Report on 2012 China-U.S. Security Perceptions Project

--Based on Public and Elite Survey Results

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Foreword

With deepening globalization and the rise of China as an economic power, the China-U.S. relationship has gradually cemented into one of the most important bilateral relationships of the 21st century, with significant impact on peace and development in both countries and the whole world. To mark the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and to enhance the understanding and interaction between the Chinese and American public and elites, the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States co-sponsored the 2012 China-U.S. Security Perceptions Project, with surveys conducted by the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University and the Pew Research Center.

Based on data collection and statistical analysis, the project aims to fully describe current public and elite attitudes in both countries on China-U.S. relations and world order., This is of great academic and practical significance, not only for economic, diplomatic, and military policymakers, but also the general public of China and the United States. First, it provides detailed, reliable, and rich information for governments, businesses, think tanks, and the general publics of both countries to learn about current public and elite perceptions of China-U.S. diplomatic relations. Second, because it is jointly carried out by leading research institutions in the two countries, the project establishes a database of public and elite attitudes on China-U.S. diplomatic ties for scholars, think tanks, and policymakers on both sides that will help tofacilitate in-depth research into bilateral relations. Third, it helps to promote the use of public opinion surveys as well as comparison between elite and public opinions in such research.

The survey in China is sponsored by the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association, and designed and conducted by the Research Center for Contemporary China. Probability sampling is used in the general public survey while quota sampling is used in the elite survey. First-hand empirical data is collected from the public and the elite on their attitudes concerning China-U.S. relations. Specifically, the survey aims to examine views about the current China-U.S. relationship and how much China trusts

the United States; how Chinese people see their own and Americans' character traits; views on China's international status; attitudes toward China's economic situation and views on China's diplomatic approaches; views on obstacles to China-U.S. relations; concerns about China-U.S. relations and the reasons for those concerns; and the deepest concerns about the United States and the reasons for those concerns.

Thanks to scientific methods, a broad perspective, and outstanding partners, the China-U.S. Security Perceptions Project will provide full intellectual support for positive interaction between the two countries and the harmonious development of diplomatic relations. We hope that the findings will help to deepen the understanding of scholars, policymakers, the media, and the general public in China and the United States about key aspects of the bilateral relationship, and facilitate the harmonious development of both China-U.S. relations and world order.

China-U.S. Security Perceptions Project

The project is jointly carried out by the leading research institutes of China and theUnited States, namely the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, and the Pew Research Center. The survey in China is sponsored by the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association, and the Research Center for Contemporary China is invited to undertake the general public survey.

Founded in Beijing in 2011, the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association is a national non-profit civil society organization composed of experts, scholars and social activists engaged in studies of international issues, the Taiwan issue, and cultural issues. Recognized as a first-class legal entity, the Association aims to promote security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and encourage peaceful development on both sides of the Taiwan Strait through studies, dissemination and exchange of Chinese strategic culture.

Established in 1988, the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University is an academic and research institution mainly comprised of experts and scholars of various disciplines at the university. It aims to bring into full play the university's pool of talents and knowledge, carry out various research programs, academic exchanges, and training programs, promote the interdisciplinary study of China's social, political and economic development, and international relations, and provide organizational assistance for Chinese and foreign scholars in their Chinese studies. It focuses on promoting the application of empirical and quantitative scientific methods in academia, policy studies and market research.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, non-profit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international engagement by the U.S. Founded in 1910, its work is nonpartisan, and it is dedicated to achieving practical results. Carnegie is pioneering the first global think tank, with flourishing offices now in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Beirut, and Brussels.

These five locations include the centers of world governance and the places whose political evolution and international policies will most determine the near-term possibilities for international peace and economic advance. The Carnegie Asia Program in Beijing and Washington provides clear and precise analysis to policymakers on the complex economic, security, and political developments in the Asia-Pacific region.

Formed in 2004, the Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that provides information on the issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world. A neutral source of data and analysis, it does not take policy positions. It is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts. The Center's work is often cited by policymakers, journalists and academics, as well as advocates from across the political spectrum. The Pew Global Attitudes Project conducts public opinions surveys around the world on a broad array of subjects ranging from people's assessments of their own lives to their views about the current state of the world and important issues of the day. More than 300,000 interviews in 59 countries have been conducted as part of the project.

Inaugurated in 2008, the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars is dedicated to promoting greater awareness of the China-U.S. relationship and its impact on both countries and the world. It does so by exploring the political, economic, historical, and cultural factors that underlie the respective behavior patterns and world views of China and the U.S. The Institute is nonpartisan, and committed to improving American expertise about China as well as Chinese knowledge about the U.S.

Overview

With deepening globalization and the rise of China as an economic power, the China-U.S. relationship has become increasingly important, capturing the close attention of the public and elites in China. The 2012 China-U.S. Security Perceptions Project aims to improve China-U.S. relations by collecting related information from the public and elites [1] in both countries and enhancing mutual understanding and interaction between the two sides. The main findings of the survey in China are briefly described below.

China-U.S. Relations, Approaches to Foreign Policy, and International Roles

The Chinese people offer a positive overall assessment of China's relations with the U.S. More than half[2] believe China-U.S. relations are generally good, and only 30% think relations are bad.

About 60% of the public say the U.S. does not consider the interests of other countries when making international policy decisions, and only a quarter of them thinks it does. In contrast, 80% believe China takes other countries' interests into account, and only 5% think the opposite. Majorities of each of the elite groups say the U.S. does not consider the interests of other countries, while over three quarters believe China takes the interests of other countries into account when making international policy decisions. When considering the means used to achieve foreign policy goals, nearly 40% of the Chinese public say China relies too little on its military strength; 30% think China relies on its military strength about the right amount; and only 16% say China relies too much on its military strength. Majorities of most of the elite groups think China relies too little on military strength to achieve its foreign policy goals, although

[1] The elite survey respondents of the 2012 China-U.S. Security Perceptions Project fall into five categories, i.e., government officials and civil servants, members of the news media, managers of enterprises and public institutions, scholars of non-military academic and research institutions, and scholars of military academic and research institutions. They will hereinafter be referred to respectively as "government," "news media," "enterprises and public institutions," "non-military academic institutions," and "military academic institutions."

[2] The results of the survey among the public are based on sampling weight, and the distribution of the variables are calculated on the basis of defining the strata, PSU, and sampling weight in order to make overall deductions on the survey. The results of the survey among the elite are based on the source data and are unweighted.

a substantial minority of the news media believe China relies too much on its military strength.

Nearly half of the public favor a shared leadership role for China; 20% suggest China should have no leadership role at all; and only 14% say China should be the single world leader. Among those who say China should play a shared leadership role, 70% think China should be no more or no less assertive than other leading nations, and 26% say China should be the most assertive among leading nations. More than 60% of the elite groups suggest China should play a shared leadership role; over 80% of the scholars in non-military and military academic institutions express this view. Among the elite groups who say China should play a shared leadership role, more than 70% believe China should be no more or no less assertive than other leading nations.

Two-thirds of Chinese elites—including as many as 76% of government officials—think a balance of power between China and the U.S. will lead to greater stability. Some 20% of them believe the world will be more stable if the U.S. remains the leading superpower, and only 8% believe there will be greater stability if China replaces the U.S. as the leading superpower.

The U.S. is a competitor and cannot be trusted.

Only 13% of the public say China can trust the U.S. while 70% do not think so. No more than a quarter across the elite groups believe the U.S. is trustworthy, and 60% clearly say China should not trust the U.S. As the results show, about one half of the public see the U.S. as a competitor of China; only 11% describe the U.S. as a partner of China; and 12% label the U.S. an enemy of China. Among the elite groups, more than 60% think the U.S. is a competitor of China, and 27% of government officials see the U.S. as an enemy of China. By comparison, the Chinese public has more trust in Russia (47%), Pakistan (33%), France (28%), and the UK (28%), and the least in Japan (6%), the Philippines (9%), and the U.S. (13%). The elite groups trust Pakistan and Russia most, and Japan and the Philippines least.

The Chinese public thinks Chinese and Americans are most alike in four traits: competitiveness, inventiveness, modernity, and selfishness; and most different in six traits: aggressiveness, being hardworking, tolerance, generosity, honesty, and violence. The majority of the Chinese public describes Americans as competitive (64%), inventive (64%), and modern (62%), as well as aggressive (67%) and violent (60%). In contrast, the Chinese people are described as hardworking (88%), tolerant (78%), generous (76%), and honest (72%). In addition, a sizable majority think the Chinese people are nationalistic (66%).

Chinese public and elites are more concerned about U.S. military strength.

Over one-third of the general public are more concerned about the military strength of the U.S.; 20% are more concerned about its economic strength; 16% are concerned about both; and 21% are concerned about neither. More than 60% believe the U.S. poses the greatest threat to China, and 17% regard Japan as the largest threat. All of the elite groups think the U.S. is the biggest threat to China; more than 70% of the people in enterprises and public institutions, the government, and military academic institutions share this view. Japan and Russia are described as the second and third largest threats respectively to China.

Specifically, over 40% of the Chinese public view the military presence of the U.S. in East Asia as a major threat to China, making this the greatest perceived threat among a list of international issues. Other major threats that draw great attention include global environmental change (31%) and international financial instability (29%). Except for non-military academic elites, more than 60% of elites in all other groups consider the military presence of the U.S. in East Asia to be the biggest threat to China. International issues such as international financial instability, global environmental change, and the DPRK's nuclear program are also regarded by the elite groups as major threats to China.

Since China's general public pays the most attention to the military strength of the U.S., in their eyes the three most serious problems that may affect China-U.S. relations

are U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S. hegemony, and U.S. containment of China's rise. About 30% of the public think such political and military matters as the United States' support of Tibetan separatism, its close-up reconnaissance activities along China's coast, and its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region are also very serious problems for China. In contrast, less than 20% of the public regard China-U.S. trade and cyber security as very important issues. Except for government officials, all other elite groups consider U.S. containment of China's rise as the most serious problem, while U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region are deemed less serious. However, government officials and military scholars are more concerned about the United States' military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, its containment of China's rise, and its arms sales to Taiwan. Managers of enterprises and public institutions on the other hand, pay much greater attention to U.S. hegemony and U.S. containment of China's rise, as well as China-U.S. trade.

Differing public and elite policy priorities toward the U.S.

Over half of the Chinese public consider strongly opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to be very important in policy toward the U.S.; 37% say the same about building strong diplomatic relations with the U.S.; and approximately one-third stress that the current exchange rate policy should stay unchanged. Among those who identified two or more items as very important, 45% believe strongly opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is most important; building strong diplomatic relations with the U.S. is less important; and maintaining the current exchange rate policy is least important.

In contrast, majorities of all of the elite groups believe that building strong relations with the U.S. is very important. More than half of the elites in the government and news media feel that strongly opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is very important, while more than half of the managers of enterprises and public institutions stress the importance of maintaining the current exchange rate policy. Among those who identified two or more items as very important, elites in all groups give top priority to building strong diplomatic relations with the U.S.;, followed by maintaining the current

exchange rate policy and strongly opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, in that order. The elite groups think that the priorities for China's policy toward the U.S. should include mutual trust and balance, economics, win-win cooperation, safeguarding China's interests, trade, and addressing the Taiwan issue.

Areas of Collaboration and Sources of Conflict

Across elite groups, the economy is most frequently offered as the best area for better cooperation between China and the U.S., with the second and the third most important areas being trade and technology respectively. Some also mention the possibility of collaboration between China and the U.S on culture and non-traditional security issues. By comparison, the primary source of conflict between China and the U.S. is considered to be military affairs, followed by theeconomy and the Taiwan issue. Other potential sources of conflict include geopolitics and trade.

Regarding possible sources of conflict in the short term, about 30% of the Chinese public cite the Taiwan issue. Other proposed sources include the South China Sea (11%), U.S. military activities around China's territory (10%), and the Diaoyu Islands (7%). All elite groups rank the Taiwan issue as the most likely possible source of conflict. Apart from non-military academic elites, over one-third of the other elite groups say this of Taiwan. The South China Sea is ranked the second most likely possible source of conflict, followed by U.S. military activities around China's territory. Both the Chinese public and elites think a military conflict between China and the U.S. is most possible over Taiwan. In response to the question, "If China used military force against Taiwan without a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan, do you think the U.S. would intervene militarily?" more than 60% of the elites say it would. However, in response to the question, "if China used military force against Taiwan following a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan, do you think the U.S. would intervene militarily?" only 46% of elites believe the U.S. would intervene militarily and 37% think it would not.

Chapter 1: How Chinese View the U.S.

Figure 1: Relations between the U.S. and China



Asked of general public only
Public Questionnaire B8

The Chinese people offer a positive overall assessment of China-U.S. relations. More than half say relations between the two countries are generally good, and only 31% think relations are bad.

Nearly half of the Chinese public regard the U.S. as a competitor of China; only 11% consider the U.S. to be a partner of China; and 12% view the U.S. as an enemy of China. Across all elite groups, 60% or more say the U.S. is a competitor of China, while 27% of government officials see the U.S. as an enemy of China, a percentage much higher than that of any other elite group.

Only 13% of the public say China can trust the U.S., compared with 72% who say China cannot trust it. The Chinese public has the greatest trust in Russia (47%), Pakistan (33%), France (28%) and the UK (28%), and the least in Japan (6%), the Philippines (9%), and the U.S. (13%). Across all elite groups, less than one-fourth believe the U.S. is trustworthy, as opposed to the 60% who do not think so. The elite groups trust Pakistan and Russia most, and Japan and the Philippines least.

