 'low politics' of domestic energy policy. Governments across the region are deciding that energy security is becoming too important to be left entirely to the markets ... ."[30]

In other words, the Asian landmass is characterized by a continuation of the conventional problems of international politics even as the continent writ large remains simultaneously the engine of global economic growth, the vortex of important political adjustments and sociological change, and the central theater in the war on terrorism.

Assessing the War on Terrorism in Asia

Evaluating U.S. achievements and failures in the war on terrorism requires attention to different aspects of the current campaign. Three dimensions of U.S. performance in particular are significant: 1) identifying the nature of the terrorist threat and the best means to defeat it; 2) mounting effective direct operations to defeat terrorism and deny it resources; and 3) developing a grand strategy to defeat terrorism.

Identifying the Nature of the Threat and the Means to Defeat It

Correctly identifying the nature of the terrorist threat and the appropriate means to defeat it is the first and most important ingredient for success in the war on terrorism. Even a cursory glance at the State Department's *Patterns of Global Terrorism* reports makes clear that there are many terrorist groups and many kinds of terrorisms. In this jungle of competing targets, the United States simply cannot afford, despite the dominant rhetoric of the day, to dissipate its energies by countering all kinds of terrorist groups simultaneously. Consequently, a strategic approach that discriminates between problems and economizes on the use of resources is needed. Given this requirement, the most important targets for immediate attention ought to be those capable of inflicting mass casualty attacks, whether through conventional or unconventional means. If this goal represents the first criterion for limiting U.S. attention in the war on terrorism, four categories of targets present themselves for attention: terrorist states; terrorist groups with transnational capability and interests; terrorist groups with national capability and concerns; and finally, the amorphous mass of sympathizers supportive of, but not actively involved in, terrorist activity.

Whenever terrorist states capable of inflicting catastrophic harm exist, they should be the first targets of U.S. notice in the war on terrorism

because states are formidable organized institutions that can inflict staggering levels of damage if they seek to exploit, or support, terrorism. Fortunately, this is also the easiest problem to deal with. Even terrorist states have a physical footprint, possess assets that can be held at risk, are governed by a regime structure that is identifiable, and are usually sensitive to the balance of power. Not surprisingly, all the seven states traditionally identified as engaged in terrorism—Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan—have challenged the United States only surreptitiously and rarely through mass casualty attacks for fear of massive retaliation.

Terrorist groups with transnational capabilities and interests, such as Al Qaeda, are in contrast the deadliest opponents: they have no obvious territorial footprint, they garner resources across national borders, are strategically (or ideologically) committed to inflicting extreme levels of harm on their opponents, and are more immune to retribution. They are and should remain the most important target of U.S. strategic attention.

Terrorist groups limited to national objectives are a more difficult category to assess. Their limited interests ought to make them the primary responsibility of their own governments, rather than that of the United States, at least in the first instance. This is the preferred course of action advocated by many critics of the administration.[31] Judging the significance of national terrorist groups, however, is often problematic because their import cannot be determined without co-relative judgments about the nature of the regimes they oppose (which may sometimes be as odious as the terrorist groups themselves). The United States should, therefore, focus on terrorist groups with national capability and interests only if the groups concerned are wedded to a transnational ideology that is likely to target the United States, countries that are vital to U.S. national purposes, or important U.S. interests at some future point in time, or if the groups at issue are anticipated to grow in capacity such that they could mount significant extra-national challenges in the future.

These criteria, obviously, cannot be mechanistically applied. In practice, political judgments will have to be made with regard to the specific course of action that the United States would embark upon in dealing with varies species of terrorism. The rules of thumb are important nonetheless because they could help to prevent the United States from transforming a meaningful war on terrorism into a frustrating "war of all against all" where both political caution and moral prudence entirely disappear.

As important as identifying the threat is for success, developing the appropriate means to defeat it is just as critical. Terrorist states and terrorist groups of global reach have to be confronted by some combination of deterrence, containment, and direct application of military force when ap-

propriate. These same instruments, coupled with political suasion, compromise, and conciliation, may be appropriate when dealing with national terrorism. As far as confronting these three categories of threat are concerned, the instruments of war can be appropriate and the struggle against terror may truly manifest itself as a "war" on terrorism.

The real challenge, however, lies in countering the fourth category of threat, the sympathizer, who cannot be managed through direct coercion and may actually move from passive sympathy to active resistance if confronted by force. The metaphor of war may thus be singularly unsuitable for dealing with this category, and could actually be counter-productive.

The war on terrorism reviewed in this volume suggests that United States has not been entirely successful in identifying the nature of the terrorist threat in Asia and the best means to defeat it. Afghanistan was a terrorist state long before September 11, but the U.S. government never listed it as a state sponsor of terrorism (apparently for technical reasons), and it did not evoke concerted U.S. counteraction before the devastating terrorist attacks. Iraq under Saddam Hussein had tenuous links with Al Qaeda, but in the run up to *Operation Iraqi Freedom* these connections, it is now widely acknowledged, were at least misperceived and possibly misrepresented.[32] Of the other identified state sponsors of terrorism in Asia, Iran and Syria have been the most deliberate and adventurous, with North Korea following in that order.[33] All, however, have been careful to avoid direct challenges to the United States.

