European Democracy Support Annual Review 2023

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Introduction

Each year, the European Democracy Hub publishes a review of European democracy support policies. These reviews cover such international and domestic policies at the European Union (EU) level as well as those of individual EU member states and non-EU European countries (specifically Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).

This year’s review finds that European democracy support lost some of its political momentum in 2023. While some notable new strategies and policy interventions prioritized support for democratic norms, overall the EU and individual countries were less ambitious than in the previous two years. In 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine gave a fillip to European commitments in defense of democracy. This effect carried over into 2023, but it ebbed. The EU made some progress in pressing for and supporting democratic reforms in Ukraine and some other countries seeking to join the union, but there was less talk of the war spurring a global defense of democratic values.

The year was marked by violent conflict in places other than Ukraine. Renewed fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as between Israel and Hamas was especially consequential for the EU: these two conflicts revealed severe weaknesses in its democracy support policies and cut across any further efforts to foster democratic reforms in the respective regions. Coups and instability in the Sahel and other parts of Africa made the EU even more cautious than before in building democracy elements into its security missions. An overarching theme that emerged in 2023 was the increasingly complex interlinking of conflict dynamics and trends in political regime type.
Within the EU, the European Commission maintained pressure on Hungary and Poland, having decided to hold back funding to their governments in late 2022. The victory of a pro-democracy coalition in Poland’s parliamentary elections in October suggested that this pressure had some effect. Less successfully, at the end of the year the EU released some of the withheld funds to still-autocratic Hungary. More broadly, the commission was forced to delay its controversial Defence of Democracy package due to widespread objections before introducing a revised version, while there were several other new initiatives, especially in relation to regulating online political debate. Political developments in member states suggested that legislative activity at the EU level was still to filter down to have a tangible impact on democracy at the national level.

This review summarizes the main contextual factors that influenced European democracy policies in 2023 and then outlines the general evolution of EU and national democracy strategies during the year. It goes on to assess those aspects of democracy policy related to Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and its regional fallout. The review then offers details and examples of European democracy funding as well as of the use (or not) of sanctions and conditionality. A final section examines the relationship between conflict dynamics and the role of democracy support in EU security missions and interventions.

Our definition of democracy support disaggregates different levels of policy commitments, and the review presents quantitative and qualitative elements of European policies. Our broad understanding of democracy support includes general foreign policy commitments, democracy-related aid projects, decisions over sanctions, the use of political conditionality, and the incorporation of democracy factors in security policies.
The Overarching Context

Several considerations defined the overarching context in which European democracy support policies were formulated and implemented in 2023.

Global Democracy

Adverse developments in global democracy continued, which meant that EU policies had to work against powerful trends of growing authoritarianism and democratic backsliding. While the year saw the continuation of incremental and judicial efforts to undermine democratic space, there were also further coups in Africa. Still, there was evidence of democratic decline flattening out in some places, triggering questions of the notion of global democratic regression.1

The War on Ukraine

Although many Western leaders still framed Russia’s war on Ukraine as an ideological battle between democracies and autocracies, the policy dynamics in 2023 were less clearly about democracy. Supporting Ukraine remained the EU’s priority, but the war did not have the same catalytic effect on democracy policy as in 2022. The EU looked to build wider global engagement and alliances, often with nondemocratic regimes, and other policy priorities came to the fore. In Ukraine, the imperative was to regain territory occupied by Russia amid a long and grueling counteroffensive. Preparations for Ukraine’s possible accession to the EU continued at a relatively technical level, and this was the lens through which the union supported some democratic reform in the country.
Conflict

There was a rise in conflict and instability in 2023, globally and in Europe. In addition to the war in Ukraine, conflicts intensified in the Sahel region, and Azerbaijan forced a mass exodus of ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh in a military attack that followed a long blockade. From October, Israel carried out a war against the Hamas organization in Gaza after the latter had perpetrated a major terrorist attack on the country. In September, 40 percent of EU citizens identified “peace and security” as their most pressing concern.² As this review details, conflict became an even more determining factor in EU democracy support policies in 2023.

Protests

In 2023, there was a further increase in the intensity of pro-democracy protest activity. Citizens in Israel and Mexico mobilized in large numbers against antidemocratic legislative proposals. In Tunisia, the president’s xenophobic statements against refugees sparked mass protests. The fears of abrupt undemocratic changes in Moldova, Peru, and Senegal intensified unrest. Protests in Iran against morality laws and the lack of freedoms for women continued in 2023. Protests also took place in Kenya and Lebanon against the rising cost of living. European countries, including Belgium and France, saw a wave of protests, reflecting citizens’ resentment of pension reforms and restrictions on demonstrations. In France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, the authorities responded to climate protests with mass arrests and new controls on activists. Mass protests in Georgia impeded the adoption of a controversial draft law on “transparency of foreign interference.” In an antidemocratic protest, meanwhile, Brazil experienced attacks on government buildings by supporters of the defeated president, Jair Bolsonaro.