About 60% of the public say the U.S. does not consider the interests of other countries when making international policy decisions, and only a quarter have the opposite opinion. In contrast, 80% of the public believe that China takes the interests of other countries into account and only 5% think the opposite. Similarly, majorities of each of the elite groups do not think the U.S. considers the interests of other countries, while more than three-quarters in every elite group believe China does.

The majority of the Chinese public think that Americans have both positive and negative traits. For example, Chinese people see Americans as competitive (64%), inventive (64%), and modern (62%), as well as aggressive (67%) and violent (60%). The Chinese people are considered to be hardworking (88%), tolerant (78%), generous

(76%), and honest (72%). A considerable percentage also consider Chinese to be nationalist (66%), competitive (63%), inventive (62%), and modern (61%). In comparative terms, the Chinese public thinks that the peoples of the two countries are most alike in that they are competitive, inventive, modern, and selfish, while the two peoples differ sharply from each other in the six characteristics ofaggressiveness, being hardworking, tolerance, generosity, honesty, and violence.

1. Assessment of China-U.S. relations: U.S. is a competitor of China

A plurality of Chinese (45%) say the U.S. is a competitor of China while 17% think the U.S. is a partner, a competitor, and an enemy of China at the same time. Few regard the U.S. as solely China's partner (11%) or enemy (12%).

Table 1: Generally speaking, do you think the U.S. is a partner, a competitor, or an enemy of China?

	Partner	Competitor	Enemy	None	All	DK	Refuse	N
General Public	11	45	12	2	17	12	1	2597
Elites								
Government	5	68	27	0	0	0	0	75
News Media	9	75	8	0	0	5	3	64
Enterprises and Public Institutions	23	66	10	0	0	1	0	70
Non-military Academic Institutions	17	57	11	0	0	13	3	76
Military Academic Institutions	15	75	8	0	0	1	0	73

.Elite Questionnaire and Public Questionnaire B12

Although majorities across all age groups consider the U.S. a competitor of China, many more people under 30 regard the U.S. as a partner of China than do people in other age groups, while more people over 50 think the U.S. is an enemy of China than do middle-aged and young people. In general, the better the people are educated, the more likely they are to see the U.S. as a partner or competitor rather than an enemy of China. Among those seeing the U.S. as a partner of China, the number of people

with university (including junior college) education or above is 2.5 times that of people with primary school education or less.

Majorities in all of the elite groups also regard the U.S. as a competitor of China. In every elite group, about 57-75% describe the U.S. as a competitor; 27% of government officials see the U.S. as an enemy, a percentage distinctly higher than that in any other elite group. The percentage of elites describing the U.S. as a partner is more than 15% in three elite groups, i.e., enterprises and public institutions, non-military academic institutions, and military academic institutions, higher than in the other two elite groups.

2. Trust in the U.S.

The Chinese public generally lacks trust in the international community. Only 13% say the U.S. can be trusted a great deal or a fair amount, compared with 72% who think the country cannot be trusted. Of the 10 countries surveyed, Russia is the most trusted: about half of the public think China can trust Russia a great deal or a fair amount. A quarter or more say China can trust Pakistan (33%), France (28%), the UK (28%), and South Korea (24%). In contrast, the Chinese public has very little trust in China's neighboring countries India and Vietnam; only 17% and 16% respectively feel that China can trust the two countries. Only 6% and 9% respectively think Japan and the Philippines can be trusted, and the U.S. is the third least trusted country behind Japan and the Philippines.

Table 2: Generally speaking, how much do you think China can trust the following countries?

Great deal/ Fair amount (%)	General Public	Elites				
		Government	News Media	Enterprise and Public Institutions	Non-military Academic Institutions	Military Academic Institutions
Russia	47	67	45	39	53	60
Pakistan	33	75	72	57	86	88
France	28	48	25	33	49	42
UK	28	33	25	36	49	42
South Korea	24	35	20	21	46	36
India	17	5	6	9	18	19
Vietnam	16	13	9	10	14	11
U.S.	13	15	16	19	26	19
Philippines	9	3	5	4	9	7
Japan	6	4	2	7	8	4
N	2597	75	64	70	76	73

Elite Questionnaire and Public Questionnaire B5

Generally, the Chinese public thinks the U.S. cannot be trusted. However, trust in the U.S. varies slightly among people of different age groups and education levels. Compared with people above age 40, those under 40 are more likely to think China can trust the U.S. a great deal or a fair amount. Trust in the U.S. is more polarized among those with higher levels of education: on the one hand, as education level increases from high school (vocational secondary school) to graduate school, the percentage of those who say the U.S. can be trusted a great deal or a fair amount increases from 15% to 20%; on the

Table 3: Generally speaking, how much do you think China can trust the U.S.? (%)

	Great deal/ Fair amount	Not too much /Not at all	DK/ Refused
General Public	**13**	**72**	**14**
18-19	16	73	11
30-39	14	74	13
40-49	13	71	15
50-59	11	68	21
60-69	10	76	15
70+	13	71	16
Primary school or below	11	61	28
Middle school	9	75	16
High school (vocational secondary school)	15	75	11
University (junior college)	17	76	7
Graduate school	20	74	7

Elite Questionnaire and Public Questionnaire B5a

other, the percentage of those who think the U.S. can be trusted not too much or not at all stays around 75%.

Similar to the public, elites across all groups say China can trust the U.S. not too much or not at all. Less than a quarter think the U.S. can be trusted; and the percentage of those who consider the U.S. to be untrustworthy exceeds 66% in every elite group.

Among the 10 countries listed, majorities within the five elite groups think China can trust Pakistan most. More than half of the elites from the government, non-military academic institutions, and military academic institutions believe Russia can be trusted. The percentage of those who think France, the UK, and South Korea are trustworthy is between 20% and 50% in every elite group, similar to public opinion. Elites in all groups say Japan and the Philippines can be least trusted; the percentage of those who consider the two countries to be trustworthy is less than 10% in every elite group. In addition, the percentage of those who say India is trustworthy is also very low among Chinese elites in government, news media, and enterprises and public institutions.

3. Chinese and U.S. Approaches to Foreign Policy

About six in ten Chinese (57%) say the U.S. does not consider the interests of other countries in the world when making international policy decisions, and only a quarter believe it does. In contrast, 80% say China takes the interest of other countries into account and only 5% do not think so.

Table 4: Generally speaking, how much do you think China/the U.S. considers the interests of other countries when making foreign policy decisions?

Great deal/Fair amount (%)	**China**	**U.S.**	**N**
General Public	80	24	2597
Elites			
Government	94	23	75
News Media	83	35	64
Enterprises and Public Institutions	92	39	70
Non-military Academic Institutions	76	44	76
Military Academic institutions	89	38	73

Elite Questionnaire and Public Questionnaire B10, B11

When asked whether the U.S. considers the interests of other countries in making foreign policy, people of different age groups have differing

views. People younger than 30 are more likely to think the U.S. takes the interests of other countries into account; 30% of those between 18 and 29 offer the view, compared with about 20% in other age groups. At the same time, those younger than 40 are more likely than middle-aged and elderly people to believe that China takes the interests of other countries into account when making foreign policy.

Views about Chinese and U.S.approaches to foreign policy differ greatly among people with different education levels. In short, respondents who are better educated are more likely to believe the U.S. considers the interests of other countries when making foreign policy. Among people with a primary school education or less, the percentage of those holding this view is merely 18%, while the percentage is 20%, 25%, 30%, and 35% among people with middle school, high school (vocational secondary school), university (junior college), and graduate school education, respectively. These trends hold when respondents are asked whether or not China considers the interests of other countries. More than 90% of people with university (junior college) education or above say China does consider other countries' interests, a much higher percentage than that in other groups.

Majorities of each of the elite groups think the U.S. does not consider the interests of other countries when making foreign policy. However, in every elite group, more than three-fourths think China does. More than four in ten (44%) elites at non-military academic institutions say the U.S. does take the interests of other countries into account, the highest percentage among all elite groups. The percentage of elites at non-military academic institutions who think China considers the interests of other countries is the lowest at 76%. By comparison, 94% of government elites say China takes into account other countries' interests, the highest percentage among all of the elite groups, while only 23% of them think the U.S. does. The views of other elite groups on Chinese and U.S. approaches to foreign policy lie between those of government elites and elites at non-military academic institutions.

4. Characteristics Associated with Chinese and Americans

More than 60% of the Chinese public believes Americans have both positive and negative traits. For example, Americans are seen as competitive (64%), inventive (64%), and modern (62%), as well as aggressive (67%) and violent (60%). About half of the Chinese associate negative characteristics with Americans, such as arrogance (58%), greediness (54%), selfishness (50%), inconsistency (47%), and nationalism (45%). Correspondingly, only a small percentage of Chinese attribute positive characteristics such as being hardworking (38%), generosity (28%), honesty (27%), and tolerance (24%) to the American people.

The majority of Chinese believe they are hardworking (88%), tolerant (78%), generous (76%), and honest (72%); more than half also say the Chinese people are nationalistic (66%), competitive (63%), inventive (62%), modern (61%), and selfish (51%). A considerable proportion think Chinese are sophisticated (48%) and greedy (43%). In contrast, the Chinese people seldom associate themselves with negative traits. For example, very few say Chinese are aggressive (12%), violent (21%), rude (25%), or arrogant (26%).

Table 5: Characteristics Associated with Americans and Chinese (%)

	Americans	Chinese	Diff.
Aggressive	67	12	54
Competitive	64	63	1
Inventive	64	62	2
Modern	62	61	1
Violent	60	21	39
Arrogant	58	26	32
Greedy	54	43	12
Selfish	50	51	-1
Inconsistent	47	32	15
Nationalistic	45	66	-21
Hardworking	38	88	-50
Rude	36	25	11
Sophisticated	34	48	-14
Generous	28	76	-48
Honest	27	72	-45
Tolerant	24	78	-54

Asked of general public only

Elite Questionnaire and Public Questionnaire B9a-B9ap

This comparison indicates that the Chinese public believe the peoples of the two countries are most alike in that they are competitive, inventive, modern, and selfish, but most different in the six traits of aggressiveness, being hardworking, tolerance, generosity, honesty, and violence.

Chapter 2: Threats and Concerns

Figure 2: What concerns you more about the U.S.?



Asked of general public only

Public Questionnaire B13

More than one-third of the Chinese people express concern about the military strength of the U.S.; 20% are concerned about its economic strength; 16% say both concern them; and 21% say neither concerns them.

Over 40% of the Chinese public believe the U.S. military presence in East Asia poses a major threat to China, topping the list of potential global threats. Other major threats that the Chinese public are highly concerned about include global environmental change (31%) and international financial instability (29%). Except for elites from non-military academic institutions, 60% or more of elites in the other groups say the U.S. military presence in East Asia is a major threat to China. Elites also perceive global issues such as international financial instability, global environmental change, and the DPRK's nuclear program as major threats to China.

Over 60% of Chinese believe the U.S. is the greatest threat to China, while 17% point to Japan. All elite groups regard the U.S. as the greatest threat to China, and more than 70% of elites in enterprises and public institutions, the government, and military academic institutions share this view. Japan and Russia rank as the second and third greatest threats respectively.

About seven in ten Chinese believe that the current economic situation is somewhat good or very good, with people older than 50 being more optimistic. In every elite group, more than half believe China will become more democratic as a result of economic growth.

As seen by the Chinese public, the top three most serious problems affecting China-U.S. relations are U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S. hegemony, and U.S. containment of China's rise. About 30% think the United States' support of Tibetan separatism, its close-up reconnaissance activities along China's coast, and its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region are also very serious problems for China. In contrast, less than 20% consider China-U.S. trade and cyber security to be very serious issues. Apart from government officials, other elite groups all agree that U.S. containment of China's rise is the most serious problem in U.S.-China relations, while U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region are secondary in importance. Government officials and military scholars are more concerned about such military and political matters as the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. containment of China's rise, and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Managers of enterprises and public institutions pay more attention to U.S. hegemony and U.S. containment of China's rise, as well as China-U.S. trade.

1. Global Threats

Regarding the U.S. military presence in East Asia, more than four in ten Chinese (41%) think it is a major threat to China, 24% believe it is a minor threat, and only 6% say it is not a threat. Among a list of global issues which may pose threats to China, the U.S. military presence in East Asia tops the list of concerns for the public. Other major threats the Chinese public is greatly concerned about include global environmental change (31%) and international financial instability (29%). By comparison, only a few regard the DPRK's nuclear program (12%), Iran's nuclear program (7%), Islamic extremist groups (7%), and the political unrest in Pakistan (5%) as major threats to China.

Table 6: Do you think the following global issues are major threats, minor threats, or not threats to China?