Perhaps the most surprising omission in respect to identifying terrorist states in Asia over the years has been Pakistan, which since at least 1989 has maintained a large national infrastructure oriented towards supporting the creation, subsidy, and operations of various Islamist terrorist groups warring against India and Afghanistan. Except for a brief moment in the early 1990s, when the first Bush administration came close to formally designating Pakistan a terrorist state, Islamabad's complicity in international terrorism has largely escaped official U.S. censure, even though it has been the subject of much reporting and analysis in the U.S. and international media.[34] While Indian coercive diplomacy in 2001 and 2002 brought Pakistani state-sponsored terrorism once again to international attention, Andersen's chapter suggests that even the post-September 11 war on terrorism has been unable to completely wean Islamabad away from support for terrorist groups as an aspect of its national security strategy.

Where terrorist groups of global reach are concerned, the United States has done better in identifying the threat, but whether it has found the best means to defeat it is not yet clear. Using a combination of direct military action, law enforcement activities—including focused assistance to vari-

ous governments to improve legislation, regulation, and judicial action, create counter-terrorism units, anti-money laundering teams, and counter-terrorism centers—and direct financial support, both Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah have been resolutely attacked. These operations, however, are far from complete and both groups, being hydra-headed, are likely to metastasize into more dangerous, regionally-based, autonomous variants in the future.[35]

In contrast to terrorist groups of global reach, the United States appears to have been less effective in understanding the challenges posed by national terrorist groups possessing the potential to operate beyond their original confines. It is increasingly obvious today that a variety of lesser known regional or national terrorist outfits, such as Ansar al-Islam, the Zarqawi network, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), Salifiya Jihadia, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), are now gravitating towards Al Qaeda operationally and seek to advance its objectives of worldwide terror. In South Asia, for example, the United States failed to perceive early enough the threat posed by Taliban reconstitution in northwestern Pakistan, and the efforts of the Pakistani security services in shielding various Taliban clients from U.S. scrutiny.

The U.S. effort to cope with national terrorist entities is also handicapped by problems of a different sort. In Central Asia and the Caucasus, for example, Washington is often perceived as supporting corrupt, unrepresentative regimes. As Graham Fuller makes clear in his chapter, this is a larger problem in the Middle East, where U.S. counter-terrorism efforts are stymied by deep popular resentment against U.S. support for corrupt and undemocratic regimes. Finally, the war against national terrorist groups is compromised by U.S. reliance on governments who themselves abet terrorism for strategic purposes. Washington now finds itself deeply reliant on Pakistan's General Musharraf and the Saudi government for prosecuting a war against Al Qaeda at a time when both regimes still remain, in different ways, a source of comfort, if not support, for terrorism.

Most problematically, the administration has been least successful in regard to managing the last category of threat, the large population of Muslim sympathizers throughout the world. As one serving CIA analyst points out in a searing anonymous indictment published recently, the conduct of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq itself has left both countries "seething with anti-U.S. sentiment, fertile grounds for the expansion of Al Qaeda and kindred groups."[36] The failure of the United States here has been a problem of diagnosis in the first instance. When President Bush asked, "why do they hate us?" he concluded that they, referring to the terrorists, hate the United States because "they hate our freedoms—

our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other."[37] While this conclusion is arguably true insofar as it refers to the motivations of some terrorist groups per se, it is dangerous to conclude that this sentiment actually characterizes the mindset of their vast number of Muslim sympathizers. The evidence on this issue increasingly suggests that Muslim displeasure with the West in general and with the United States in particular is less a matter of its institutions and more a consequence of its policies, however justifiable these may be from the viewpoint of U.S. interests.[38]

While many aspects of modernity no doubt offend conservative Muslims, no Islamist movement as yet has launched a jihad to destroy a genuinely democratic regime. In fact, one survey suggests that "many of the Muslim publics polled expressed a stronger desire for democratic freedoms than the publics in some nations of Eastern Europe, notably Russia and Bulgaria."[39] The same poll goes on to state that "despite soaring anti-Americanism and substantial support for Osama bin Laden, there is considerable appetite in the Muslim world for democratic freedoms. In most Muslim populations, large majorities continue to believe that Western-style democracy can work in their countries."[40]

In the face of such evidence, what Osama bin Laden appears to have done successfully is to make an appealing argument that Washington's support of unjust, despotic, and corrupt Muslim states, its war against Muslim countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, and its favoritism toward Israel, actually represents evidence that the United States is at war with Islam itself and, consequently, leaves the weaker Muslim community with no alternative to armed resistance. As long as millions of Muslims believe this claim, many passive sympathizers will elect for active terrorism, and the war on terrorism will not be won. Thus far, the administration unfortunately has little to show by way of success on this score.

Mounting Direct Operations to Defeat Terrorism

If the record with respect to identifying the threat and the best means to defeat it remains a mixed bag, the second dimension—mounting effective direct operations to defeat terrorism and deny it resources—is marked by significant successes, but important incomplete tasks as well. The first great achievement in direct operations to defeat terrorism has been the U.S. victory over the Taliban-Al Qaeda compact in Afghanistan. Although Al Qaeda's core senior leadership has not yet been eliminated, their planning and operations must of necessity be conducted either on the run or from transient hides in the tribal areas of Pakistan, where they remain under pressure from joint U.S.-Pakistani counter-terrorism operations.

