

TABLE 2. KEY NIE DISSENTS

NIE STATEMENTS ABOUT IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM	DISSENTING STATEMENTS ABOUT IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
<p>The NIE stated that although Saddam Hussein did “not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them.” “Most agencies” believed that Iraq restarted its nuclear program in 1998 after inspectors left the country. The report said that “if Baghdad acquires sufficient fissile material from abroad it could make a nuclear weapon within several months to a year.” (emphasis in original)</p>	<p>“The activities [State/INR] have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment.”</p>
<p>“Most agencies believe that Saddam’s personal interest in and Iraq’s aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors—as well as Iraq’s attempts to acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools—provide compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad’s nuclear weapons program.”</p>	<p>“DOE agrees that reconstitution of the nuclear program is underway but assesses that the [aluminum] tubes probably are not part of the program.” <i>“Iraq’s efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors . . . The very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were tested by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the procurement efforts are among the factors, in addition to the DOE assessment, that lead INR to conclude that the tubes are not intended for use in Iraq’s nuclear weapon program.”</i></p>
<p>The document sources outside reports and foreign intelligence to support the statement that Iraq attempted to purchase uranium from Niger, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.</p>	<p>“[T]he claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR’s assessment, highly dubious.”</p>

enrichment research and development. Inspectors dismantled all known facilities for the enrichment of fuel, destroyed the principal building of the Al Atheer nuclear weapon development and production plant and related equipment. It verified and accounted for the entire inventory of research reactor fuel targeted by the “crash program.”²³

In October 1997, the IAEA’s assessment of Iraq’s nuclear program was that “There are no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.”²⁴ No evidence was found that Iraq had been successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons, and no proof was discovered that Iraq had produced more than a

few grams of weapon-grade nuclear material through indigenous processes or secretly acquired weapon-usable material from abroad.²⁵

IAEA inspections resumed on November 27, 2002, after a four-year hiatus. There were 237 inspections at 148 sites including all those identified in overhead satellite imagery as having suspicious activity. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003, that:

- ▶ There is “no indication of resumed nuclear activities...nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.”
- ▶ “There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990.” The documents that