Major threat to China (%)		Elites				
	General Public	**Government**	**News Media**	**Enterprises and Public Institutions**	**Non-military Academic Institutions**	**Military Academic Institutions**
U.S. military presence in East Asia	41	75	69	59	46	62
Global environmental change	31	16	44	37	25	21
International financial instability	29	31	48	50	55	51
DPRK's nuclear program	12	32	28	26	38	32
Iran's nuclear program	7	1	9	7	4	4
Islamic extremist groups	7	19	22	10	18	18
Political unrest in Pakistan	5	7	3	3	4	7
N	2597	75	64	70	76	73

Elite Questionnaire and Public Questionnaire B7a-B7g

Views about whether the U.S. military presence in East Asia poses a major threat to China vary by age group and education level. People younger than 40 are more concerned about the U.S. military presence in East Asia. About 44% of people aged 18-29 and 47% of people aged 30-39 think it is a major threat to China, while 33-41% of the people older than 40 share the same viewpoint. People with high school (vocational secondary school) education or above are more likely to view the U.S. military presence in East Asia as the greatest threat to China, including 45% of people with high school (vocational secondary school) education, 50% of those with university (junior college) education, and 49% of those with graduate school education. The percentage of people holding the same view among those with a primary school education or less and those with middle school education is 25% and 41% respectively.

Except for non-military academic elites, 60% or more in all of the other elite groups say the U.S. military presence in East Asia represents a major threat to China. Government officials are most concerned about the U.S. military presence in East Asia; 75% of them think that it is a major threat to China, compared with seven in ten among news media (69%) and six in ten among military academic elites (62%) and managers of enterprises and public institutions (59%). The percentage is quite low among non-military scholars (46%).

Besides the U.S. military presence in East Asia, international financial instability, global environmental change, and the DPRK's nuclear program are also viewed by Chinese elites as major threats to their country. Scholars at non-military academic institutions are more concerned about international financial instability, with 55% of them saying it's a major threat to China, compared with 51% of scholars at military academic institutions, 50% of the people in enterprises and public institutions, 48% of people in the news media, and 31% of government officials. About four in ten elites from the news media (44%) and enterprises and public institutions (37%) believe global environmental change is also a major threat to China, while more than three in ten government officials (32%) and scholars at non-military academic institutions (38%) and military academic institutions (32%) think the DPRK's nuclear program also represents a major threat to China.

2. U.S. Seen as the Greatest Threat to China

When asked which countryposes the greatest threat to China, more than six in ten Chinese (63%) name the U.S., a percentage far higher than for other countries. In addition, 17% view Japan as the greatest threat, followed by India (3%), Russia (2%), Al-Qaeda/terrorist groups (1%), the Philippines (1%), and the DPRK (1%). Other countries are not mentioned.

Table 7: Which country poses the greatest threat to China?

Country posing greatest threat to China (%)	General Public	Government	News Media	Elites Enterprises and Public Institutions	Non-military Academic Institutions	Military Academic Institutions
U.S.	63	76	67	81	55	70
Japan	17	29	23	14	21	15
India	3	4	3	3	5	3
Russia	2	8	14	9	12	3
Al-Qaeda/Terrorist	1	0	0	0	0	0
Philippines	1	1	0	0	0	1
DPRK	1	0	3	0	3	3
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	0
Afghanistan	0	0	0	0	0	0
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mexico	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	2597	75	64	70	76	73

Elite Questionnaire and Public Questionnaire B4a-B4m

People aged 30-50 are more likely to view the U.S. as the greatest threat to China. About 66% of people aged 30-39 and 64% of people aged 40-49 age feel this way, while 59% of people aged 60-69 and 58% of those older than 70 share this opinion. More educated respondents are more likely to view the U.S. as the biggest threat. Five in ten people with university education or below regard the U.S. as the largest threat to China, compared with 64%, 68%, 66%, and 71% respectively, among those with middle school education, high school (vocational secondary school) education, university (junior college) education, and graduate school education.

All elite groups see the U.S. as the greatest threat to China. The percentage of people holding the view is 81%, 76%, 70%, 67%, and 55% respectively among people at enterprises and public institutions, government officials, scholars at military academic institutions, members of the news media, and scholars at non-military academic institutions. Japan ranks second in Chinese elites' threat perceptions, viewed as the greatest threat by about three in ten (29%) government officials, 23% of media elites, and 21% of scholars at non-military academic institutions. This view is also shared by

14% of the people at enterprises and public institutions and 15% of military scholars. Russia is considered the third greatest threat to China, followed by India and the DPRK.

3. Economic Strength and Development of China and the U.S.

The Chinese public is more concerned about U.S. military rather than economic strength. Thirty-four percent say they are more concerned about U.S. military strength; only 20% are more concerned about U.S. economic strength. Meanwhile, 16% are concerned about both, and 21% are concerned about neither.

Table 8: Which concerns you more about the U.S., its economic or military strength?

	General Public	Primary School or less	Middle School	High School (VSH)	University (Junior college)	Graduate School
Economic Strength	20	9	16	23	26	40
Military Strength	34	25	38	42	32	14
Both	16	9	11	16	26	38
Neither	21	36	25	15	13	5
Don't know	8	21	9	3	3	3
Refused	1	1	1	1	1	0

Public Questionnaire B13

In general, more highly educated respondents are more likely to be concerned about the economic strength of the U.S. Merely 9% of the people with primary school education or less are concerned with U.S. economic strength, compared with 16%, 23%, and 26% respectively among those with middle school education, high school (vocational secondary school) education, and university (junior college) education. The proportion of those with graduate school education indicating concern about U.S. economic strength is four times that of respondents with primary school education or less. There is an inverted "U"-shaped correlation between education level and concern about U.S. military strength. As education level increases from primary school or less to high school (vocational secondary school), the percentage of respondents concerned about U.S. military strength rises from 25% to 42%. However, as education

level increases further, the proportion of respondents with university (junior college) and graduate school education indicating concern over U.S. military strength decreases to 32% and 14% respectively.

When asked about China's current economic situation, more than 60% of the public believe it is somewhat good, compared with 6% who think it is very good, and over a quarter saying it is somewhat bad or very bad. People older than 50 are more optimistic about the current economic situation. The percentage of those saying it is very good or somewhat good is 70%, 75%, and 84% respectively among those aged 50-55, 60-90, and over 70, as opposed to about 65% among people younger than 50. As for education levels, the percentage of those thinking the current economic situation is very good or somewhat good is highest among those having received middle school education (73%), compared with 68% among those with either high school (vocational secondary school) education or university (junior college) education, and 62% among those with graduate school education.

Figure 3: How do you think the current economic situation is?



Asked of general public only
Public Questionnaire B6

4. Most Serious Problems: U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan, Hegemony, and Containment of China's Rise

When asked about the most serious problems in China-U.S. relations, the Chinese public expresses the most concern over U.S. military and security behavior. Among the surveyed bilateral issues, the top three concerns are U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (45%), U.S. hegemony (39%), and U.S. containment of China's rise (37%).

Moreover, about 30% of the public believe the United States' support of Tibetan separatism (33%), its close-up reconnaissance activities along China's coast (32%), and its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region (28%) are also very serious problems. In contrast, less than 20% of the public say China-U.S. trade (18%) and cyber security (17%) are very serious issues.

Except for government officials, all other elite groups think the most serious problem in China-U.S. relations is U.S. containment of China's rise. The percentage of those who see this issue as very serious is 59%, 53%, 52%, 49%, and 40% respectively among elites from military academic institutions, the government, news media, enterprises and public institutions, and non-military academic institutions. The next greatest concern is over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan; 48% of government officials, 37% of military scholars, 36% of news media elites, 36% of managers of enterprises and public institutions, and 29% of scholars at non-military academic institutions describe this issue as very serious. In addition, 30% or more in each elite group also view the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and U.S. support of Tibetan separatism as very serious problems, compared with two in ten or more who regard U.S. close-up reconnaissance activities along China's coast and cyber security as very serious issues. While government officials and military scholars are more concerned about military and political matters such as the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. containment of China's rise, and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, managers of enterprises and public institutions pay more attention to U.S. hegemony and containment of China's rise, as well as China-U.S. trade.

Table 9: Do you think the following issues are very serious problems, somewhat serious problems, not too serious problems, or not problems at all?

		Elites				
Very serious problem for China (%)	**General Public**	**Government**	**News Media**	**Enterprises and Public Institutions**	**Non-military Academic Institutions**	**Military Academic Institutions**
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan	45	48	36	36	29	37
U.S. hegemony	39	43	31	54	15	25
U.S. containment of China's rise	37	53	52	49	40	59
U.S. support of Tibetan separatism	33	35	34	37	29	34
U.S. close-up reconnaissance activities along China's coast	32	20	31	39	22	26
U.S. military presence in the Asia–Pacific region	28	57	34	43	29	32
China-U.S. trade	18	23	25	47	26	11
Cyber security	17	37	25	21	25	27
N	2597	75	64	70	76	73

Elite Questionnaire and Public Questionnaire B17a-B17h

Chapter 3: China's Policy toward the U.S.

Regarding China's policies toward the U.S., half of the public say strongly opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is very important; 37% choose to build strong diplomatic relations with the U.S.; and about one-third emphasize that the current exchange rate policy should stay unchanged. Among those who see more than two priorities as very important, 45% consider strongly opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to be most important, followed by building strong diplomatic relations with the U.S. and maintaining the current exchange rate policy.

Apart from government officials, 60% or more of elites in all other categories think building strong diplomatic relations with the U.S. is very important. Five in ten or more of elites in the government, news media, and military academic institutions see strongly opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as very important, while over 50% of managers of enterprises and public institutions stress the importance of maintaining the current exchange rate policy. Among those who identified two or more items as very important, building strong diplomatic relations with the U.S. was of foremost importance in all elite groups, followed by maintaining the current exchange rate policy. Strongly opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is considered the least important by all elite groups. In response to an open-ended question, elites expressed that China's policy toward the U.S. should give top priority to mutual trust and balance, economics, win-win cooperation, safeguarding China's interests, trade, and addressing the Taiwan issue.

Thirty percent of the Chinese public think that the Taiwan issue would be the most likely cause of military conflict between China and the U.S. in the next two to three years. In addition, about 10% of the public think the South China Sea, U.S. military activities around China's territory, and the Diaoyu Islands are also major sources of possible China-U.S. military conflict. All elite groups believe China-U.S. conflict would most likely arise from the Taiwan issue. Except for non-military academic elites, over one-third of respondents in all other elite groups espouse this view. The South China

Sea and U.S. military activities around China's territory are seen as the second and third most likely causes of bilateral military conflict, respectively.

Thirty-five percent of elites mention the economy as the best area to enhance cooperation between China and the U.S., in response to an open-ended question. The economy is followed by, in decreasing order, trade, technology, culture, and non-traditional security issues. In response to another open-ended question about potential sources of conflict between China and the U.S., elites identify the military field; the economy and the Taiwan issue are considered by the elite groups as the second most likely source of conflict. Other sources include geopolitics and trade.

Taiwan is seen by both the public and elites as the specific issue over which China-U.S. military conflict would most likely arise. When asked the question "If China used military force against Taiwan without a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan, do you think the U.S. would intervene militarily?" more than 60% of elites responded that it would. However, "if China used military force against Taiwan following a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan", only 46% of elites believe the U.S. would intervene militarily, while 37% think it would not.

1. Policy Priorities

The survey asked the Chinese public about their views on the importance of three different elements of China's policy toward the U.S. Half of them believe strongly opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is very important, 37% think building strong diplomatic relations with the U.S. is very important, and nearly one-third emphasize that the current exchange rate policy should be maintained.

Table 10: How important do you think the following policies are for China's policy toward the U.S.?

		Elites				
Very important (%)	**General Public**	**Government**	**News Media**	**Enterprises and Public Institutions**	**Non-military Academic Institutions**	**Military Academic Institutions**
Strongly oppose U.S. arms sales to Taiwan	50	69	56	47	32	49
Build strong diplomatic relations with the U.S.	37	53	59	63	65	59
Maintain the current exchange rate policy	32	49	41	54	33	29
N	2597	75	64	70	76	73

Elite Questionnaire and Public Questionnaire B15a-B15c

Except for government officials, 60% or more of elites in all other groups say building strong diplomatic relations with the U.S. is very important. The percentage of those holding this view is 65%, 63%, 59%, 59%, and 53% respectively among elites from non-military academic institutions, enterprises and public institutions, military academic institutions, news media, and military academic institutions. Government officials, members of the news media, and people in military academic institutions are more likely to believe strongly opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is crucial; over 50% of respondents in each of these three elite groups feel this way. By contrast, managers of enterprises and public institutions are more likely to stress the importance of

maintaining the current exchange rate policy (54%), a higher proportion than that of any other elite group.

Respondents from the public and elites who described more than one item as “very important” were asked about the relative importance of the three policies. Forty-five percent of the public say strongly opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is the most important; 32% believe building strong diplomatic relations with the U.S. is the most important; and only 21% say maintaining the current exchange policy is the most important.

In contrast, all elite groups placed first priority on building strong diplomatic relations with the U.S. The percentage of those holding this view is 69%, 53%, 49%, 44%, and 39% respectively among elites in non-military academic institutions, military academic institutions, the government, enterprises and public institutions, and news media. Maintaining the current exchange rate policy is secondary in importance across all elite groups. More than 30% of elites in the government, enterprises and public institutions, and news media consider maintaining the current exchange rate policy to be most important. In contrast, only 20% or less in every elite group think strongly opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is the most important priority in China’s policy toward the U.S., and notably only 4% of government officials feel this way.

Table 11: Which do you think is the most important among the following very important policies? (%)

		Elites				
	General Public	Government	News Media	Enterprises and Public Institutions	Non-military Academic Institutions	Military Academic Institutions
Strongly oppose U.S. arms sales to Taiwan	45	4	19	21	14	13
Build strong diplomatic relations with the U.S.	32	49	39	44	69	53
Maintain the current exchange rate policy	21	44	32	33	14	20
Don't know	2	0	3	0	3	0
Refused	1	2	7	3	0	13
N	965	45	31	39	29	30

Asked only of those who identified more than one item as "very important" in B15.