The Far Right

Concerns mounted over an apparent turn toward far-right movements in Europe. The Finns Party entered into government in Finland, and the EKRE party finished second in Estonia’s parliamentary elections. Germany experienced a significant increase in far-right marches in the first half of 2023 while the Alternative für Deutschland party surged in two state elections and rose to 20 percent support in national polling. In Austria, the Freedom Party finished second in regional elections in Lower Austria, won seats in Salzburg’s regional government, and gained in popularity ahead of 2024 parliamentary elections. In the Netherlands, the Party for Freedom doubled its seats, setting its leader, Geert Wilders, on course to become the next prime minister. In Spain, the Vox party lost ground in elections but consolidated its place as an influential political force. Even though these parties insist they do not threaten democracy, their progress clearly represents a challenge to core liberal political values across Europe.
New Strategies

In 2023, the EU introduced fewer new strategies related to democracy than in the previous two years. This was in part a reflection of the term of the European Parliament and European Commission gradually drawing to a close ahead of parliamentary elections in 2024, although other factors were also at play, as explained later. Still, there were notable positive developments, with some advances in aspects of EU policies and a modest number of new policies introduced by national governments. Advances were evident in external and internal EU democracy support strategies.

External EU Initiatives

In June, a Mid-Term Review of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy promised an upgraded democracy effort. It committed itself to contributing to women’s empowerment and gender equality in 85 percent of all new external actions by 2025. The mid-term report on the EU Gender Action Plan (GAPIII) reiterated gender equality as a central objective for external democracy support. The Team Europe Democracy initiative conducted its first annual meeting, bringing together 130 representatives from European civil society organizations, EU member states, and EU institutions. It launched country-specific initiatives, including in Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Jordan, Mongolia, Tanzania, and Uganda.

The European Commission and the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Josep Borrell, announced an EU strategy for tackling corruption and advanced plans for sanctions related to corruption. The commission’s directive on combating corruption extends the list of corruption offenses and, for the first time, incorporates public and private sector corruption in one legal act. Agreement was reached on a due diligence directive that will enable the EU to fine private companies implicated in human rights abuses; this will apply to EU companies with more than 500 employees and a turnover of €150 million and to non-EU companies with a €300 million turnover in the union.

The EU and the Council of Europe reinforced their strategic partnership, and the EU made progress toward accession to the European Convention on Human Rights. The EU and the United Nations (UN) launched the Advocacy, Coalition Building and Transformative Feminist Action initiative to prevent gender-based violence and support frontline gender organizations, initially in Africa and Latin America. The EU advocated reforming the UN Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations to strengthen civil society influence.

In November, a new partnership agreement—the Samoa agreement—between the EU and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States was signed to replace the Cotonou Agreement. The agreement will apply provisionally from January 2024. The EU had to press many states hard to sign as they objected to conditionality clauses, especially related to
LGBTQ rights. The agreement has democracy as one of its priority areas, but slightly diluted democratic conditionality. The democracy and human rights clause introduces a special joint committee for dispute resolution. The Cotonou Agreement expired in 2020 but was rolled over to 2023, due in part to objections by Hungary and Poland over language promoting nondiscrimination, LGBTQ rights, and gender equality in the text of its successor agreement. In February, the EU launched a renewed strategy for Africa’s Great Lakes region that prioritizes the promotion of peace, democracy, and sustainable development, although with a stronger focus on security than democracy.

The EU’s renewed interest in Latin America and the Caribbean was visible in a summit with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in July, the first such meeting in eight years, as well as the adoption of a new agenda to strengthen cooperation with the region. While EU member states primarily focused on restarting dialogue and recovering ground lost to China in the region, the agenda mentioned democracy, the rule of law, human rights, the empowerment of women and girls, and increased engagement with youth as new areas of cooperation.

A proxy indicator for the strength of democracy commitments can be found in the mentions of democratic values in EU statements and communications. Table 1 shows how frequently key high-level EU officials stressed the importance of democracy support.

| Table 1. Shares of EU Commissioners’ Statements Containing a Focus on Democracy |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                  | DG JUST Commissioner | DG INTPA Commissioner | DG NEAR Commissioner | Vice President for Values and Transparency | High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security |
| Main Focus       | 10.4 | 2.4 | 1.7 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 6.5 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 5.3 | 5.7 | 2.6 | 4.8 | 19.4 | 10.5 | 1.4 | 7.5 | 18.2 | 16.9 | 1.9 | 5.7 |
| Core Part        | 20.8 | 17.1 | 17 | 8 | 3.9 | 7.8 | 5 | 7.6 | 13.3 | 12.3 | 7.8 | 8.7 | 25.4 | 18.5 | 28.8 | 12.5 | 16.7 | 9.1 | 10.1 | 3.6 |
| Addressed        | 20.8 | 14.6 | 11.9 | 13 | 15.5 | 26 | 36.3 | 25.8 | 33.7 | 25.5 | 34.8 | 26 | 28.4 | 26.7 | 20.5 | 27.5 | 22.7 | 31.2 | 12 | 17.6 |
| Not Addressed    | 47.9 | 65.9 | 69.5 | 87 | 79.1 | 59.7 | 56.2 | 74.2 | 47.8 | 56.5 | 54.8 | 74.1 | 25.4 | 44.2 | 49.3 | 72.5 | 42.4 | 42.8 | 76.1 | 82.4 |