Unfortunately, the great advantage that the United States gained from evicting the Taliban-Al Qaeda regime from Afghanistan has not yet been consolidated, even though the new Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai has overseen important steps toward taking Afghanistan to some sense of stability. Successes here include developing a consensual transition plan toward democracy under UN aegis, gaining international support for national reconstruction, and involving U.S. and multinational forces in modest peacekeeping and rebuilding missions. Major tasks that remain incomplete—and which sometimes cast a dark shadow on the success of the whole enterprise—relate to extending central authority over the country, disarming and integrating the various warlords (some embedded in positions of state authority), curbing the debilitating upsurge in narcotics production, securing a substantial NATO commitment toward peacemaking, and completing the economic reconstruction program fast enough to earn the Afghan moderates in political positions strengthened legitimacy.[41]

Towering above all, however, appears to be a worsening security situation caused by factional feuds, personal and ethnic rivalries, drug-related incidents, weak or corrupt provincial and district administrations, continued rule by local commanders, and the absence of effective national law enforcement, in addition to the problem of terrorist violence associated with the reconstitution of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in northwestern Pakistan.[42] These remnants of the old regime, though defeated, seek to create enough mayhem to unsettle the Karzai government, aggravate Afghanistan's ethnic imbalances, and ultimately evict Western forces from the country.

The problem of Taliban resurgence, while specific to the challenges in Afghanistan, illuminates a larger problem facing the United States in the context of mounting effective direct operations to defeat terrorism, namely, the challenge of confronting "double dealers who seek U.S. favor but still countenance terrorism in their midst."[43] In cases where double dealers are judged to be basically friendly, the administration has adopted a "pressure in private, praise in public" policy. When double dealers are generally unfriendly, the policy has been largely reversed, with public pressure supplemented episodically by low-key private efforts at inducement. Thus far neither approach appears to have succeeded completely. In fact, what seems to motivate double dealers to reconsider their duplicitous policies more than any other is when their terrorist clients begin to turn upon them. Thus, the Saudi monarchy initiated resolute action against domestic supporters of terrorist groups only when the latter began to launch attacks within the kingdom. Similarly, General Musharraf began to reconsider his backing for officially supported jihadi groups only after these elements began to target him and senior Pakistani army officers personally.

If, despite its shortcomings, Afghanistan is emblematic of much that is right with direct action against terrorism, few analysts today would assert the same about Iraq. The administration justified the military action against Saddam Hussein on the grounds that he possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which in the post-September 11 environment raised fears about the use of such weapons against U.S. interests either directly or through Iraq's connections with Al Qaeda. Today, both these rationales for pre-emptive war have been severely undermined by the failure to find the WMD stockpiles Hussein is supposed to have possessed,[44] and by the growing realization that Iraq's "operational relationship" with terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda was at best tenuous.[45] To complicate matters further, it now appears as if the decision to go to war was shaped greatly by both erroneous and distorted intelligence assessments.[46]

Despite these facts, there were arguably good reasons for pursuing regime change in Iraq, as even the Clinton administration concluded in the final months of its term. The fact that Saddam Hussein continued to harbor an interest in reconstituting Iraq's WMD programs, that these programs were temporarily arrested only because of a UN-supported sanctions regime that was rapidly fraying, that the U.S.-led coercive enforcement effort over a decade was judged to cost close to what a war with Iraq might have, and that Saddam Hussein represented a long-term threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and, by extension, to U.S. interests in the Middle East, all taken together arguably justified the use of military force against Baghdad. These arguments admittedly better validate a preventive, as opposed to a pre-emptive, war, but the former can be defended more cogently only on the basis of a larger U.S. grand strategy aimed at cementing global primacy and maintaining long-term regional stability than on the more narrow justification of a war on terrorism.[47]

Since the Bush administration, however, chose to justify the war against Iraq on the pre-emptive basis—a view strengthened by fears that Iraq's unconventional weapons might be used to support global terrorism—the legitimacy of the conflict quickly became suspect when the post-war facts on the ground began to confound the administration's claims.

More problematically, however, the failure to secure an international consensus (including assistance from most of the United States' traditional allies) prior to the war, coupled with several bad decisions made both in Washington and at the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad during the post-war occupation, have resulted in Iraq becoming a magnet for international terrorism.[48] Even worse, it threatens to undermine core elements of the President Bush's approach to the war on terrorism: the importance of acting pre-emptively when necessary, creating a "coalition of the will-

ing" in the face of resistance by allies or the UN, confronting Iraq as the cornerstone of global terrorism, and transforming Baghdad into a democracy to catalyze region-wide change in the Middle East.[49] Even if some of these components survive the Iraqi crisis in one form or another, as is likely, they will always be the object of great suspicion not because they are inherently problematic but because they may have been applied inappropriately in this case and, at any rate, without requisite preparation.

At this point, therefore, it is hard to conclude, despite the many benefits of removing Saddam Hussein for larger U.S. geo-political interests in the Middle East, that the war in Iraq represents a net plus for the United States in its war on terrorism. At some point in the future—if violence in Iraqi attenuates sufficiently, a democratic dispensation takes root, the Iraqi economy is revitalized, and Iraq's territorial integrity is preserved—this judgment hopefully will be revised, but as things stand only the most optimistic accounts would treat the current situation in Iraq as conducive to success in the war on terrorism. In fact, if the present conflagration in Iraq extends to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other vulnerable neighboring states, even the larger geo-political benefits of Saddam's removal will be called into question. And if the Iraqi crisis ends up denuding Washington of the political willingness and the military capability to confront other, possibly more serious, threats to U.S. interests such as Iran and North Korea, then *Operation Iraqi Freedom* will have turned out to be even more costly from the perspective of preserving American primacy than it appears at first sight. If these liabilities are compounded at home by a return to high budget deficits, anemic economic performance, constricted civil liberties, increased threats to homeland security, and a heightened loss of political confidence in Washington's capacity for leadership, then the final costs of the Iraqi war will have turned out to be very high indeed.