Elite Questionnaire and Public Questionnaire B16.

Elites were asked an additional open-ended question about priorities for China's policy toward the U.S. According to the results, the elites believe there should be ten priorities in China's policy toward the U.S., including mutual trust and balance (13%), economics (9%), win-win cooperation (9%), safeguarding China's interests (8%), trade (5%), addressing the Taiwan issue (5%), security (4%), improving strengths and guarding against threats (4%), keeping a low profile in the long term (4%), and responding to the U.S. Asia-Pacific security strategy (3%). In summary, the priorities cover three major aspects: China-U.S. diplomatic relations, economic and trade cooperation, and military affairs.

2. Problems That May Cause China-U.S. Military Conflict

Figure 4: What do you think should be the top priority in China's policy toward the U.S.? (%)

Asked of elites only

Elite Questionnaire B8

The public considers the Taiwan issue as the most likely source of China-U.S. military conflict in the next two or three years (31%). The South China Sea, U.S. military activities around China's territory, and the Diaoyu Islands are also seen as possiblemajor sources of military conflict, with about 10% of respondents choosing each of these issues. Other possible sources of China-U.S. military conflict include nuclear weapons (3%), the DPRK's nuclear crisis (3%), China's military activities in the Western Pacific (2%), and cyber security (1%).

Table 12: In the next 2-3 years, which of the following issues do you think is most likely to cause military conflict between China and the U.S.?

		Elites				
Most important area (%)	**General Public**	**Government**	**News Media**	**Enterprises and Public Institutions**	**Non-military Academic Institutions**	**Military Academic Institutions**
Taiwan	31	37	38	33	26	44
South China Sea	11	29	31	29	24	19
U.S. military activities around China's territory	10	9	19	6	16	11
Diaoyu Islands	7	9	6	9	7	8
Nuclear weapons	3	3	0	4	1	0
DPRK's nuclear crisis	3	5	3	10	13	6
China's military activities in the Western Pacific	2	3	0	4	3	1
Cyber security	1	1	0	1	4	1
Space arms race	0	1	2	0	1	3
Other	1	0	0	0	0	1
Don't know	26	0	0	0	1	1
No military conflict	1	0	0	1	0	1
Refused	4	1	2	3	4	3
N	2597	75	64	70	76	73

Elite Questionnaire and Public Questionnaire B18a

Similarly, all elite groups regard Taiwan as the greatest possible source of China-U.S. military conflict; 44%, 38%, 37%, 33% and 26% respectively in military academic institutions, news media, the government, enterprises and public institutions, and non-military academic institutions espouse this opinion. This view exceeds one-third of each elite group except those from non-military academic institutions. Across all elite groups, the South China Sea is seen as the second most likely possible source of military conflict. Except for scholars at military academic institutions (19%), more than a quarter of every other elite group shares this view. Furthermore, apart from managers of enterprises and public institutions (6%), 10% or more of other elite groups believe that U.S. military activities around China's territory could be a major cause of China-U.S. military conflict. In addition, non-military scholars (13%) and managers of enterprises and public institutions (10%) are concerned that the DPRK's nuclear crisis could cause China-U.S. military conflict.

3. Areas of Cooperation and Sources of Conflict

Figure 5: What are the most promising areas for improving China-U.S. cooperation? (%)



Asked of elites only

Elite Questionnaire B13

The survey asked open-ended questions about elite views on the major areas for improving China-U.S. cooperation. According to the results, elites think the most promising area to boost China-U.S. cooperation is the economy (35%), followed by trade and technology, areas identified by over one in ten respondents. Nearly 10% of elites say China and the U.S. could collaborate more on culture and non-traditional security issues. Other areas suggested include environmental protection (6%), win-win cooperation (5%), improving

recognition and understanding (3%), education (3%), and addressing geopolitical issues (2%).

When elites were asked an open-ended question on likely sources of China-U.S. conflict, military affairs tops the list of responses (19%). The economy and addressing the Taiwan issue are considered to be the next most likely sources of China-U.S. conflict, with 15% of elites identifying each of these issues. Ten percent or more of elites point to geopolitics and trade as other sources of conflict. Other areas where China-U.S. conflict may arise include military affairs, such as responding to the U.S. Asia-Pacific security strategy (8%), and security (5%), as well as political affairs, such as promoting human rights, democracy, and freedom (6%), politics (6%), and ideology (4%).

Figure 6: What are the most likely sources of conflict between China and the U.S.? (%)



Asked of elites only

Elite Questionnaire B14

4. U.S. Military Intervention in Taiwan

Taiwan is considered by both the public and elites as the most likely specific source of China-U.S. military conflict. The survey also asked elites about their expectations and views concerning U.S. military intervention in Taiwan. When asked "If China used military force against Taiwan without a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan, do you think the U.S. would intervene militarily?", more than 60% say it would; 20% believe it would not; and nearly 20% did not provide specific answers. However, "if China used military force against Taiwan following a unilateral declaration of

independence by Taiwan," only 46% of elites think the U.S. would intervene militarily, while 37% say it would not.

In the first scenario involving U.S. use of force without unilateral declaration of

Figure 7: Elite Views about U.S. Military Intervention in Taiwan

If China used military force against Taiwan without a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan, do you think the U.S. would intervene militarily?



If China used military force against Taiwan following the unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan, do you think the U.S. would intervene militarily?



Asked of elites only

Elite Questionnaire B19-B20

independence by Taiwan, there is greater expectation of U.S. military intervention among managers of enterprises and public institutions (69%) and members of the news media (64%). Among scholars at military academic institutions, government officials, and scholars at non-military academic institutions, the percentage of people holding such a view is 60%, 59%, and 54% respectively. Under the second scenario, in which Taiwan unilaterally declares independence, 61% of news media elites and 60% of managers of enterprises and public institutions think the U.S. would intervene militarily, compared with 49%, 37%, and 26% respectively among military scholars, government officials, and non-military scholars.

Chapter 4: China's International Role and the Global Balance of Power

Nearly half of the Chinese public thinks China should play a shared leadership role, 20% suggest China should not play any leadership role, and only 14% believe China should be the single world leader. Among those who feel China should play a shared leadership role, 70% think China should be no more or no less assertive than other leading countries, while 26% believe China should be the most assertive leading country. More than 60% of elites suggest China should play a shared leadership role, notably including more than 80% of scholars at non-military and military academic institutions. Among the elites who think China should play a shared leadership role, over 70% believe China should be no more or no less assertive than other leading countries.

Two-thirds of China's elites think that a balance of power between China and the U.S. will lead to greater stability in the long run, compared with 20% who think the world will be more stable if the U.S. remains the leading superpower and only 8% saying the world will be more stable if China replaces the U.S. as the leading superpower. Over 60% of every elite group say a balance of power between China and the U.S. will ensure a more stable world, including, in particular, 76% of government officials.

About 40% of the Chinese public think China relies too little on military strength to achieve its foreign policy goals, nearly 30% say China uses military strength about the right amount, and only 16% believe China depends too much on military strength. Apart from members of the news media (44%), over half of every other elite group thinks China depends too little on military strength to reach its foreign policy goals. Except for military academic elites (19%), over one-third of the other elite groups believe China uses military strength about the right amount. Members of the news media are more likely than other elite groups to believe China relies too much on its military strength.

1. China's International Role

Nearly half (45%) of the Chinese public believe China should play a shared leadership role, 19% suggest China should not play any leadership role, and only 14% say China should be the single world leader. Among those who say China should play a shared leadership role, 71% think China should be no more or less assertive than other leading countries, while merely 26% say China should be the most assertive leading country.

In each elite group, more than 60% think China should play a shared leadership role. Seven in ten government officials and managers of enterprises and public institutions hold this view, compared with 86% and 84% respectively among scholars at non-military and military academic institutions. More than two in ten (21%) government officials believe China should not play any leadership role, with about 13% in every other elite group giving the same response. While 11% of news media elites say China should be the single world leader, few people in other elite groups espouse this view.

Table 13: What role do you think China should play in the world? (%)

	Become the single world leader	Play a shared leadership role	Not play any leadership role	DK	Refused	N
General Public	14	45	19	20	2	2597
Elites						
Government	3	69	21	0	7	75
News Media	11	63	14	6	6	64
Enterprises and Public Institutions	7	70	14	1	7	70
Non-military Academic Institutions	3	86	12	0	0	76
Military Academic Institutions	1	84	12	3	0	73

Elite Questionnaire and Public Questionnaire B1

Among the elites who believe China should play a shared leadership role, more than 70% say China should be no more or less assertive than other leading countries. The elites in military academic institutions, news media, and enterprises and public institutions are more likely to believe China should be no more or less assertive than

other leading countries, with over 80% of the people in each of the three groups reporting this opinion. However, only 71% of government officials and non-military scholars share this view. Compared with other elite groups, a much greater proportion of government officials (27%) want China to become the most assertive leading country.

Table 14: Should China become the most assertive leading country, or should it be no more or less assertive than other leading countries? (%)

	Most assertive leading country	No more or less assertive than other leading countries	DK	Refused	N
General Public	26	71	2	1	1191
Elites					
Government	27	71	0	2	52
News Media	13	83	3	3	40
Enterprises and Public Institutions	14	82	2	2	49
Non-military Academic Institutions	14	71	8	8	65
Military Academic Institutions	8	85	0	7	61

Asked only of those who said China should "play a shared leadership role" in B1.

Elite Questionnaire and Public Questionnaire B2

2. Global Balance of Power

Two-thirds of Chinese elites believe a balance of power between China and the U.S. will lead to greater stability in the long run. However, 18% of elites say the world will be more stable if the U.S. remains the leading superpower, and only 8% think the world will be more stable if China replaces the U.S. as the leading superpower.

Figure 8: Thinking about the long run, which of the following scenarios would make the world more stable?



Asked of elites only

Elite Questionnaire B6

In every elite group, around 60% or more believe the balance of power between China and the U.S. will lead to greater stability in the long run. Government officials are most likely to hold such a view (76%), followed by elites from the news media (70%), enterprises and public institutions (67%), and military academic institutions (66%). By comparison, 20% or more of the elites at non-military academic institutions, military academic institutions, and enterprises and public institutions think the world will be more stable if the U.S. remains the leading superpower. Only 10% of government officials, managers of the enterprises and public institutions, and members of the news media predict greater stability if China replaces the U.S. as the leading superpower.

Table 15: Thinking about the long run, which of the following scenarios would make the world more stable?

	Government	News Media	Enterprises and Public Institutions	Non-military Academic Institutions	Military Academic Institutions
U.S. remains the leading superpower	8	14	20	24	22
China replaces the U.S. as the leading superpower	12	9	10	5	3
Balance of power between China and U.S .	76	70	67	58	66
Don't know	1	3	1	9	4
Refused	3	3	1	4	6
N	75	64	70	76	73

Elite Questionnaire B6

3. Attainment of China's Foreign Policy Goals and Military Strength

Thirty-six percent of the Chinese public think China relies too little on military strength to achieve its foreign policy goals, compared with 28% who believe China uses its military strength about the right amount. Only 16% say China depends too much on military strength to reach its foreign policy goals.

Table 16: In general, does China rely on military strength too much, too little, or about the right amount to achieve its foreign policy goals? (%)

	Too much	Too little	About right amount	DK	Refused	N
General Public	16	36	28	20	1	2597
Elites						
Government	9	52	33	0	5	75
News Media	16	44	33	2	6	64
Enterprises and Public Institutions	7	51	36	0	6	70
Non-military Academic Institutions	3	54	32	7	5	76
Military Academic Institutions	11	56	19	0	14	73

Elite Questionnaire and Public Questionnaire B3

Regarding China's reliance on military strength to reach its foreign policy goals, public views vary with the respondent's level of education. Apart from those with graduate

school education, as education attainment increases from primary school or less to university (junior college), the percentage of respondents who think China relies too little on military strength to reach its foreign policy goals rises from 22% to 48%, and the percentage of those who believe China uses its military strength about the right amount grows from 21% to 31%.

Except for members of the news media (44%), over 50% of every elite group think that China relies too little on military strength to reach its foreign policy goals, including 56% of scholars at military academic institutions, 54% of scholars at non-military academic institutions, 52% of government officials, and 51% of managers of enterprises and public institutions. With the exception of military scholars (19%), one-third or more of every other elite group believe China uses military strength about the right amount. Members of the news media (16%) are more likely to think China relies too much on military strength to reach its foreign policy goals, compared to 10% or less in other elite groups.

Survey Methods

Sampling and Implementation of General Public Survey for 2012 China-U.S. Security Perceptions Project

China Strategic Culture Promotion Association

Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University

July 2012

First responsible person	Prof. Shen Mingming
Sampling expert	Prof. Shen Mingming
	Associate Prof. Yan Jie
Project manager	Chai Jingjing
	Yan Jie
Project assistant	Liang Yu

I. Survey Overview

1.1 Duration

May 2, 2012-July 5, 2012

1.2 Results

The number of target samples for the general public survey was 4,312; and the number of actually selected samples was 4,080. The number of actually completed probability samples was 2,597, with an effective completion rate of 64%.