Source: Hand-coded assessments of 1,827 statements, speeches, and press releases of key high-level EU officials in 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023. This includes statements, speeches, and press releases from the commissioners for DG INTPA (International Partnerships), DG JUST (Justice), and DG NEAR (Neighbourhood and Enlargement) and the vice president for transparency and values as well as press releases and statements from the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy published through the Council of the EU.
In 2023, the EU deployed seven Election Observation Missions: to Guatemala, Liberia, Maldives, Nigeria, Paraguay, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe. The EU also deployed Election Follow-up Missions to Ghana, Guyana, and Honduras. It expressed concerns over the exclusion of candidates in Guatemala, restrictions on freedom of speech and citizens’ right to stand for election in Cambodia, and limits to the independence of the Electoral Commission and the violent arrest of accredited citizen observers in Zimbabwe. Political difficulties forced the EU to downscale its planned observation mission to the DRC to a small deployment of electoral experts ahead of December general elections.

Source: Based on data available through the European Union Database on Election Missions, EODS III Report Missions Database and information provided via the EEAS Newsroom.

Note: This map is illustrative; boundaries, names, and designations used do not represent or imply any opinion on the part of Carnegie or the authors. Dotted lines represent approximate disputed boundaries. The final status has not yet been agreed upon.
In 2023, the EU continued its regular human rights dialogues, political dialogues, and consultations with different countries and bodies. It held forty-one human rights dialogues, consultations, and working group meetings with the following partners: the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bhutan, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, the Economic Community of West African States, Ecuador, Georgia, Iraq, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, the United States, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. The February human rights dialogue with China was the first since such meetings were suspended in 2019. The human rights dialogues and consultations with Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, Myanmar, and Russia remained suspended.

In March, U.S. President Joe Biden hosted the second Summit for Democracy, with all EU member states in attendance except Hungary, whose exclusion by the organizers prevented participation by the EU as such. The summit was low-key, as was the commitment of European governments to it. The European Commission and European governments
acted as coleads in eleven out of seventeen thematic cohorts: Bulgaria on anti-corruption, the Czech Republic and Norway on civic space, Ireland and the European Commission on deliberative democracy, Greece on elections, Romania and Sweden on gender equality, Spain on inclusive democracy, Latvia on information integrity, the Netherlands on media freedom, Lithuania on resisting authoritarian pressure, Estonia and the United Kingdom on technology for democracy, and the European Commission on youth engagement. EU member states offered to support South Korea in organizing the third summit in 2024 but declined to devise a high-level or proactive strategy for the process.

**National Foreign Policy Initiatives**

Few European countries made democracy support a central aim of their foreign policy in 2023. In contrast, the more specific and related issue of gender equality became a significant component in several EU member states’ foreign policy—in fact, there was a clear trend of gender-related initiatives gaining far greater prominence and priority in European policies than democracy-related ones.

Germany adopted its first national security strategy, which references democratic principles thirty-eight times and stresses the need to protect democracy internally and internationally, although it has what it calls an “interest-driven” focus. Germany’s government also released new Defense Policy Guidelines that commit to a whole-of-society approach. The German development ministry’s new Africa Strategy reaffirmed a commitment to democracy while raising the relative importance of other issues and promising a non-paternalistic approach. The government also unveiled a feminist foreign policy and a feminist development policy.

The Netherlands continued to advance its feminist foreign policy. Its Security Strategy for 2023–2029 prioritizes the participation of women in decisionmaking, particularly in matters of peace and security. In June, a policy note emphasized the importance of human rights and democracy in creating stronger ties with the Global South. In September, the Netherlands launched the Global Declaration on Information Integrity Online at the UN General Assembly, calling for international rules to counter disinformation. In November, it hosted the international Shaping Feminist Foreign Policy Conference.