On a brighter note, however, the administration's efforts with respect to directly attacking terrorism and denying it resources have borne fruit in three important areas. In contrast to past efforts, the Bush administration has attempted to develop a comprehensive strategy to attack major terrorist groups worldwide. This effort has included using diplomacy to create a better understanding of the terrorist threat; interdicting terrorist financing; revitalizing law enforcement cooperation with key states, increasing the global sharing of law enforcement information, and implementing tough new anti-terrorism laws; creating a department of Homeland Security to protect critical infrastructure, improve local capacity to respond to chemical and biological threats; and, in a more controversial solution, enacting the Patriot Act to provide legal cover for federal efforts to track and disrupt terrorist cells. Although many of these efforts are still incomplete and have

been critiqued for various shortcomings, the administration deserves credit for trying to think about the issue comprehensively and developing cooperative international efforts for dealing with the problem.[50]

A second achievement is that the administration has managed to secure and maintain the support of key Asian governments in its war on terrorism. As Robert Sutter points out in his chapter on the United States, even on as controversial and vexing an issue as Iraq, the administration has secured troop contributions from Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and Australia, despite much public opposition in many of these countries. It could secure Pakistani and Bangladeshi troop contributions in the future as well, although the pull-out of Philippine troops following the July hostage crisis was a blow. More interestingly, however, as Sutter and contributors in this book elaborate, the administration's focus on terrorism has resulted in almost every major Asian state—Japan, Russia, China, and India—reorienting its grand strategy to exploit opposition to terrorism to improve its relations with the United States. As a result, core geo-political rivalries between China and the United States, Russia and the United States, China and Japan, and China and India (though for reasons beyond terrorism in this case), have attenuated, at least for now. Relations between some neighbors have also improved, as in the case of India and Pakistan, spurred partly by concerns about terrorism.[51]

Finally, and irrespective of what role the United Nations eventually plays in the international struggle against terrorism, the administration's emphasis on defeating international terrorism has animated Asian states to explore regional multilateral mechanisms for dealing with this threat. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for example, has enhanced Sino-Russian anti-terrorism cooperation as well as provided a multilateral framework for coordinating counter-terrorism efforts in Central Asia and with the United States. Similarly, anti-terrorism cooperation has substantially increased among Asian states and become a central issue in the activities of the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, leading once again to discussions about the need for establishing a formal multilateral security organization in Asia that would integrate existing regional and sub-regional security bodies into a broader Asian security architecture.[52]

Developing a Grand Strategy to Defeat Terrorism

The third dimension in the war on terrorism and one that is fundamental to its long-term success, is developing an appropriate "grand strategy" to defeat terrorism. This is another area where the United States has not done as well as it should. A note of caution is appropriate here: given the large

number of terrorisms, each with its own peculiarities and specific causes, it is impossible to craft a grand strategy for defeating terrorism writ large. Rather, what is needed is a grand strategy for conquering the most important kind of terrorism confronting the United States today, namely the transregional discontent that wraps itself in the symbols and idioms of Islam and is located along a vast geographic swath stretching from Asia through the Middle East to North Africa.[53]

If tactical counter-terrorism operations focus on defeating terrorist states, terrorist groups of global reach, and national terrorisms as appropriate, the objective of a grand strategy would be to, first, differentiate actual terrorists from their more numerous sympathizers and then marginalize the former and thus ultimately defeat them. A grand strategy against terrorism, accordingly, would address the long-term challenge of how to prevent millions of disaffected Muslims throughout the world from seeking redress of their grievances through violence as opposed through the mechanisms of normal politics.

Developing a grand strategy of this sort will require great intellectual effort on the part of the United States, U.S. allies, and the West at large. It will also require a willingness to confront squarely shortcomings in current U.S. policy, to the degree that these failures contribute to the legitimization of armed Islamist resistance. Above all, it will require a vision that is integrative, one that addresses the political, economic, social, and ideological drivers of dissatisfaction in the contemporary Muslim world. Any serious effort at developing a grand strategy that pivots on the transformation of the Middle East will be a long drawn effort likely to span several generations. President Bush, in his public remarks, has clearly underscored this fact. But it is not obvious that the United States as a nation at this point in history has the stomach for a major political obligation to transform an entire region of the globe. For all the administration's desire to promote Middle East transformation, therefore, there is still no evidence of a bipartisan commitment in Congress to support such an endeavor, as there was in an earlier generation for the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe. The public interest in this initiative has also been conspicuously minimal.

The administration's effort to develop a grand strategy to defeat terror via transforming the Middle East has also run into other problems.

First, the European allies, whose cooperation would be vital to implementing any successful grand strategy against terrorism, reacted somewhat coolly to the Bush initiative. This response derived, in part, from trans-Atlantic tensions with the administration over its conduct in Iraq. It was also driven by a suspicion that what the President was proposing—programs to strengthen the electoral process, train parliamentarians, non-gov-

ernmental organizations, and journalists, reform the judiciary, and animate civil society—was little other than a warmed over version of what the Europeans themselves had initiated through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative in 1995.[54] Consequently, most European allies, while welcoming the new American willingness to confront the structural problems giving rise to terrorism, did little more than offer polite support.