Appendix Table 1: Completed and Uncompleted Interviews

Interview status	No.	Percentage
1 Interviews completed	**2597**	**63.7%**
2 Interviewed address rejects the interview	399	9.8%
3 Respondent rejects the interview	356	8.7%
4 Failure to meet respondent after many attempts	131	3.2%
5 Respondent can't understand or answer the questions because of language barrier/old age	46	1.1%
6 No person at the address	526	12.9%
7 Household sampling error	8	0.2%
8 Non-respondent interviewed	17	0.4%
Total of eligible addresses	**4080**	**100%**
9 Non-occupied houses	153	
10 No eligible person at the address	54	
11 Non-dwelling unit	27	
Total of ineligible addresses	**234**	
Total of pre-selected addresses	**4314**	

II. Sampling Report

2.1 Research Targets

The research targets of this survey were residents aged 18 or more, who have Chinese nationality and have lived for more than one year in the urban areas of cities at

prefecture level or above (excluding the village committees under the jurisdiction of the cities) on the Chinese mainland.

2.2 Survey Targets

The dwelling units with the following characteristics were excluded from the survey targets: the military and its concentrated family compounds; dwelling units within central ministries and commissions; embassies and consulates; vital units (like transformer substations, water supply stations, etc.); prisons; scenic resorts; or religious places. The permanent residents within the dwelling units with the following characteristics were excluded: residents of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; non-Chinese nationals.

2.3 Sampling Method

We adopted the method of GPS Assisted Area Sampling[3] in the general public survey. Samples were selected by applying stratified and multi-stage Probability-Proportional to Size (PPS), and taking the population in the grid as the measure of size.

2.4 Stratification

The cities were put into three strata according to GDP per capita (both economic and population factors taken into account). Primary sampling units (PSUs) at each stratum were distributed with the principle that the number of PSUs at each stratum was equally proportional to the aggregate.

2.5 Sampling Units

(1) Primary sampling unit (PSU): a district under the jurisdiction of a city at prefecture level or above.

[3] Pierre F. Landry and Shen Mingming, "Reaching Migrants in Survey Research: The Use of The Global Positioning System to Reduce Coverage Bias in China," *Political Analysis*, 2005, Vol 13, 1-22.
The method of GPS Assisted Area Sampling was invented by the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University, and the major advantages of the method are as follows: on the one hand, it can solve many problems of the traditional household register sampling. For example, the channels of getting sampling frame materials from governments at all levels are not open and smooth; household register materials are outdated and inaccurate; there are too many "empty households" and too much separation of people from household; and the migrant population cannot be included. On the other hand, the positioning problem in area sampling can be solved.

(2) Secondary sampling unit (SSU): 30*30 grid, i.e., a region delimited by 0.5 degree of longitude and 0.5 degree of latitude.

(3) Tertiary sampling unit: dwelling unit, i.e., an address where there are dwellers.

(4) Respondent: as per the Kish tables, within each selected dwelling unit, a respondent was selected who had to be older than 18 and had to have lived in the city for more than one year.

2.6 Sample Size

To meet the 95% confidence level, under the condition of allowing 3% margin of error, and considering such factors as the design effect (deff) of multi-stage sampling and the no-response rate (including ineligible people at the addresses, addresses with no people at home during the interview, those refusing to do the interview, and those who cannot do the interview because of physical impairments or language barriers), we planned to select 4,560 dwelling units, and get 2,500 effective samples. The actually selected samples are 4,080 addresses, and the number of effective samples is 2,597.

III. Implementation Report

3.1 Superintendent Training

The superintendents of the project are all staff members of the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University. With the uniform arrangements of the Center, they received systematic training at the Center's conference room on April 23 and 26, 2012 by the scholars at the Center. The training covered project background, basic interview skills, the specific requirements of the project, the method of using GPS, sampling at specific locations, methods of address sampling and respondent sampling, summary of the content of each question in the questionnaire and explanation of each question, in-class exercises, project implementation procedures, quality check procedures, and code of conduct and workplace safety for the superintendents.

3.2 Interviewer Training

The interviewers for the project were all college students of the target cities. In accordance with the requirements of the interviewers' manual, the interviewers received one-day training by the superintendents of the project. Each superintendent started out, and the training was given at different times. However, each interviewer received an entire day of systematic training by the superintendent. The major contents of the interviewer training include: project background, basic interview skills, the specific requirements of the project, method respondent sampling, summary of the content of each question in the questionnaire and explanation of each question, in-class exercises, household interview procedures and norms, quality check procedures, and code of conduct and workplace safety for interviewers.

3.3 Implementation

The superintendent went to the 0.5-degree grid according to the longitude and latitude given by the Center. After reaching the 0.5-degree grid, the superintendent entered the clusters according to the longitude and latitude given by the Center, to sample addresses in the clusters by strictly following the sampling procedures of the Center. If the number of addresses in a cluster exceeded 60, second-stage sampling was done.

When the interviewer entered the interviewed addresses, he/she asked all of the residents who had lived in the surveyed region for more than 12 months (a resident was eligible if he/she had lived in the surveyed region for more than 12 months, even though he/she had not lived at the interviewed address for 12 months; a permanent resident at the interviewed address was ineligible if he/she temporarily did not live at the address, or if he/she had to live in other places for a time, such as on a business trip or being abroad), and registered them in the Kish tables. Then, he/she ordered the eligible males and females older than 18 by age, from oldest to youngest. Finally, the interviewer selected one person to be the respondent according to the Kish principle.

The superintendent supervised the household interview by the interviewer on location, and checked all of the completed questionnaires to guarantee that all of the

questionnaires had been completed according to the desired quality and quantity, and that the authenticity (interview the selected respondent who should not be replaced), accuracy (accurately record the answers of the respondent), and completeness (all of the questions should be asked, and no question should be missed) of the interview. When the interview was finished, the interviewer checked the records of the questionnaire on the spot. After completing the check, he/she signed the records and handed them to the superintendent. The superintendent checked the completed questionnaires every day, and identified problems in a timely manner to prevent them from being repeated. The superintendent signed his/her name on the cover of the valid questionnaires. The things to be checked included: whether the interviewer had done the interview at the address designated by the superintendent; whether the interviewer had strictly followed the Kish tables when sampling; whether the interviewer had interviewed the selected respondent; whether there were omitted questions; whether the respondent had answered questions that should not be answered; whether there were answers that were not clear in meaning or did not conform to the requirements of the questionnaire; and whether the answers were contradictory in logic.

IV. Establishment of Database

4.1 Data Input and Effective Sample Rechecking

The work of data input was completed by experienced professionals at the Center using advanced input software. The input software is highly capable of avoiding the occurrence of unrecognizable code. Three graduate students at Peking University were responsible for re-checking the input of completed and uncompleted questionnaires. The things to be re-checked included: whether the interviewer was correctly selected according to the rules; and whether someone other than the respondent had been interviewed. Through the statistical software, the effectiveness of the samples was re-checked and 25 questionnaires (accounting for 0.6% of all of the questionnaires) with sampling and interview errors were screened out.

4.2 Data Cleaning

The work of data cleaning included three procedures: first, in the event of results of double inputs, clean the errors of inconsistency; second, detect unrecognizable code and conduct logic detection; third, when all errors have been corrected, conduct a second logic detection by different personnel on the whole data set. This method guarantees the accuracy of analysis based on the cleaning of data and materials. It can also recognize other system errors according to each input code.

4.3 Establishment of Database

On July 25, 2012, the cleaning of the questionnaire database was completed. Work was started to establish the database, including variable labels and variable value explanations. Various sampling supporting information was added, like strata and PSU data, etc. On July 28, 2012, the complete database and code manual were completed.

4.4 Weighting

The database provided two kinds of weight variables: one was basic weight, i.e. the reciprocal of the entry probability of each respondent (including no-response weight), and the name of the variable is “wt_base”. The database provided three variables—wt, wt_respo, wt_base. Their use method depends on how to deal with the no-responses. If we plan to deal with the no-responses with the method of weighting, we can directly use the weighting variable of wt_base. If we use other means to deal with the no-responses, we make other adjustments on the basis of “wt”.

Post stratification was based on the data on urban population from the 2010 National Census. Under this project, samples were stratified by age group (10-year gap) and gender. With such a method of stratification, the weighting of various categories ranges between 0.8 and 1.2. Therefore, the technique of weighting is adopted. In the database, the name of the post-stratification weight variable is “wt_ps”.

Sampling and Implementation of Elite Survey for 2012 China-U.S. Security Perceptions Project

China Strategic Culture Promotion Association

Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University

August 2012

First responsible person	Luo Yuan
Sampling expert	Wang Hui
	Liu Xiangdong
Project manager	Jin Donghui
	Li Guolin
	Li Ye
Project assistant	Wang Wu

I. Survey Overview

1.1 Duration

May 22, 2012-August 22, 2012

1.2 Results

Number of actual selected samples: 423

Number of actually completed probability samples: 358

Effective completion rate: 84.6%

II. Sampling Report

2.1 Research Targets

The research targets of the survey were government officials, members of the news media, managers of enterprises and public institutions, scholars at non-military academic institutions, and scholars or officers at military academic institutions, who all have Chinese nationality and are located in China.

2.2 Sampling Method

A list of elites was made according to the resources of target population available to the Association. When preparing the list, the balance of the regional distribution of the target population was noted, and the samples were selected mainly in four cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Xi'an. The sampling method adopted was quota sampling. The sample size was distributed by equal quota among five elite groups, i.e., government officials, members of the news media, managers of enterprises and public institutions, scholars at non-military academic institutions, and scholars or officers at military academic institutions.

2.3 Sample Size

We planned to select 300 effective samples, and the number of actually selected samples was 423. The number of effective samples was 358.

III. Implementation report

3.1 Superintendent Training

The superintendents of the project are all staff members of the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association. With the uniform arrangement of the Association, they received systematic training at the conference room of the Association on April 23 and 26, 2012, by scholars from the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University. The training covered project background, basic interview skills, the specific requirements of the project, summary of the content of each question in the questionnaire and explanation of each question, project implementation procedures, and code of conduct and workplace safety for the superintendents.

3.2 Interviewer Training

The interviewers for the elite surveys were all staff members of the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association. They received one-day training from the superintendents of the project. The major contents of the training included: summary of the content of each question in the questionnaire and explanation of each question, in-class exercises, interview procedures and norms, and code of conduct and workplace safety for interviewers.

3.3 Implementation

3.3.1 Members of the Project Team

First responsible person: Luo Yuan

Project managers: Jin Donghui, Li Guolin, and Li Ye

Project executive manager: Wang Wu

Project superintendents: three staff members of the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association

Project interviewers: 10 staff members of the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association

3.3.2 Process of Implementation

(1) Respondent Sampling

The superintendents and the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association made a list of respondents according to the information they have. By using the method of quota sampling, the number of respondents of each of the five elite groups was 80.

(2) Method of Interviewing Respondents

The interviewer first contacted the respondent by phone call and ascertained the willingness of the respondent along with the time and form of interview. The specific interview methods were as follows, with more effective samples being obtained through the second method:

1) Send the interviewer to the location to conduct a face-to-face interview with the respondent, or use work time to conduct a face-to-face interview with the respondent.
2) Take the opportunities presented by academic conferences and training sessions to ask the respondent to complete the questionnaire on the spot with the supervision of the superintendent and interviewer.
3) Use work time or the opportunity of an academic conference to conduct video interviews with individual respondents.
4) Send electronic or hard-copy questionnaires as requested by individual respondents.

(3) Daily Responsibilities of Superintendents

- Make arrangements for the progress of the interviews, and guarantee interview quality.
- Collect the questionnaires; print the returned electronic questionnaires; sign and receive the mailed-back hard-copy questionnaires; record on the questionnaire handout and retrieval form; check the completed questionnaires every day; and identify problems in a timely manner to prevent them from being repeated.
- Record the interview process. The superintendent must earnestly complete the work journals and daily interview summary form and sort out all of the questionnaires. The copy of the forms—including the interview progress form,

completed questionnaire form, and questionnaire handout and retrieval form—must be legible, neat, and free from errors.

- Report daily to the Research Center on Contemporary China about the work progress; when new problems emerge, he/she should take action and afterward immediately report to the Center.

3.4 Completion of Interviews

Appendix Table 2: Completed Interviews

Elite status	Number of pre-selected samples	Number of actually selected samples	Number of effective samples	Percentage
1 Government officials, civil servants	140	95	75	20.9%
2 Members of the news media	140	76	64	17.9%
3 Managers of enterprises and public institutions	140	74	70	19.6%
4 Scholars at non-military academic institutions	140	86	76	21.2%
5 Scholars/officers at military academic institutions	140	92	73	20.4%
Total	**700**	**423**	**358**	**100.0%**

3.5 Causes of Uncompleted Interviews

Appendix Table 3: Causes of Uncompleted Interviews

Interview status	Number	Percentage
1 Interview completed	**358**	**84.6%**
2 Respondent rejects the interview	15	3.5%
3 Respondent fails to return electronic questionnaire	18	4.3%
4 Failure to meet respondent after many attempts	11	2.6%
5 Questionnaire information is incomplete or completely identical	21	5.0%
Total number of actually interviewed respondents	**423**	**100%**

Frequency Distribution Manual

Frequency Distribution Manual Instructions

- The findings of the general public survey are weighted based on sampling weight, and the distribution of the variables are calculated on the basis of defining strata, PSU, and sampling weight in order to obtain overall deductions on the survey. The findings of the elite survey are based on the source data and are unweighted. For further details on both the general public and elite sample designs used in the China-U.S. Security Perceptions Project, see the Survey Methods section.

- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline "total" columns show 100%, because they are based on unrounded numbers. When multiple responses are allowed, totals may add to more or less than 100%.

- Sample sizes for the general public and elite groups can be found on the first table in the topline. Unless otherwise noted, those sample sizes are the same throughout the topline.

- Open-ended question results are listed in the Coding Manual after recoding.

Essential Questions*

***These translations are for informal reference purposes only. For the actual language used in the survey, please see the Chinese version of this report.**

Sample Size

		Sample size
General Public		2597
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	75
	Members of the news media	64
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	70
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	76
	Scholars at military academic institutions	73

b0a Generally speaking, are you satisfied with the current state of China? (General Public)		
	Percentage	Cumulative percentage
Satisfied	68	68
Unsatisfied	27	95
Refused	5	100
Total	100	

b0b Do you agree that "our nation is not perfect, but our culture is superior to other cultures"? (General Public)		
	Percentage	Cumulative percentage
Totally agree	26	26
Somewhat agree	48	74
Somewhat disagree	12	86
Totally disagree	2	88
Don't know (DK)	11	99
Refused	1	100
Total	100	

		b1 What role do you think China should play in the world? (%)					Total
		Become the single world leader	Play a shared leadership role	Not play any leadership role	DK	Refused	
General Public		14	45	19	20	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	3	69	21	0	7	100
	Members of the news media	11	63	14	6	6	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	7	70	14	1	7	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	3	86	12	0	0	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	1	84	12	3	0	100

		b2 ASK IF "SHARED LEADERSHIP ROLE" IN B1: Should China become the most assertive leading country, or should it be no more or less assertive than other leading countries? (%)				Total
		The most assertive leading country	No more or less assertive than other leading countries	DK	Refused	
General Public		26	71	2	1	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	27	71	0	2	100
	Members of the news media	13	83	3	3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	14	82	2	2	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	14	71	8	8	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	8	85	0	7	100

	b3 In general, does China rely on military strength too much, too little, or about the right amount to achieve its foreign policy goals? (%)	Total

		Too much	Too little	About the right amount	DK	Refused	
General Public		16	36	28	19	1	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	9	52	33	0	5	100
	Members of the news media	16	44	33	2	6	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	7	51	36	0	6	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	3	54	32	7	5	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	11	56	19	0	14	100

		b4a Which country in the world poses the greatest threat to China? Afghanistan (%)					Total
		Yes	No	DK	None	Refused	
General Public		0	81	14	4	1	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	0	88			12	100
	Members of the news media	0	97			3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	0	94			6	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	0	87			13	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	0	89			11	100

		b4b Which country in the world poses the greatest threat to China? India (%)					Total
		Yes	No	DK	None	Refused	
General Public		3	79	14	4	1	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	4	84			12	100
	Members of the news media	3	94			3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	3	91			6	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	5	82			13	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	3	86			11	100

		b4c Which country in the world poses the greatest threat to China? Iran (%)					Total
		Yes	No	DK	None	Refused	
General Public		0	81	14	4	1	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	0	88			12	100
	Members of the news media	0	97			3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	0	94			6	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	0	87			13	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	0	89			11	100

		b4d Which country in the world poses the greatest threat to China? Iraq (%)					Total
		Yes	No	DK	None	Refused	
General Public		0	81	14	4	1	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	0	88			12	100
	Members of the news media	0	97			3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	0	94			6	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	0	87			13	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	0	89			11	100

		b4e Which country in the world poses the greatest threat to China? Israel (%)					Total
		Yes	No	DK	None	Refused	
General Public		0	81	14	4	1	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	0	88			12	100
	Members of the news media	0	97			3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	0	94			6	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	0	87			13	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	0	89			11	100

		b4f Which country in the world poses the greatest threat to China? Japan (%)					Total
		Yes	No	DK	None	Refused	
General Public		17	64	14	4	1	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	29	59			12	100
	Members of the news media	23	73			3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	14	80			6	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	21	66			13	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	15	74			11	100

		b4g Which country in the world poses the greatest threat to China? Mexico (%)					Total
		Yes	No	DK	None	Refused	
General Public		0	81	14	4	1	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	0	88			12	100
	Members of the news media	0	97			3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	0	94			6	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	0	87			13	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	0	89			11	100

		b4h Which country in the world poses the greatest threat to China? DPRK (%)					Total
		Yes	No	DK	None	Refused	
General Public		0	81	14	4	1	
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	0	88			12	100
	Members of the news media	3	94			3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	0	94			6	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	3	84			13	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	3	86			11	100

		b4i Which country in the world poses the greatest threat to China? Pakistan (%)					Total
		Yes	No	DK	None	Refused	
General Public		0	81	14	4	1	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	0	88			12	100
	Members of the news media	0	97			3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	0	94			6	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	0	87			13	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	0	89			11	100

		b4j Which country in the world poses the greatest threat to China? Russia (%)					Total
		Yes	No	DK	None	Refused	
General Public		2	80	14	4	1	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	8	80			12	100
	Members of the news media	14	83			3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	9	86			6	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	12	75			13	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	3	86			11	100

		b4k Which country in the world poses the greatest threat to China? United States (%)					Total
		Yes	No	DK	None	Refused	
General Public		63	18	14	4	1	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	76	12			12	100
	Members of the news media	67	30			3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	81	13			6	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	55	32			13	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	70	19			11	100

		b4l Which country in the world poses the greatest threat to China? Al-Qaeda/Terrorist groups (%)					Total
		Yes	No	DK	None	Refused	
General Public		1	80	14	4	1	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	0	88			12	100
	Members of the news media	0	97			3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	0	94			6	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	0	87			13	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	0	89			11	100

		B4m Which country in the world poses the greatest threat to China? Philippines (%)					Total
		Yes	No	DK	None	Refused	
General Public		1	80	14	4	1	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	1	87			12	100
	Members of the news media	0	97			3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	0	94			6	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	0	87			13	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	1	88			11	100

		b5a How much do you think China can trust the following countries? United States (%)						Total
		A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK	Refused	
General Public		1	12	39	33	13	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	3	12	48	28	1	8	100
	Members of the news media	2	14	59	22	2	2	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	7	11	44	34	1	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	5	21	55	11	7	1	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	3	16	60	12	3	6	100

		b5b How much do you think China can trust the following countries? Japan (%)						Total
		A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK	Refused	
General Public		0	6	32	47	13	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	1	3	35	47	1	13	100
	Members of the news media	0	2	44	53	0	2	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	0	7	30	61	1	0	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	1	7	42	45	4	1	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	0	4	44	47	0	6	100

		b5c How much do you think China can trust the following countries? France (%)						Total
		A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK	Refused	
General Public		1	27	32	12	26	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	0	48	36	1	3	12	100
	Members of the news media	0	25	55	13	5	3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	4	29	43	19	4	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	1	47	41	4	5	1	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	0	43	47	3	3	6	100

		b5d How much do you think China can trust the following countries? UK (%)						Total
		A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK	Refused	
General Public		0	28	32	13	25	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	1	32	48	3	3	13	100
	Members of the news media	0	25	58	14	0	3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	3	33	43	16	4	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	3	46	40	4	7	1	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	0	43	45	4	3	6	100

		b5e How much do you think China can trust the following countries? Russia (%)						Total
		A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK	Refused	
General Public		9	38	21	9	21	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	9	57	23	1	1	8	100
	Members of the news media	2	44	42	13	0	2	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	3	36	40	16	4	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	3	50	36	5	5	1	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	1	59	29	3	1	7	100

		b5f How much do you think China can trust the following countries? South Korea (%)						Total
		A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK	Refused	
General Public		2	22	37	15	23	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	0	35	43	4	1	17	100
	Members of the news media	0	20	52	25	2	2	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	1	20	39	33	6	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	1	45	4	8	4	1	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	0	36	45	7	1	11	100

		b5g How much do you think China can trust the following countries? Vietnam (%)						Total
		A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK	Refused	
General Public		1	15	38	20	25	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	0	13	33	33	1	19	100
	Members of the news media	0	9	50	38	0	3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	0	10	29	53	7	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	1	13	62	18	4	1	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	1	10	55	26	1	7	100

		b5h How much do you think China can trust the following countries? Pakistan (%)						Total
		A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK	Refused	
General Public		7	27	26	11	28	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	33	41	8	3	1	13	100
	Members of the news media	33	39	16	9	2	2	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	24	33	19	16	7	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	36	50	4	3	5	3	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	47	41	4	0	1	7	100

		b5i How much do you think China can trust the following countries? India (%)						Total
		A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK	Refused	
General Public		1	16	38	18	25	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	0	5	51	25	1	17	100
	Members of the news media	0	6	67	25	0	2	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	0	9	44	39	7	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	1	17	66	9	5	1	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	0	19	55	15	3	8	100

		b5j How much do you think China can trust the following countries? Philippines (%)						Total
		A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK	Refused	
General Public		1	9	28	36	24	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	0	3	32	49	1	15	100
	Members of the news media	0	5	41	53	0	2	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	0	4	26	61	7	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	0	9	49	36	5	1	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	1	6	55	29	1	8	100

		b6 Thinking about the long run, which of the following scenarios would make the world more stable? (Elites) (%)					Total
		The U.S. remaining the world's leading superpower	China replacing the U.S. as the world's leading superpower	A balance of power between China and the U.S.	DK	Refused	
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	8	12	76	1	3	100
	Members of the news media	14	9	70	3	3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	20	10	67	1	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	24	5	58	9	4	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	22	3	66	4	6	100

b6 How do you think the current economic situation is? (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Very good	6	6
	Somewhat good	63	69
	Somewhat bad	23	92
	Very bad	4	96
	DK	4	99
	Refused	0	100
	Total	100	

		b7a What threat does the following international issue pose to China? U.S. military presence in East Asia (%)					Total
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK	Refused	
General Public		41	24	6	28	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	75	23	0	1	1	100
	Members of the news media	69	20	5	5	2	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	59	33	6	3	0	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	46	40	11	3	1	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	62	32	4	0	3	100

		b7b What threat does the following international issue pose to China? Political unrest in Pakistan (%)					Total
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK	Refused	
General Public		5	33	25	35	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	7	36	29	4	24	100
	Members of the news media	3	64	22	5	6	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	3	56	36	4	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	4	67	21	3	5	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	7	64	19	0	10	100

		b7c What threat does the following international issue pose to China? DPRK's nuclear program (%)					Total
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK	Refused	
General Public		12	32	24	30	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	32	40	11	1	16	100
	Members of the news media	28	56	6	5	5	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	26	44	24	4	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	38	45	11	4	3	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	32	55	7	0	7	100

		b7d What threat does the following international issue pose to China? Iran's nuclear program (%)					Total
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK	Refused	
General Public		7	32	26	33	3	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	1	33	35	5	25	100
	Members of the news media	9	47	31	5	8	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	7	46	36	7	4	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	4	51	34	5	5	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	4	48	40	0	8	100

		b7e What threat does the following international issue pose to China? International financial instability (%)					Total
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK	Refused	
General Public		29	31	9	28	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	31	45	7	1	16	100
	Members of the news media	48	39	6	3	3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	50	41	4	1	3	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	55	36	5	1	3	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	51	37	7	0	6	100

		b7f What threat does the following international issue pose to China? Global environmental change (%)					Total
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK	Refused	
General Public		31	31	8	28	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	16	41	17	1	24	100
	Members of the news media	44	41	11	2	3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	37	33	23	4	3	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	25	49	20	1	5	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	21	53	16	0	10	100

		b7g What threat does the following international issue pose to China? Islamic extremist groups (%)					Total
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK	Refused	
General Public		7	31	23	36	3	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	19	37	23	1	20	100
	Members of the news media	22	59	11	3	5	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	10	57	21	9	3	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	18	63	11	3	5	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	18	59	15	0	8	100

b8_cd1 What do you think should be the top priority in China's policy toward the U.S.? (open-ended) Coding (first answer) (Elites)				
		Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Economy (broad sense)	31	9	9
	Trade (broad sense)	17	5	13
	Win-win cooperation	26	7	21
	Strengthen autonomy	6	2	22
	Anti-sanction measures	2	0	23
	Steady development of world economy	1	0	23
	Finance (broad sense)	3	0	24
	Currency sovereignty	4	1	25
	Debt problems	4	1	26
	Resources (broad sense)	1	0	27
	Other economic issues	1	0	27
	Politics (broad sense)	3	1	28
	Diplomacy (broad sense)	1	0	28
	Safeguard China's interests	21	6	34
	Mutual trust and balance	37	10	44
	Keep a low profile in the long term	11	3	47
	Take a tough attitude	4	1	48
	Improve strengths	6	2	50
	Become a world power	2	1	51
	U.S. policy toward China	5	1	52
	One China principle	5	1	53
	Introduce advanced systems	3	1	54
	Guard against system threat	1	0	55

	Promote human rights, democracy, and freedom	1	0	55
	Other political issues	3	1	56
	Military affairs (broad sense)	5	1	57
	Address the Taiwan issue	17	5	62
	Security (broad sense)	11	3	65
	Improve strengths and guard against threats	9	3	67
	Stop arms race	1	0	68
	Respond to the U.S. Asia-Pacific security strategy	10	3	70
	Non-traditional security issues, such as anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, and anti-nuclear proliferation	1	0	71
	Other military issues	1	0	71
	Culture (broad sense)	2	1	72
	Promote recognition and understanding	8	2	74
	Respect for dignity and equality	7	2	76
	Cope with values penetration	1	0	76
	Science and technology (broad sense)	1	0	76
	Strengthen high-tech exchanges	3	1	77
	Talent exchanges	2	1	78
	Environment and hygiene (broad sense)	1	0	78
	Environmental governance and protection	1	0	78
	Other	3	1	79
	DK/Not clear	4	1	80
	NA/Refused	71	20	100
	Total	358	100	

b8_cd2 What do you think should be the top priority in China's policy toward the U.S.? (open-ended) Coding (second answer) (Elites)