In France, President Emmanuel Macron unveiled a new partnership with Africa, which lists democracy as a key interest of French policy in the continent. The French government announced its new development cooperation policy, which formally prioritizes support for human rights, democracy, and gender equality, and also launched an international strategy on sexual and reproductive rights for 2023–2027, with a €120 million budget available for feminist civil society organizations (CSOs). In October, the Spanish government published an Action Plan for Feminist Foreign Policy.
The United Kingdom released an updated version of its Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. This emphasized the need to build democratic resilience but cautioned against dividing the international arena into a democracy-versus-autocracy binary. The United Kingdom pledged to increase women’s participation in foreign, security, and defense policy. A new White Paper on international development outlined commitments to supporting digital democracy and increased funding to the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. Democracy support in general regained some ground as a priority for the United Kingdom’s development agenda.

The Czech Republic strengthened its democratic support for Taiwan and Ukraine. In March, a 150-person delegation, the largest of any Czech overseas delegation in the past five years, visited Taiwan to sign a joint statement of legislative cooperation. In September, the country adopted a new Security Strategy that foregrounds democracy support and prioritizes human rights and the rule of law worldwide. The country’s Magnitsky Act came into effect, providing for restrictions on organizations and regimes that violate human rights and commit terrorist acts or cyber attacks.

Bulgaria’s new government included the promotion and protection of human rights among its primary foreign policy goals. Estonia’s new national security strategy underlined that “preserving democracy is also part of security policy.” Supporting democratic activists from Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine remained a priority for Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Besides its traditional focus on Eastern Europe and Eurasia, Latvia increasingly turned toward Africa, implementing its first development projects in Namibia and Zambia, with a focus on female empowerment. In August, prime minister Krišjānis Kariņš called on the EU to let member states without a colonial history lead on diplomacy in Africa, Asia, and South America. Lithuania hosted the Third Future of Democracy Forum and is planning to turn the country into a hub for democracy and make the forum an annual event. Slovenia launched its first Feminist Foreign Policy Strategy during the year.

Swedish lost some of its shine as a “democracy superpower” after the election of a government that is dependent on the support of far-right members of parliament. This government stepped further back from the country’s erstwhile feminist foreign policy and tied more development aid to migration control. CSOs strongly criticized the government’s intention to reshape development policy in favor of the business sector. Additionally, protests featuring the burning of the Quran in Denmark and Sweden prompted discussions over free-speech laws in both countries. After the involvement of several ministers in racism scandals, Finland’s new government introduced a new anti-racism policy, including measures to promote nondiscrimination and gender equality. Norway launched a new action plan on gender equality, peace, and security.

Croatia signed an agreement with the United Kingdom to strengthen their bilateral cooperation and work together to enhance stability, democracy, and the rule of law as well as tackle crime and corruption in the Western Balkans, with a special emphasis on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia also promised to share its experience and know-how with countries
in the Western Balkans as well as Ukraine and help them in their journeys toward EU membership. Similarly, Romania continued to support Moldova, including by cochairing the fourth ministerial conference of the Moldova Support Platform—together with France and Germany—to help mitigate the impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

**EU Internal Initiatives**

In her 2023 State of the Union speech, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s mentioned democracy only four times and did not announce any major democracy-related initiatives—a contrast to the prominence of democracy commitments in her 2022 speech. The apparent downgrading of democracy was also evident in the European Council’s preparation for the 2024–2029 EU Strategic Agenda. The president of the European Council, Charles Michel, defined four major priority areas, none of which related to democracy—unlike in the 2019–2024 EU Strategic Agenda.

Still, the European Commission claimed far-reaching progress on numerous commitments related to democracy. This included tightening rules on corruption and proposing a new anti-corruption sanctions regime. The commission also supported a pilot project on “building Europe with local councillors” and the establishment of the permanent EU Children’s Participation Platform to endorse youth political participation.

Citizen panels continued as a follow-up activity to the Conference on the Future of Europe. In February, a panel on virtual worlds held its kick-off session, and a panel on learning mobility was launched in Brussels in March. Each panel convened approximately 150 citizens chosen randomly from all member states. It was not clear how the recommendations would translate into policy. Separately, the commission registered eleven European Citizens’ Initiatives in 2023.

Anti-corruption and transparency initiatives were a priority in 2023. As part of the European Commission’s targeted proposals to tackle corruption, an EU network is set to map high-risk areas in 2024 and the results of this mapping will feed into the EU’s new anti-corruption strategy. The Qatargate corruption scandal, labeled the worst in the history of the European Parliament, prompted the adoption of enhanced transparency rules in September, introducing restrictions on gifts for members of the parliament and mandating the declaration of private interests as well as any remuneration exceeding €5,000. The commissioner for values and transparency presented plans for an interinstitutional EU ethics body; members of the European Parliament criticized this as “unsatisfactory and not ambitious enough.” In October, France called for the establishment of an anti-corruption watchdog.