Second, the Middle Eastern states themselves were not enthusiastic about the President's ideas for reform.[55] This disenchantment arose partly from issues of process. Most Arab countries first learned of this initiative not through a private intimation by the U.S. government, but as a result of leaked documents that were to have been unveiled at a G-8 meeting. Fearing that this approach cast them as objects rather than as partners in Middle East reform, several Arab states reacted viscerally to what they perceived was yet another imperial plan about to be foisted on the region without prior consultation.[56] Other fundamental problems were implicated as well. Most authoritarian regimes could be expected to tolerate modest reform measures that might burnish their internal legitimacy and their external standing, but there is no reason to presume that they would support serious reforms that threaten to divest them of real power over their states—unless they were either coerced by superior power or suborned by phenomenal blandishments, neither of which appeared in the President's plan.

Finally, and most importantly, President Bush's Middle East transformation initiative did not address what is clearly the core problem with any U.S. grand strategy aimed at defeating Islamist terrorism by reforming retrograde Arab regimes, namely, U.S. dependence on these entities for larger geo-political purposes. Whether these interests be the free flow of energy or denying others a preponderant influence in the Middle East, the U.S. reliance on authoritarian regimes to protect these equities has created painful dilemmas that cannot be easily resolved.[57] As Graham Fuller highlights in his chapter, the sustained protection of authoritarian clients has over time given rise to growing resentment against both these local sovereigns and their superpower protector. In the post-Cold War era, this opposition has materialized in the form of terrorism wrapped in Islamic trappings.

Disarming the millions of Islamist sympathizers in the Middle East—even as the United States attacks the terrorists directly—would require greater democratization, equity, and enlightenment in these polities.[58] That by definition however implies that the current ruling elites, which support the United States, could lose their power, with all the accompanying consequences for larger U.S. interests. Risking the loss of reliable, even if somewhat unsavory, clients who provide immediate strategic benefits, including those connected to the war on terrorism, for the uncertain, and at

best long-term, gains accruing from the spread of democratic politics in the Middle East remains a structural predicament that no U.S. administration has thus far been able to resolve.

Developing a grand strategy to defeat Islamist terrorism in such circumstances will, therefore, be a tricky and difficult business. It is not certain that the United States in practice will be able to develop one, let alone implement it. Yet, without such a comprehensive vision of political change and the willingness to execute it, the battle to prevent the large mass of Muslim sympathizers from slowly gravitating toward active terrorism will surely be lost. As the administration contemplates this painful fact, two elements in particular deserve special attention.

The issue that demands greater U.S. attention and perhaps a better strategy is the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The Palestinian crisis is such a catalyzing issue in Muslim politics because it lies at the intersection of multiple problems—the rights of a dispossessed people, U.S. support for Israel, Israel's security and internal stability, the cold war between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and the larger questions of "civilizational" relations between Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. Consequently, no attempt at defusing Muslim resentment against the United States is likely to be effective without better approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian problem.

The second issue that demands attention and must be addressed primarily by Muslims themselves is Islam's own relationship with the modern world. This is not a matter on which the United States can make a major contribution, yet America is vitally affected by it. Given the threat posed by radicalized Islam for Muslim populations in general, it is vital that issues in Islamic thought that have not been settled before—the distinction between the public and the private, the justification of violence and the conditions attaching thereto, the relationship between religion and the state in a multi-religious universe—be addressed and debated anew.[59] Success in this endeavor will depend greatly on the ability of Muslims to recover the tradition of *ijtihad*, which involves creatively "working with the sources of dogma" to "steer a new course for Islam and Islamic law, a course that stays within the boundary of Islamic tradition, but at the same time avoids the blindness of simply imitating earlier scholars, without consideration of the changing conditions of society."[60] As Goh Chok Tong, former prime minister of Singapore, one of the strongest U.S. allies in Asia, concluded, "this ideological struggle is far more complex than the struggle against communism because it engages not just reason but religious faith. Non-Muslims have no *locus standi* to engage in this struggle for the soul of Islam. It is a matter for Muslims to settle among themselves."[61]

Long-Term Implications of the War on Terrorism

Although public attention has been dominated by the war on terrorism, in part shaped by the administration's own rhetoric on this issue, the fact remains that the Bush presidency has attempted to simultaneously manage two very different challenges during its 2001–04 term: defending against a global Islamist insurgency, while laying the foundations for protecting U.S. primacy well into the future. Accordingly, the administration ought to be judged by both these yardsticks because, tragic though they were, the September 11 attacks have neither affected the core position of the United States in the international system nor have they erased other more enduring problems of high politics. When viewed in this fashion, there emerges a complex, mixed picture of the administration's achievements. In the war on terrorism itself, there have been some important successes, many incomplete, though still continuing, endeavors, and some failures. On matters of grand strategy, there have been many more successes, but most of these have been silent or largely taken for granted.

As one looks to the future, then, three distinct sets of challenges lie ahead in regard to the war on terrorism, understood narrowly and apart from the co-relevant issues of grand strategy.