		Frequency	**Percentage**	**Cumulative percentage**
	No further answer	282	79	79
	Economy (broad sense)	1	0	79
	Trade (broad sense)	2	1	80
	Win-win cooperation	5	1	81
	Strengthen autonomy	6	2	83
	Finance (broad sense)	1	0	83
	Currency sovereignty	1	0	83

	Debt problems	2	1	84
	Resources (broad sense)	1	0	84
	Political issues (broad sense)	1	0	84
	Safeguard China's interests	6	2	86
	Mutual trust and balance	8	2	88
	Keep a low profile in the long term	3	1	89
	Take a tough attitude	4	1	90
	Become a world power	1	0	91
	Participate in global issues	2	1	91
	U.S. policy toward China	1	0	91
	One China principle	1	0	92
	Introduce advanced systems	2	1	92
	Promote human rights, democracy, and freedom	2	1	93
	Military affairs (broad sense)	6	2	94
	Address the Taiwan issue	1	0	95
	Security (broad sense)	5	1	96
	Improve strengths and guard against threats	4	1	97
	Other military issues	1	0	98
	Promote recognition and understanding	3	1	98
	Respect for dignity and equality	1	0	99
	Science and technology (broad sense)	1	0	99
	Strengthen high-tech exchanges	3	1	100
	Education (broad sense)	1	0	100
	Total	358	100	

b8_cd3 What do you think should be the top priority in China's policy toward the U.S.? (open-ended) Coding (third answer) (Elites)				
		Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	No further answer	346	97	97
	Economy (broad sense)	2	1	97
	Win-win cooperation	1	0	98
	Currency sovereignty	1	0	98
	Improve strengths	2	1	98
	Ideology (broad sense)	1	0	99
	Military affairs (broad sense)	1	0	99
	Territory (broad sense)	1	0	99
	Improve strengths and guard against threats	1	0	99
	Strengthen high-tech exchanges	1	0	100
	Environmental governance and protection	1	0	100
	Total	358	100	

b8 How do you think China-U.S. relations generally are? (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Very good	1	1
	Somewhat good	53	54
	Somewhat bad	29	82
	Very bad	3	85
	DK	14	99
	Refused	1	100
	Total	100	

		b9_elite Will economic growth lead to China becoming more democratic? (%) (Elites)				Total
		Yes	No	DK	NA	
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	73	17	9	0	100
	Members of the news media	52	27	22	0	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	51	43	6	0	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	58	20	22	0	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	59	22	18	1	100

b9a What characteristics do Chinese have? Generous (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	76	76
	No	18	94
	DK	5	99
	Refused	2	100
	Total	100	

b9b What characteristics do Chinese have? Violent (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	21	21
	No	71	92
	DK	6	98
	Refused	2	100
	Total	100	

b9c What characteristics do Chinese have? Greedy (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	43	43
	No	49	91
	DK	7	98
	Refused	2	100
	Total	100	

b9d What characteristics do Chinese have? Honest (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	72	72
	No	21	93
	DK	5	98
	Refused	2	100
	Total	100	

b9e What characteristics do Chinese have? Selfish (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	51	51
	No	41	92
	DK	6	98
	Refused	2	100
	Total	100	

b9f What characteristics do Chinese have? Arrogant (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	26	26
	No	63	89
	DK	8	98
	Refused	2	100
	Total	100	

b9g What characteristics do Chinese have? Tolerant (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	78	78
	No	15	93
	DK	5	98
	Refused	2	100
	Total	100	

b9h What characteristics do Chinese have? Hardworking (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	88	88
	No	7	95
	DK	3	98
	Refused	2	100
	Total	100	

b9i What characteristics do Chinese have? Rude (General Public)		
	Percentage	Cumulative percentage

	Yes	25	25
	No	66	90
	DK	7	98
	Refused	2	100
	Total	100	

b9j What characteristics do Chinese have? Sophisticated (General Public)			
		Percentage	**Cumulative percentage**
	Yes	48	48
	No	38	86
	DK	12	97
	Refused	3	100
	Total	100	

b9k What characteristics do Chinese have? Inventive (General Public)			
		Percentage	**Cumulative percentage**
	Yes	62	62
	No	29	90
	DK	8	98
	Refused	2	100
	Total	100	

b9l What characteristics do Chinese have? Nationalistic (General Public)			
		Percentage	**Cumulative percentage**
	Yes	66	66
	No	22	88
	DK	10	98
	Refused	2	100
	Total	100	

b9m What characteristics do Chinese have? Modern (General Public)			
		Percentage	**Cumulative percentage**
	Yes	61	61
	No	26	87
	DK	10	98
	Refused	2	100
	Total	100	

b9n What characteristics do Chinese have? Competitive (General Public)			
		Percentage	**Cumulative percentage**
	Yes	63	63
	No	26	89
	DK	9	98

	Refused	2	100
	Total	100	

b9o What characteristics do Chinese have? Aggressive (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	13	13
	No	75	88
	DK	10	97
	Refused	3	100
	Total	100	

b9p What characteristics do Chinese have? Inconsistent (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	32	32
	No	56	88
	DK	10	97
	Refused	3	100
	Total	100	

b9aa What characteristics do Americans have? Generous (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	28	28
	No	41	69
	DK	29	98
	Refused	2	100
	Total	100	

b9ab What characteristics do Americans have? Violent (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	60	60
	No	15	75
	DK	23	98
	Refused	3	100
	Total	100	

b9ac What characteristics do Americans have? Greedy (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	54	54
	No	18	72
	DK	26	97
	Refused	3	100
	Total	100	

b9ad What characteristics do Americans have? Honest (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	27	27
	No	41	69
	DK	29	97
	Refused	3	100
	Total	100	

b9ae What characteristics do Americans have? Selfish (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	50	50
	No	19	69
	DK	28	97
	Refused	3	100
	Total	100	

b9af What characteristics do Americans have? Arrogant (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	58	58
	No	13	71
	DK	26	97
	Refused	3	100
	Total	100	

b9ag What characteristics do Americans have? Tolerant (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	24	24
	No	43	67
	DK	30	97
	Refused	3	100
	Total	100	

b9ah What characteristics do Americans have? Hardworking (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	38	38
	No	29	67
	DK	30	97
	Refused	3	100
	Total	100	

b9ai What characteristics do Americans have? Rude (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Yes	36	36

	No	31	67
	DK	30	97
	Refused	3	100
	Total	100	

b9aj What characteristics do Americans have? Sophisticated (General Public)			
		Percentage	**Cumulative percentage**
	Yes	34	34
	No	30	64
	DK	33	97
	Refused	3	100
	Total	100	

b9ak What characteristics do Americans have? Inventive (General Public)			
		Percentage	**Cumulative percentage**
	Yes	64	64
	No	8	72
	DK	25	98
	Refused	2	100
	Total	100	

b9al What characteristics do Americans have? Nationalistic (General Public)			
		Percentage	**Cumulative percentage**
	Yes	45	45
	No	22	67
	DK	30	97
	Refused	3	100
	Total	100	

b9am What characteristics do Americans have? Modern (General Public)			
		Percentage	**Cumulative percentage**
	Yes	62	62
	No	10	71
	DK	26	97
	Refused	3	100
	Total	100	

b9an What characteristics do Americans have? Competitive (General Public)			
		Percentage	**Cumulative percentage**
	Yes	64	64
	No	8	72
	DK	25	97
	Refused	3	100

	Total	100	

b9ao What characteristics do Americans have? Aggressive (General Public)			
		Percentage	**Cumulative percentage**
	Yes	67	67
	No	8	74
	DK	23	98
	Refused	2	100
	Total	100	

b9ap What characteristics do Americans have? Inconsistent (General Public)			
		Percentage	**Cumulative percentage**
	Yes	47	47
	No	21	68
	DK	30	97
	Refused	3	100
	Total	100	

		b10 To what extent do you think China takes into account the interests of other countries in the world in making international policy decisions? (%)						**Total**
		Great deal	**Fair amount**	**Not too much**	**Not at all**	**DK**	**Refused**	
General Public		27	53	4	1	15	1	100
Elites	**Government officials, civil servants**	24	71	3	0	0	3	100
	Members of the news media	22	61	13	3	2	0	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	31	60	1	4	3	0	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	12	65	21	0	1	1	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	14	75	8	0	1	1	100

	b11 To what extent do you think the U.S. takes into account the interests of other countries in the world in making international policy decisions? (%)						**Total**
	Great deal	**Fair amount**	**Not too much**	**Not at all**	**DK**	**Refused**	
General Public	3	21	39	18	19	1	100

Elites	Government officials, civil servants	3	20	52	25	0	0	100
	Members of the news media	8	27	44	20	2	0	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	3	36	47	13	1	0	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	1	43	43	11	1	0	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	1	37	48	10	1	3	100

		b12 Generally speaking, do you think the U.S. is a partner, a competitor, or an enemy of China? (%)							Total
		Partner	Competitor	Enemy	None	All	DK	Refused	
General Public		11	45	12	2	17	12	1	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	5	68	27			0	0	100
	Members of the news media	9	75	7			5	3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	23	66	10			1	0	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	17	57	11			13	3	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	15	75	8			1	0	100

b13_cd1 What are the most promising areas for improving cooperation between China and the U.S.? (open-ended) Coding (First answer) (Elites)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Economy (broad sense)	34	34
	Trade (broad sense)	13	46
	Win-win cooperation	5	51
	Agricultural exchanges	1	52
	Maritime free trade	0	52
	Steady development of world economy	1	53
	Finance (broad sense)	1	53
	Increase investment	0	53
	Cope with financial crisis	1	54
	Resources (broad sense)	0	54
	Oil security	1	55
	Develop new energy	1	56
	Other economic issues	0	56
	Politics (broad sense)	1	56
	Mutual trust and balance	1	57
	Participate in global issues	1	58
	Promote human rights, democracy, and freedom	1	59
	Military affairs (broad sense)	1	60
	Address the Taiwan issue	0	60
	Security (broad sense)	1	61
	Respond to the U.S. Asia-Pacific security strategy	1	62
	Address geopolitical issues	1	63
	Non-traditional security issues, such as anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, and anti-nuclear proliferation	3	66
	Culture (broad sense)	5	70
	Values (broad sense)	0	70
	Promote recognition and understanding	2	72
	Science and technology (broad sense)	5	77
	Strengthen high-tech exchanges	1	79
	Space technology and space development	1	79
	Internet security	0	79
	Education (broad sense)	4	83
	Talent exchanges	0	84
	Sports and art	1	84
	Environmental protection (broad sense)	2	86
	Environmental governance and protection	1	87
	Climate issues	0	87

	Improve medical services	1	88
	Other	0	88
	DK/Not clear	1	89
	NA/Refused	11	100
	Total	100	

b13_cd2 What are the most promising areas for improving cooperation between China and the U.S.? (open-ended) Coding (Second answer) (Elites)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	No further answer	73	73
	Economy (broad sense)	1	74
	Trade (broad sense)	1	75
	Win-win cooperation	0	75
	Steady development of world economy	1	76
	Finance (broad sense)	0	76
	Increase investment	0	76
	Resources (broad sense)	0	77
	Develop new energy	1	78
	Diplomacy (broad sense)	1	79
	Safeguard China's interests	0	79
	Participate in global issues	1	79
	Promote human rights, democracy, and freedom	1	80
	Military affairs (broad sense)	0	80
	Security (broad sense)	1	81
	Respond to the U.S. Asia-Pacific security strategy	0	82
	Address geopolitical issues	1	82
	Non-traditional security issues, such as anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, and anti-nuclear proliferation	3	86
	Maintain world peace	0	86
	Culture (broad sense)	4	90
	Values (broad sense)	0	90
	Promote recognition and understanding	1	91
	Science and technology (broad sense)	3	95
	Education (broad sense)	1	96
	Talent exchanges	0	96
	Sports and art	1	97
	Environmental protection (broad sense)	1	98
	Environmental governance and protection	1	99
	Climate issues	0	99
	Fight public diseases	0	100
	Improve medical services	0	100
	Total	100	

b13_cd3 What are the most promising areas for improving cooperation between China and the U.S.? (open-ended) Coding (Third answer) (Elites)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	No further answer	93	93
	Economy (broad sense)	0	93
	Steady development of world economy	0	93
	Finance (broad sense)	0	94
	Participate in global issues	0	94
	Security (broad sense)	0	94
	Address geopolitical issues	0	94
	Non-traditional security issues, such as anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, and anti-nuclear proliferation	2	96
	Culture (broad sense)	1	97
	Promote recognition and understanding	0	98
	Science and technology (broad sense)	1	98
	Strengthen high-tech exchanges	0	99
	Space technology and space development	0	99
	Education (broad sense)	0	99
	Talent exchanges	0	99
	Sports and art	1	100
	Total	100	

b13 Which concerns you more about the U.S.? (General Public)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Economic strength	20	20
	Military strength	34	54
	Both	16	70
	Neither	21	91
	DK	8	99
	Refused	1	100
	Total	100	

b14_cd1 What are the most likely sources of conflict between China and the U.S.? (open-ended) Coding (First answer) (Elites)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	Economy (broad sense)	12	12
	Trade (broad sense)	8	19
	Finance (broad sense)	1	20
	Currency sovereignty	1	21
	Resources (broad sense)	1	22
	Oil security	1	23
	Rare resources	0	23
	Other economic issues	0	24
	Politics (broad sense)	5	28
	Safeguard China's interests	1	30
	Mutual trust and balance	0	30
	Become world power	2	32
	U.S. policy toward China	1	32
	System (broad sense)	0	32
	Ideology (broad sense)	3	36
	Promote human rights, democracy, and freedom	4	39
	Military affairs (broad sense)	15	54
	Territory (broad sense)	2	56
	Address the Taiwan issue	12	68
	Address the South China Sea issue	3	71
	Address the Diaoyu Islands issue	0	71
	Security (broad sense)	3	74
	Respond to the U.S. Asia-Pacific security strategy	4	79
	Address geopolitical issues	5	83
	Marine security	1	84
	Culture (broad sense)	2	86
	Values (broad sense)	0	86
	Address religious issues	0	86
	Strengthen high-tech exchanges	0	86
	Internet security	0	87
	Protect intellectual property rights	1	87
	Other	1	88
	DK/Not clear	1	89
	NA/Refused	11	100
	Total	100	

b14_cd2 What are the most likely sources of conflict between China and the U.S.? (open-ended) Coding (Second answer) (Elites)