The European Commission delayed its Defence of Democracy package due to civil society concerns that one part of the proposal could negatively impact genuine democracy work. The package was finally adopted in December and included a directive on financing
by foreign actors as well as nonbinding recommendations on civil society and electoral standards across Europe. CSOs complained that the register of foreign interests and transparency requirements on funding could be weaponized by antidemocratic forces and cause difficulties for democracy support coming into Europe—effectively restricting civic space in the same way as measures the EU criticizes other governments for adopting. The European Commission also proposed creating a new legal format, the European Cross-Border Association, that would give CSOs recognition by all member states and make it easier for them to act across borders.

The fight against disinformation remained prominent. At the beginning of the year, the European External Action Service published its first Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats. A first set of reports was also published under the Code of Practice on Disinformation, listing anti-disinformation activities by internet platforms and making them accessible online in the new Transparency Centre. The European Commission started implementing the Digital Services Act (DSA), which may help tackle authoritarian interference in democratic processes. The commission identified the first nineteen platforms that need to comply with the DSA’s transparency requirements, including Amazon, Apple’s App Store, Google, Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, TikTok, X, and YouTube. In October, the commission opened an investigation into Meta, TikTok, and X for failing to tackle disinformation about the war between Israel and Hamas.

At the end of the year, the European Council and the European Parliament reached agreement on the EU’s long awaited Artificial Intelligence Act. The text includes bans on emotion recognition, predictive policing, and biometric identification, but with law-enforcement exemptions. It treats artificial intelligence (AI) systems used in electoral processes as high-risk and will subject these to a risk assessment. The act also includes an obligation to conduct fundamental rights impact assessments for entities providing essential public services. The text still needs to be formally adopted, and the new rules are likely to become fully applicable only in 2026.

The EU also agreed to the European Media Freedom Act, which aims to foster media pluralism. The European Parliament endorsed the act in October, but press freedom groups criticized several of its provisions, including the lack of a ban on using spyware against journalists. France lobbied for a security exemption in the act and detained a journalist on national security grounds in September. The European Parliament’s committee investigating the use of surveillance spyware called for safeguards to prevent the targeting of journalists, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe singled out Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Spain in its October report, urging them to investigate abuse.

The European Commission’s fourth annual Rule of Law Report claimed that two-thirds of the previous year’s recommendations had been fully or partially addressed, while also highlighting that systemic concerns remain in several member states—with rule of law scores worsening in fourteen member states between 2022 and 2023. The EU ratified the Istanbul Convention on combating violence against women and domestic violence; as of
late 2023, only twenty-one member states had ratified the convention. In September, the European Commission formally ended the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism that had been put in place in 2007 to improve judicial independence and anti-corruption efforts in Bulgaria and Romania. While the commission noted significant progress, both countries continue to experience problems with the rule of law.

**Democracy and the War on Ukraine**

While in 2022 most of the narratives surrounding Russia’s war on Ukraine referred to the need to protect democracy, this rhetoric lost some of its prominence and clarity in 2023. As the war entered its second year, EU institutions and member states switched their focus to more pragmatic issues such as the development of adequate instruments to support Ukraine financially and militarily. At this level, pre-accession preparations for Ukraine and other applicant states opened the way toward more far-reaching democracy support, as did plans for new funding instruments.

**Sanctions**

In 2023, the EU adopted three more packages of sanctions against Russia in connection to its invasion of Ukraine; by the end of the year, its sanctions applied to over 1,950 individuals and entities. The package adopted on the first anniversary of the war was widely described as the toughest yet, and it further limits key imports from and exports to Russia.

The eleventh package of sanctions aimed to close loopholes and prevent third countries and businesses from bypassing EU sanctions. Some member states were reticent in agreeing to these, fearing such measures could antagonize third countries. Germany strongly opposed the inclusion on the EU sanctions list of eight Chinese companies for furthering Moscow’s war efforts. Eventually, all objections were dropped; the European Commission developed a strategy of outreach to third countries and only included three of the eight Chinese companies.

**Military Support**

As it became clear that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was turning into a long, protracted conflict, the EU increased its military support to Kyiv. The EU and its member states provided €27 billion of military support, an increase from 2022. Germany became the second-biggest contributor of military aid to the country after the United States. Limiting the increase in support, Hungary blocked the release of an eighth tranche of the European Peace Facility (worth €500 million) in reaction to Ukraine listing the Hungarian OTP Bank as a “sponsor of war” due to its perceived support to Russia.
In November, the European Council approved further funding to bolster the training of Ukrainian armed forces under the EU Military Assistance Mission. The increased financial support, totaling €194 million and facilitated through the European Peace Facility, elevates the overall funding for the mission to €255 million. Looking beyond 2023, the EU put forward plans to provide Ukraine with steady military aid of up to €5 billion a year for the next four years under the European Peace Facility. At the end of the year, Hungary was still preventing approval of this proposal.

**Non-military Aid**

The European Commission announced the launch of the Ukraine Facility, a dedicated financing instrument with as much as €18 billion per year from 2024 to 2027. The facility emphasizes democracy-related aspects such as good governance and the rule of law. At the December European Council, Hungary blocked agreement on the facility. EU governments promised to return to the issue in January 2024 and indicated they would look for off-budget means of getting the aid to Ukraine should Hungary not relent.