The first will be completing the destruction of Al Qaeda remnants in Pakistan, including the apprehension or killing of Osama bin Laden and his immediate cohort. The administration, in collaboration with the government of Pakistan, is currently pursuing these elements hiding in the mountains along the Afghan-Pakistani border. Poor Pakistani operational security, questionable counter-terrorism tactics, and political hesitancy in conducting aggressive operations against former Taliban cadres intermixed with the Al Qaeda membership, however, have episodically compromised the effort.[62] This mission nonetheless must be brought to a successful close.

The second task consists of completing stability operations in Iraq. While the U.S. counter-insurgency mission is likely to persist for some time to come, two critical objectives present themselves in the near term. The first is to complete the raising, training, and deployment of the new Iraqi security forces so as to enable the latter to combat the insurgency with reduced reliance on U.S. forces.[63] The second is to ensure genuine elections and a successful Iraqi constitutional convention in 2005.[64] If these two objectives can be attained over the next two years, the current insurgency in Iraq is likely to lose its momentum, the level of U.S. troop presence in the country can be gradually reduced, and the vision of a stable, democratic, and federal Iraq that remains friendly to the United States would receive a new lease on life.

The third task consists of dealing with various derivative consequences arising from the earliest rounds of the anti-terror campaign and which have received insufficient attention thus far. This includes dealing with national terrorist groups that threaten to expand operations beyond their local confines. Such groups, which would include various Kashmiri terrorist organizations, the IMU, the Armed Islamic Group, the Al-Jama Al-Islamiyya, and the Hizb ut-Tahrir organization, will require increased collaboration with the countries affected by these threats, though that in turn brings difficult challenges if the regimes threatened by insurgent terrorism are not democratic. Further, the United States will have to address more directly the problems caused by recalcitrant or double-dealing allies, such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, while resuscitating the initial efforts already underway in developing a grand strategy for Middle East transformation.

Even as the United States girds itself to deal with further challenges relating to the war on terrorism itself, the other half of its national obligation—implementing an effective grand strategy to cement U.S. primacy over the long term—presents different challenges of its own. Two important sets of unfinished, related, tasks can be discerned here.

The first task consists of developing a U.S. grand strategy that will have as its core objective increasing the acceptance of U.S. preponderance as a desirable feature of the international system. As Henry Kissinger phrased it, "American power is a fact of life; but the art of diplomacy is to translate [that] power into consensus."[65] Thus far, however, U.S. national security strategy has focused more on justifying the material foundations necessary to assure primacy, and elaborating how U.S. capabilities would be used to defend it. It has paid less attention to thinking about the mix of policy instruments required to induce acceptance of U.S. primacy globally.

Conceptualizing this approach across multiple areas requires a revised U.S. national security strategy that elaborates a sustainable vision for preserving U.S. preponderance in the post-Iraq environment. The strategy document ought to place renewed emphasis on sustaining alliances and partnerships to manage international crises as well as rising challengers, bearing the costs required to resolve transnational problems, and recreating a global consensus that is closely aligned with U.S. interests on the most important issues that matter to Washington. A strategy aimed at diminishing resistance to American power simply will not work if the United States is reluctant to accept as one of its major tasks the production of those global public goods that only a "privileged"[66] entity, such as a preponderant state, can supply.

The second major task facing the United States in the realm of grand strategy consists of managing the various trade-offs inherent in the war

on terrorism and the long-term issues connected with maintaining U.S. primacy. The adroit fashion in which China has positioned itself both vis-à-vis the United States and vis-à-vis Asia represents one example of how a country, though currently supportive of the war on terrorism, could expand its power in a way that could threaten U.S. interests over the longer term.[67] The shift in U.S. attitudes toward Taiwan is another example. In contrast to longstanding policy, which asserted that the United States took no position on the question of Taiwanese independence so long as the issue was resolved peacefully with China, the Bush administration has now opposed Taiwanese independence in an effort to avoid a confrontation with Beijing at a time when the United States is deeply enmeshed in Iraq.[68] The merits of this shift are not at issue here. Rather, this discussion simply highlights the fact that the war on terrorism has forced the United States into accepting policy changes that potentially could affect larger U.S. interests related to preserving its primacy.

When all such challenges are considered in tandem, it is obvious that balancing the demands imposed by the ongoing war of terrorism and the larger issues of potential structural change in the international system—preventing the rise of hostile great powers; managing local security competitions in Asia and Europe; containing the diffusion of WMD and their delivery systems; promoting a more open global economy; and expanding democracy and the respect for liberal values—will itself become a major challenge facing U.S. policymakers. Even as the United States grapples with these challenges in the future, the war on terrorism has already highlighted six lessons that ought to be greatly relevant for future U.S. grand strategy.

First, maintaining U.S. primacy will not be a cost-free endeavor. While the reality of continuing primacy is unlikely to be called into question soon, the persistence of U.S. power will continue to be a magnet inviting strategies of resistance and further attacks on the United States and its interests. Consequently, it is imperative that policy-makers remain attuned to the fact that violence directed at the United States will not be simply episodic or idiosyncratic but rather part of a structural antithesis resulting from the reality of U.S. preponderance. In this context, what will be needed are ongoing strategies for preventing, confronting, and mitigating opposition. While military solutions and coercive instruments usually come first to mind, what will be equally important are ideational tools that convincingly convey that American primacy, though good for the United States, can also be good for the rest of world insofar as it promotes truly universal ideals and helps resolve collective action problems of interest to all.