		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	No further answer	65	65
	Economy (broad sense)	3	68
	Trade (broad sense)	2	70
	Maritime free trade	0	71
	Finance (broad sense)	0	71
	Currency sovereignty	1	72
	Cope with financial crisis	0	72
	Resources (broad sense)	1	73
	Oil security	0	73
	Politics (broad sense)	2	75
	Diplomacy (broad sense)	0	75
	Safeguard China's interests	1	76
	System (broad sense)	0	76
	Ideology (broad sense)	1	77
	Promote human rights, democracy, and freedom	2	79
	Other political issues	0	79
	Military affairs (broad sense)	3	82
	Territory (broad sense)	1	83
	Address the Taiwan issue	3	86
	Address the Tibet issue	1	87
	Address the Xinjiang issue	0	87
	Address the South China Sea issue	1	88
	Address the Diaoyu Islands issue	1	89
	Security (broad sense)	1	90
	Improve strengths and guard against threats	1	90
	Respond to the U.S. Asia-Pacific security strategy	2	92
	Address geopolitical issues	4	96
	Marine security	1	96
	Culture (broad sense)	1	98
	Values (broad sense)	0	98
	Strengthen high-tech exchanges	0	98
	Space technology and space development	0	98
	Internet security	0	99
	Protect intellectual property rights	1	100
	Talent exchanges	0	100
	Total	100	

b14_cd3 What are the most likely sources of conflict between China and the U.S.? (open-ended) Coding (Third answer) (Elites)			
		Percentage	Cumulative percentage
	No further answer	90	90
	Economy (broad sense)	0	91
	Trade (broad sense)	0	91
	Win-win cooperation	0	91
	Agricultural exchanges	0	91
	Finance (broad sense)	0	92
	Currency sovereignty	1	92
	Resources (broad sense)	0	93
	Diplomacy (broad sense)	0	93
	Safeguard China's interests	0	93
	Participate in global issues	1	94
	U.S. policy toward China	0	94
	System (broad sense)	0	94
	Guard against system threats	0	94
	Promote human rights, democracy, and freedom	1	95
	Military affairs (broad sense)	1	96
	Territory (broad sense)	0	96
	Address the Taiwan issue	0	97
	Address the Xinjiang issue	0	97
	Address the South China Sea issue	0	97
	Address the Diaoyu Islands issue	1	98
	Security (broad sense)	0	98
	Respond to the U.S. Asia-Pacific security strategy	0	98
	Address geopolitical issues	1	99
	Marine security	0	99
	Culture (broad sense)	0	99
	Values (broad sense)	0	100
	Protect intellectual property rights	0	100
	Total	100	

		b15a How important do you think each of the following policies is? Building strong diplomatic relations with the U.S. (%)						Total
		Very important	Somewhat important	Not too important	Not at all important	DK	Refused	
General Public		37	36	6	1	18	1	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	53	35	1	1	0	9	100
	Members of the news media	59	33	2	0	3	3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	63	33	4	0	0	0	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	65	26	5	1	3	0	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	59	33	4	0	1	3	100

		b15b How important do you think each of the following policies is? Maintaining the current exchange rate policy (%)						Total
		Very important	Somewhat important	Not too important	Not at all important	DK	Refused	
General Public		32	34	7	1	24	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	49	32	8	0	0	11	100
	Members of the news media	41	36	11	2	8	3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	54	34	6	1	1	3	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	33	40	18	5	3	1	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	29	49	12	3	4	3	100

		b15c How important do you think each of the following policies is? Strongly opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (%)						Total
		Very important	Somewhat important	Not too important	Not at all important	DK	Refused	
General Public		50	22	5	1	20	2	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	69	16	7	3	0	5	100
	Members of the news media	56	22	14	2	3	3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	47	24	17	11	0	0	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	32	32	28	7	1	1	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	49	28	14	4	1	3	100

		b16 ASK IF MORE THAN ONE ITEM IN B15 CONSIDERED "VERY IMPORTANT": Which of the following very important items do you think is the most important? (%)						Total
		If “very important” is used to describe more than one item in b15, use this code	Building strong diplomatic relations with the U.S.	Maintaining the current exchange rate policy	Strongly opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan	DK	Refused	
General Public		63	12	8	17	1	0	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	40	29	27	3	0	1	100
	Members of the news media	52	19	16	9	2	3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	44	24	19	11	0	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	62	26	5	5	1	0	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	59	22	8	6	0	6	100

		b17a How serious is each of the following problems for China? U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (%)						Total
		Very serious	Somewhat serious	Not too serious	Not at all serious	DK	Refused	
General Public		45	26	7	1	19	3	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	48	33	7	1	0	11	100
	Members of the news media	36	39	13	2	5	6	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	36	31	21	9	0	3	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	29	33	33	3	1	1	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	37	38	21	0	0	4	100

		b17b How serious is each of the following problems for China? U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region (%)						Total
		Very serious	Somewhat serious	Not too serious	Not at all serious	DK	Refused	
General Public		28	35	9	2	24	3	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	57	29	4	1	0	8	100
	Members of the news media	34	45	8	2	5	6	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	43	43	7	6	0	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	29	40	24	5	0	3	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	32	49	14	1	0	4	100

	b17c How serious is each of the following problems for China? Internet security (%)						Total
	Very serious	Somewhat serious	Not too serious	Not at all serious	DK	Refused	

General Public		17	31	18	3	19	3	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	37	36	13	0	0	13	100
	Members of the news media	25	47	16	3	3	6	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	21	50	21	3	0	4	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	25	58	12	3	0	3	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	27	53	10	1	1	7	100

		b17d How serious is each of the following problems for China? China-U.S. trade (%)						Total
		Very serious	Somewhat serious	Not too serious	Not at all serious	DK	Refused	
General Public		18	34	18	3	25	3	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	23	48	12	3	0	15	100
	Members of the news media	25	36	20	5	5	9	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	47	34	11	1	3	3	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	26	41	28	3	0	3	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	11	60	21	3	0	6	100

		b17e How serious is each of the following problems for China? U.S. containment of China's rise (%)						Total
		Very serious	Somewhat serious	Not too serious	Not at all serious	DK	Refused	
General Public		37	26	10	2	22	3	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	53	24	11	1	0	11	100
	Members of the news media	52	25	11	2	5	6	100

	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	49	34	9	4	3	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	40	32	16	7	3	4	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	59	26	11	1	0	3	100

		b17f How serious is each of the following problems for China? U.S. hegemony (%)						**Total**
		Very serious	**Somewhat serious**	**Not too serious**	**Not at all serious**	**DK**	**Refused**	
General Public		39	26	9	2	22	3	100
Elites	**Government officials, civil servants**	43	28	13	0	0	16	100
	Members of the news media	31	38	14	5	5	8	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	54	26	11	4	3	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	15	42	34	5	0	4	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	25	51	16	3	0	5	100

		b17g How serious is each of the following problems for China? U.S. support of Tibetan separatism (%)						Total
		Very serious	Somewhat serious	Not too serious	Not at all serious	DK	Refused	
General Public		33	27	11	2	24	3	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	35	35	12	3	0	16	100
	Members of the news media	34	31	20	2	5	8	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	37	31	19	7	4	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	29	30	30	7	1	3	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	34	41	15	3	0	7	100

		b17h How serious is each of the following problems for China? U.S. close-up reconnaissance activities along China's coast (%)						Total
		Very serious	Somewhat serious	Not too serious	Not at all serious	DK	Refused	
General Public		32	28	10	2	26	3	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	20	44	21	0	0	15	100
	Members of the news media	31	42	16	0	5	6	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	39	33	17	6	4	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	22	38	33	5	0	1	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	26	52	14	0	1	7	100

		b18a In the next 2-3 years, which of the following issues do you think is most likely to cause military conflict between China and the U.S.? Please select the three most important and rank them according to importance. First in importance. (%)													Total
		Taiwan	South China Sea	Diaoyu Islands	U.S. military activities around China's territory	China's military activities in the Western Pacific	DPRK's nuclear crisis	Cyber security	Space arms race	Nuclear weapons	Other	DK	No military conflict	Refused	
General Public		31	11	7	10	2	3	1	0	3	1	26	1	4	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	37	29	9	9	3	5	1	1	3	0	0	0	1	100
	Members of the news media	38	31	6	19	0	3	0	2		0	0	0	2	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	33	29	9	6	4	10	1	0	4	0	0	1	3	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	26	24	7	16	3	13	4	1	1		1	0	4	100

	Scholars at military academic institutions	44	19	8	11	1	6	1	3	0	1	1	1	3	100

		b18b In the next 2-3 years, which of the following issues do you think is most likely to cause military conflict between China and the U.S.? Please select the three most important and rank them according to importance. Second in importance. (%)													**Total**
		Taiwan	**South China Sea**	**Diaoyu Islands**	**U.S. military activities around China's territory**	**China's military activities in the Western Pacific**	**DPRK's nuclear crisis**	**Cyber security**	**Space arms race**	**Nuclear weapons**	**Other**	**DK**	**No military conflict**	**Refused**	
General Public		3	10	15	15	11	2	5	2	2	4	26	1	4	100
Elites	**Government officials, civil servants**	8	8	35	17	11	3	16	1	0	0	0	0	1	100
	Members of the news media	2	5	19	34	11	8	11	5	2	3	0	0	2	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	1	9	21	30	11	4	9	3	4	3	0	1	3	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	7	8	25	11	15	12	15	0	3	1	1	0	4	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	1	10	27	21	8	7	7	10	1	3	1	1	3	100

		b18c In the next 2-3 years, which of the following issues do you think is most likely to cause military conflict between China and the U.S.? Please select the three most important and rank them according to importance. Third in importance. (%)														Total
		No further answer	Taiwan	South China Sea	Diaoyu Islands	U.S. military activities around China's territory	China's military activities in the Western Pacific	DPRK's nuclear crisis	Cyber security	Space arms race	Nuclear weapons	Other	DK	No military conflict	Refused	
General Public		6	8	7	13	10	5	6	4	2	10	0	26	1	4	100
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	12	8	9	17	12	1	17	12	7	3	0	0	0	1	100
	Members of the news media	8	13	16	11	3	6	17	9	6	10	0	0	0	2	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	4	14	11	19	17	11	7	6	6	0	0	0	1	3	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	13	11	12	11	13	7	11	8	4	5	1	1	0	4	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	8	4	21	15	15	7	11	11	3	0	0	1	1	3	100

b18 In the next 2-3 years, which of the following issues do you think is most likely to cause military conflict between China and the U.S.? (mentioned rate)			
Respondent		**Elites**	**General Public**
Effective	**1 Taiwan**	19.2	24.24
	2 South China Sea	23.8	16.24
	3 Diaoyu Islands	16.1	17.24
	4 U.S. military activities around China's territory	12.9	15.43
	5 China's military activities in the Western Pacific	5.6	7.09
	6 DPRK's nuclear crisis	11.4	4.66
	7 Cyber security	5.3	3.61
	8 Space arms race	3.0	2.11
	9 Nuclear weapons	2.5	8.95
	Other	0.0	0.41
	Total	100.0	100.0
Missing	**DK**		
	No military conflict		
	Refused		

		b19 If China used military force against Taiwan without a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan, do you think the U.S. would intervene militarily? (Elites) (%)				Total
		Would	Would not	DK	NA	
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	59	36	5	0	100
	Members of the news media	64	16	19	2	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	69	23	9	0	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	54	20	26	0	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	60	11	15	14	100

		b20 If China used military force against Taiwan following a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan, do you think the U.S. would intervene militarily? (Elites) (%)				Total
		Would	Would not	DK	NA	
Elites	Government officials, civil servants	37	56	5	1	100
	Members of the news media	61	20	16	3	100
	Managers of enterprises and public institutions	60	33	6	1	100
	Scholars at non-military academic institutions	26	43	30	0	100
	Scholars at military academic institutions	49	27	10	14	100