**Accession Talks**

Pre-accession preparations progressed steadily during the year, with low-key EU pressure helping push along political reforms in Moldova and Ukraine. In its assessment in June 2023, the European Commission recognized the two countries’ progress in meeting some but not all of the benchmarks it had set. The commission then recommended in its November Enlargement Package that formal negotiations be opened with both countries, despite them still not meeting some democracy-related preconditions. Hungary was the only government to oppose this recommendation; after Hungary agreed to a form of constructive abstention, member states decided in favor of opening accession talks at their December summit.

Georgia was denied candidate status in 2022, mainly on democracy grounds. In 2023, despite strong support for EU integration among the public, the government’s illiberal leanings threatened to derail the country’s path toward accession. Most damagingly, the governing Georgian Dream party attempted to introduce a “foreign agents law” against civil society. Despite further democratic backsliding, however, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status in December. Fear of Georgia being left vulnerable to Russian influence outweighed immediate democracy concerns.

Despite many high-level visits and bold political speeches, there was little progress toward accession in the Western Balkan countries, and EU pressure failed to turn political trends in the region in a more democratic direction. The EU offered a new €6 million Growth
Plan for the Western Balkans to extend some of the advantages of membership, including through integration into the single market, conditional on the delivery of key reforms. However, this new financial commitment failed to make up for the lack of tangible progress on accession.

Following the commission’s recommendation, at their December summit, member states agreed to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina once the country complies with democratic reform conditions. The commission will report on this to the European Council in March 2024. The commission presented screening reports on Albania and North Macedonia, urging further reforms before accession talks open. Negotiations with Serbia did not advance as the commission stipulated the need for more democracy reforms and alignment with the EU’s foreign policy aims, while postelection protests in December further complicated the picture. In Montenegro, progress on accession reforms stalled due to political polarization and instability. The EU did not offer Kosovo candidate status, which the latter had applied for at the end of 2022. It urged Kosovo and Serbia to speed up their normalization talks under the EU-brokered Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue in order to make progress toward accession, but it had little success in this.

**Wider Strategic Discussions**

Summits of the European Political Community (EPC) were held in June and October 2023, each gathering over forty leaders. As in the first EPC summit in 2022, democracy support was not a topic of discussion, and several non-democracies were included. While many leaders continued to define the EPC as an alliance for or of democracies, it contained no concrete democracy-related initiative. Its focus was on security, energy, and other areas of cooperation, including with authoritarian regimes. The two summits were relatively low-key and after the second there were doubts about whether the EPC would continue to exist in the long term.

**Democracy Aid**

The member states mostly continued to produce only limited information on their democracy support in real time. Most still do not pre-allocate a defined share or amount of aid for democracy for each budget year. Most governments can measure their democracy spending only ex post, through data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that takes two years to compile and is organized in categories that do not correspond precisely with democracy. At the end of 2023, therefore, the best picture available from the OECD was that European donors spent €8.6 billion in 2021 on “government and civil society” projects, a category including many programs that are not strictly concerned with democracy support.
This imprecision puts democracy support at a disadvantage compared to other areas of external funding—like migration, security, and climate change—for which governments tend to make a clearer allocation of funds at the beginning of each year. Governments did nothing in 2023 to rectify this shortcoming; indeed, many of them seem reluctant to be more transparent about their democracy funding. European donors insist that democracy aid is difficult to define, yet the United States pre-allocates precise and identifiable amounts for democracy.

**External Funding**

While only a partial picture is available of external European democracy funding, it was clear in 2023 that the general trend was toward other aid priorities.

Under the Human Rights and Democracy program of the European Commission’s Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) €143 million was available for country projects. By region, the Human Rights and Democracy program was split for the year as follows: €22 million for the EU’s neighborhood, €20 million for the Asia-Pacific, €15.9 million for Latin America, €22.4 million for sub-Saharan Africa, €6.6 million for the Western Balkans and Türkiye, €4.1 million for Central Asia, and €2.4 million for the Middle East and the Gulf countries.58

The European Commission asked for an update to the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) after it became apparent that much aid had been reallocated to Ukraine from other states. Under the Civil Society Thematic Programme, €9.2 million was reallocated to supporting Ukraine, while €5.8 million was moved away from other budget lines to support Ukrainian civil society. The requested update would increase the amount for external action by €10.5 billion, but little of this will be allocated to strengthening democracy, with the focus rather on migration, border control, and defense.