Second, the debate between unilateralism and multilaterialism is a spurious one in the context of managing U.S. primacy. The United States will

have to act unilaterally on some occasions in defense of its vital interests. Great powers almost never have the luxury of choosing retrenchment when multilateral solutions are unavailable; for a hegemonic power, that is invariably the case. Consequently, the only issue is how ought unilateral actions to be managed in order to meet the test of legitimacy, assuming effectiveness is not at issue.

Third, "full spectrum military dominance" is essential for U.S. interests both from the perspective of maintaining primacy as well as defeating terrorism. Maintaining peerless military capabilities can deter future security competition and are critical for defeating armed threats at lowered costs and risk. A superior military force that adequately balances technology, doctrine, and training is also adaptable enough and can produce success when dealing with a range of threats with minimal organizational dislocation. Continuing the on-going military transformation is thus essential on multiple counts, but it is equally important to recognize that even the most potent military capabilities acquired by the United States will be unable to assure perfect homeland security. Consequently, auxiliary measures like law enforcement and diplomacy, including working through international institutions, allies, and partners will be important to manage the threat. Where mitigating covert WMD threats are concerned, increased attention to "supply-side" solutions could multiply benefits in a way that makes direct counter-terrorism efforts more successful.

Fourth, enhancing U.S. security and increasing Washington's ability to manage the problems of international politics will require the United States to get the "big ones" right. The "big ones" in this context refer both to great powers and to great problems: successfully identifying these and developing strategies to cope with them will be vital for future success. The United States can neglect the great powers, both current and rising, only at its peril, because even if these states are not genuine "peer" competitors today their capacity for collaboration or resistance makes a great difference to which outcomes ultimately obtain in the international system. In this context, recognizing which powers are rising and hence worthy of increased attention is itself one issue. How the United States ought to respond to them is another. And which global problems ought to incur concentrated U.S. attention, and how different states, especially rising powers, become relevant to each of these problems remains a third issue that will demand on-going consideration.

Fifth, failed, failing, and ill-governed states cannot be treated any more simply as humanitarian problems, but are potentially significant national security threats. Equally dangerous over the long-term could be friendly states that are run by governments of questionable legitimacy, particularly

if problems of illegitimacy and rectitude give rise to ideologically charged violence directed against the United States. Both sets of problems pose difficult challenges for future grand strategy. The former undermines the received realist wisdom on when political-military intervention is appropriate, insofar as it compels the United States to consider involvement even when a country may be—by most indicators of high politics—irrelevant to U.S. grand strategic objectives. The latter raises the vexing issues of how best to press friends who are locked into shortsighted policies and under what circumstances might it be preferable to sacrifice them.

Sixth, and finally, successful realpolitik will increasingly require successful idealpolitik in the conduct of foreign policy. The conventional realist wisdom, which urged policymakers to concentrate on the external behavior of states and ignore regime character, was appropriate so long as the internal constitution of a state did not produce resentments that were exported abroad. When these dissatisfactions, however, flow beyond national boundaries and are directed towards the United States, alternatives to the Westphalian solution must be considered. The standard realist fix, however, ought not to be jettisoned if appropriate: problem states ought to be pressed to better manage their own domestic dissidents and prevent their resentments from reaching beyond their borders. There is, however, no guarantee that this approach will always work. Consequently, the sources of discontent have to be addressed. In this instance, exporting the liberal project will be increasingly essential for the *security* of the United States and its friends, because democratic regimes can in principle provide opportunities for discontented citizens to find solutions to their grievances within a national framework. Reducing the attractiveness of the United States as a magnet for attack may also be assisted by this strategy. To realize this objective, the United States "must act in ways that benefit all humanity or, at the very least, the part of humanity that shares its liberal principles…. The United States, in short, must pursue legitimacy in the manner truest to its nature: by promoting the principles of liberal democracy not only as a means to greater security but as an end in itself."[69]

Endnotes

[1] The intelligence community, in contrast, was deeply concerned about the growth and operations of Al Qaeda throughout the 1990s and senior CIA leaders, in their earliest briefing to then President-elect Bush, declared Al Qaeda to represent the first and most important threat facing the United States. See Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack,* New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004, p. 12. See also the annual testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on The Worldwide Threat; and Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror*, New

York: Free Press, 2004. On the growth of Al Qaeda itself, see Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, and Benjamin Orbach, "Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida: Origins and Doctrines," *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, vol. 5, no. 4 (December 2001).

[2] An excellent, if still early, history of this seminal event is Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.

[3] See, by way of example, John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*, New York: Basic Books, 1989; Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete?" *International Security*, vol 14, no. 4 (Spring 1990), 42–64; Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, John D. Steinbruner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992; Janne E. Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994; Malcolm Chalmers, "Beyond the Alliance System: The Case for a European Security Organization," *World Policy Journal*, vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 215–30; and Gregory Flynn and David Scheffer, "Limited Collective Security," *Foreign Policy*, vol. 80 (Fall 1990), pp. 77–101.

[4] Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003.

[5] Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, vol. 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988), p. 591.

[6] Lawrence M. Rausch, *Asia's New High-Tech Competitors*, NSF 95–309, Arlington: National Science Foundation, 1995.

[7] Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why Great Powers Will Arise," *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5–51.

