

TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPON PROGRAM

PREWAR CONCERNS	PRE-2002 INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS	OCTOBER 2002 NIE ASSESSMENT	UN FINDINGS 2002–2003	ADMINISTRATION STATEMENTS	EVIDENCE SINCE MARCH 2003
Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical weapons.	MAYBE. Pre-2002 reports did not report the existence of chemical weapon stockpiles. Discrepancies in Iraqi accounting suggested that "Iraq may have hidden an additional 6,000 CW munitions."	YES. "High confidence" that Iraq had chemical weapons, probably between 100 and 500 metric tons.	NOT SURE. UNMOVIC uncovered several chemical warheads, but no significant stockpile. Iraq failed to provide evidence that it destroyed significant quantities of chemical munitions and precursor materials.	YES. Certain that Iraq had vast chemical weapon stockpiles including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, and VX, and was hiding them from inspectors.	NO. No chemical weapons found. Appears none were produced after 1991. Kay: "Iraq did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled CW program after 1991."
Iraq had covert chemical weapon production facilities.	NOT SURE. Iraq "rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use" in addition to purchasing dual-use equipment.	YES. Iraq "has begun renewed production" of chemical agents, including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX.	PROBABLY NOT. UNMOVIC inspections did not find any active production facilities or evidence of hidden chemical weapon production capability.	YES. Iraq hid its chemical program. Secretary Powell: "We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry."	NO. No open or covert chemical munitions or production facilities found. Some low-level research activity and dual-use programs possible.