France pledged to increase its aid by 2025, but for 2023 its official development assistance (ODA) remained at 0.55 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).59 It has not stipulated how much, if any, of its aid increases will go to democracy, although the French Development Agency did allocate over €1 billion for civil society partners.60

In Germany, the budget of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) decreased slightly to €12.16 billion in 2023.61 Under its feminist foreign and development policies, Germany committed itself to providing at least 8 percent of aid to “gender-transformative” projects and 85 percent to “gender-sensitive” projects. The Foreign Office committed to reaching these targets for all its funding by 2025, while the BMZ referred to them only for new projects managed under its separate feminist development policy.62
In its Development Cooperation Plan for 2022–2024, Austria committed itself to increasing its bilateral development cooperation by €12 million, setting democratic governance and the empowerment of women as priorities. Belgium announced the establishment of a new Civic Space Fund, which will allocate €8 million to human rights organizations in fourteen countries. Belgium allocated €50 and €198 million to women’s rights and CSOs, respectively. Additionally, it signed a three-year funding agreement with the UN Development Program (UNDP), worth €28.9 million per year, to strengthen democratic governance and promote the rule of law in least-developed and low-income countries.

After the United Kingdom’s ODA for 2022–2023 shrunk by €2 billion, for 2023–2024 it increased from €6.9 billion to €8.5 billion. The budget for Open Societies and Human Rights rose to €74 million for 2023–2024. The country’s International Women and Girls Strategy 2023 to 2030 commits it to focusing on gender equality in at least 80 percent of bilateral aid programs.

Spain’s development agency committed to increasing its funding to CSOs by 40 percent, mainly focusing on Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. Women’s rights and fighting corruption were a major component of Spanish development cooperation. Spain announced that it would contribute €100 million over the next three years to support organizations that promote gender equality and sexual health rights. Portugal’s External Cultural Action program announced 3,673 initiatives in over 100 countries with the aim of promoting cultural productions related to democratic values.

Estonia significantly increased its budget for development cooperation and humanitarian aid from €32.9 million in 2022 to €40.93 million in 2023, primarily focusing on Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, and with particular attention to the empowerment of civil society as well as the situation of women and girls in Afghanistan. Lithuania’s ODA increased to €88 million in 2023 due to the costs of hosting refugees and aid to Ukraine as well as to increased support to pro-democracy activists and human rights defenders. Poland’s Solidarity Fund, which dedicates part of its activities to democracy support, received €8.3 million in 2023, the same amount as in 2022.

The Czech foreign ministry slightly decreased funding for its Transformation Cooperation Program, which supports democratic institutions, human rights, civil society, and good governance. Romania committed around 4 percent of its development aid to strengthening the rule of law in 2023; this included a new Democratization and Sustainable Development Fund for Moldova. Slovakia committed €50,000 for Sharing Slovak Expertise activities to be implemented in the Western Balkans, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

Finland’s proposed development cooperation budget for 2023 committed €971 million to supporting governance and civil society programs. The new government announced a shift away from gender equality and self-determination projects, although some programs focusing on the former are still being rolled out. Sweden’s government proposed a reduction in ODA to €5.1 billion for 2023–2025, although still with higher levels of democracy support.
than most other member states. 76 Denmark announced the allocation of €174.4 million for eighteen strategic partnerships with CSOs in 2023. While there was a slight decrease in its cross-cutting aid for democracy, human rights, and good governance to €21.8 million in 2023, financial support for its Neighbourhood Program, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, and the New Democracy Fund increased to €28.8 million.

In terms of more specific examples, despite the unavailability of comprehensive and up-to-date overarching figures, it is possible to identify some of the most significant democracy programs funded by the EU during the year.

Under the NDICI’s Human Rights and Democracy program, the European Commission launched a call for proposals for Thematic Framework Partnerships for Human Rights and Democracy of €31 million, under which grants would be awarded on the following priorities: abolishing the death penalty (€6 million), protecting the freedoms of association and of peaceful assembly (€5 million), and protecting independent media (€20 million). 77

Team Europe Democracy was granted €9.4 million from the 2023 NDICI Global Europe human rights and democracy budget. 78 The EU launched the Women and Youth in Democracy initiative with a €40 million budget. 79 As part of this, it launched a new global program on support to political party systems. The Thematic Programme for Civil Society Organizations had a budget of €196 million for 2023, €98 million of which was for sub-Saharan Africa. 80 Additionally, a new Strengthening Global CSO Umbrella Organisations program began, with a budget of €56 million, and the EU awarded an indicative budget of €50 million to an EU System for an Enabling Environment for Civil Society. 81 This aims to create an early-warning mechanism against new repression. The EU also issued a €36 million call for projects on business and human rights, a €36 million call on gender and religious discrimination, and a €22 million program on coalition building and transformative feminist action to end violence against women. 82