[8] For the history of the Bush administration's approach toward the preservation of American primacy, see James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*, New York: Viking, 2004; on the role of institutions and American power, Richard N. Haass, "What to do with American Primacy," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 5 (September/October 1999), pp. 37–49.

[9] Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2003.

[10] J.D. Crouch, "Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review," January 9, 2002; Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, May 1, 2001. This effort, admittedly, is riddled with many inherent tensions. The President's own interest in reducing the salience of nuclear weapons has been offset by bureaucratic interest on the part of U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories in preserving the prospect of developing new kinds of nuclear weapon designs. The changing character of the nuclear arsenals in some existing nuclear powers, which emphasize deep underground shelters for protecting various assets, also increase the pressure to develop new nuclear weapons capable of interdicting these targets, even if only to preserve deterrence. Finally, the sheer political

and conventional military preeminence of the United States obviously heightens the perceived value of nuclear weapons in the minds of many international competitors—all of which taken together could conspire to defeat President Bush's intention to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons as instruments of high politics.

[11] Remarks by the President on the Enlargement of NATO, The South Lawn, March 29, 2004; Philip H. Gordon and James B. Steinberg, *NATO Enlargement: Moving Forward; Expanding the Alliance and Completing Europe's Integration*, The Brookings Institution Policy Brief, no. 90, November 2001.

[12] Colin Powell, "Partnership and Principle," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83, no. 1 (January/February 2004), pp. 22–34. As one analyst put it, "The reshuffling of world alliances may be one of Bush's main geo-political legacies." See Bruno Tertrais, "The Changing Nature of Military Alliances," *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 27, no. 2 (Spring 2004), pp. 135–50.

[13] Robert B. Zoellick, "The WTO and New Global Trade Negotiations: What's at Stake," Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, October 30, 2001; Robert B. Zoellick, "Globalization, Trade, and Economic Security," Remarks at the National Press Club, October 1, 2002.

[14] The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003, pp. 11–12.

[15] One scholar, reading Bush's National Security Strategy against the backdrop of these many innovations, suggested that the administration's approach represented "the most sweeping shift in U.S. grand strategy since the beginning of the Cold War." See John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," *Foreign Policy*, November/December 2002, pp. 50–57.

[16] Michael Traugott et al., "How Americans Responded: A Study of Public Reactions to 9/11/01," *PS: Political Science and Politics*, September 2002, pp. 511–16.

[17] See Henry A. Kissinger, "Center of Gravity Shifts in International Affairs," San Diego Union-Tribune, July 4, 2004; Ian Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, eds., *Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999; Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue, eds., *Governance in a Globalizing World*, Cambridge: Visions of Governance for the 21st Century, 2000.

[18] Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian O. Lesser, eds., *Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and U.S. Strategy*, Santa Monica: RAND, 1998; Frank B. Tipton, *The Rise of Asia: Economics, Society and Politics in Contemporary Asia*, Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1998; National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts*, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2000; Aaron L. Friedberg, "Introduction," in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, eds., *Strategic Asia 2001–02: Power and Purpose*, Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001, pp. 1–16; James F. Hoge, Jr., "A Global Power Shift in the Making," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83, no. 4 (July/August 2004), pp. 2–7.

[19] See Stephen Hanson's chapter on Russia in this volume.

[20] See Mike Mochizuki's chapter on Japan in this volume.
[21] See Victor Cha's chapter on Korea in this volume.
[22] See Nicholas Eberstadt's chapter on Korean scenarios in this volume.
[23] Pervez Musharraf, "A Plea for Enlightened Moderation," *Washington Post*, June 1, 2004.
[24] Najam Sethi, "Whose Enlightenment?" *Friday Times*, October 24–30, 2003.
[25] See Sheldon Simon's chapter on Southeast Asia in this volume.
[26] See Richard J. Ellings and Robert A. Scalapino, "Introduction: Fragility and Crisis," in Ellings and Friedberg, eds., *Strategic Asia 2003–04: Fragility and Crisis*, Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003.
[27] See Sheldon Simon's chapter on Southeast Asia in this volume.
[28] For a useful survey, see Frances Omori and Mary A. Sommerville, eds., *Strength Through Cooperation: Military Forces in the Asian-Pacific Region*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999.
[29] See Gaurav Kampani's chapter on WMD diffusion in this volume.
[30] See Mikkal Herberg's chapter on energy security in this volume.
[31] See, for example, Jeffery Record, *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism*, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003.
[32] The Iraqi-Al Qaeda relationship has been summarized in *The 9/11 Commission Report*, Washington, DC: The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 66.
[33] The State Department's annual report, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, remains a good source of information on the activities of these three countries.
[34] See Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 6 (November/December 2000), pp. 115–26; International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military*, ICG Asia Report, no. 36, July 29, 2002; International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military*, ICG Asia Report, no. 49, March 20, 2003 for excellent overviews of state-sponsored terrorism and Pakistan.
[35] Ambassador Cofer Black, "al-Qaida: The Threat to the United States and Its Allies," testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Washington, DC, April 1, 2004.
[36] Anonymous, *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror*, Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2004.
[37] George W. Bush, *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, September 20, 2001.
[38] Alfred B. Prados, "Middle East: Attitudes toward the United States," *CRS Report for Congress*, December 31, 2001; Pew Global Attitudes Project, "A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists," March 16, 2004; Pew Global Attitudes Project, "Views of a Changing World 2003: War With Iraq Further Divides Global Publics," June 3, 2003.
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