In February 2023, the European Commission launched the third phase of its Partnership for Good Governance for Eastern Partnership countries, which aims at strengthening the rule of law and gender rights in these countries. 83 In this region, one notable development was the EU’s decision to provide Belarusian civil society activists with an additional €30 million. Under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance II—covering Türkiye and the Western Balkans—a call allocated €45 million for democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and gender equality and €25 million for civil society and local authorities. 84 The EU delegation in Bosnia and Herzegovina announced a call with an overall budget of €7.8 million to support CSO networks working on issues related to democracy. 85

In Africa, the EU funded several initiatives advocating gender equality and youth political participation. The €20 million Spotlight 2.0 Initiative was launched in Uganda with the aims of eliminating gender-based violence and promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights. 86 The EU funded a Civil Society Convention in Uganda. 87 It signed an $88 million agreement with Liberia’s government, $16.5 million of which was allocated to
strengthening an inclusive and accountable democracy. The European Commission began a new initiative called PAGODES in Benin, worth €63.75 million, that supports reforms related to economic, democratic, and social governance.\textsuperscript{88} In Nigeria, the EU is negotiating a new sexual and gender-based violence package for implementation in 2024 and launched the five-year, €30 million Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Programme Phase II.\textsuperscript{89}

A new EU-funded project supported grassroots civil society groups in Kenya. The EU extended the implementation of its "democratic package" for Ethiopia until October 2023. In partnership with Rwanda’s government and civil society, the EU gave €19.5 million to enhance the justice sector and protect human rights in the country. In South Sudan, the EU delegation and UNDP signed a €3 million agreement to improve the enabling environment for elections.\textsuperscript{90} In the framework of the Team Europe Democracy initiative, an advisory board of youth volunteers was launched in Zimbabwe to engage the EU delegation and member-state embassies on good governance, human rights, gender equality, and women’s empowerment.\textsuperscript{91} Similar initiatives were conducted in Cameroon and Namibia.

France increased its financial support for women’s empowerment and youth political participation in African countries. In particular, the French Development Agency supported female entrepreneurs in the DRC, with €12 million allocated to the “Pour Elles” project to challenge social norms.\textsuperscript{92} It also allocated €17 million in grants to CSO initiatives, including the “Seed of Citizenship” project in Mauritania to facilitate the civic emancipation of young people and support dialogue with the public authorities in favor of the integration of young people.\textsuperscript{93} In April, the French Development Agency announced the allocation of approximately €32 million to twenty-three new projects worldwide on promoting gender equality and strengthening civil society and good governance.\textsuperscript{94}

Portugal signed a 2023–2027 strategic cooperation program with Angola worth €500 million, in which the promotion of human rights, good governance, gender equality, and women empowerment are priorities. Portugal also supported Sao Tome and Principe in strengthening the country’s democracy and rule of law with a €15 million package.

The forty-month Partnership for Democracy and Accountability, created by the EU and the Open Government Partnership, aims to enhance democratic governance and citizens’ lives globally and in partner countries, including in Colombia, Ghana, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, and the Philippines.\textsuperscript{95} The EU and Denmark jointly launched the Digital Democracy Initiative to help civil society harness technology for democracy, to which Denmark contributed €40 million and the EU provided €11 million.\textsuperscript{96} To strengthen justice and the rule of law in Latin America and the Caribbean, the EU launched the second edition of the EL PACCTO program with a total budget of €58.8 million. The program will be implemented by France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, following a Team Europe Democracy approach.\textsuperscript{97}
The South Programme V joint initiative between the Council of Europe and the EU entered its fifth phase with a budget of €5.5 million. It continued to focus on the protection of the rule of law, human rights, and democracy in the Southern Mediterranean. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights also cooperated with the Council of Europe, which it consulted for its Programming Document 2023–2025 and Annual Work Programme.

The EU supported events and initiatives on gender equality and democratic governance in Asia. It funded two programs in Uzbekistan—Empowerment Now! and the Improving Governance in Uzbekistan Programme—with an €8 million budget, and it granted €2.34 million to CSOs in Kyrgyzstan to launch democracy and human rights–related programs. Also aimed at CSOs, it launched a new €3.5 million program in Bhutan and signed a separate €9.3 million financing agreement to strengthen the country’s local governance and digitalization. The EU also undertook less direct initiatives in countries with authoritarian regimes. In particular, the first Student Debate Tournament on Gender Equality took place in Turkmenistan, and, in cooperation with UN Women, the EU launched the Women in Motion initiative, a two-and-half-year program for improving labor conditions and opportunities for migrant women in China’s Guangdong Province.

In 2023, the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) celebrated its tenth anniversary and increased funding levels. It prioritized supporting independent media, including in conflict environments like Israel/Palestine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Sudan, and Syria. The EED held the first transatlantic dialogue with democracy support organizations attending with the objective of forming a Transatlantic Democracy Support Platform to coordinate democracy aid.

**Internal Funding**

The Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) program is the main instrument that supports democratic values inside the EU, with a budget of €1.55 billion. The program has several strands: EU values (€690 million); equality, rights, and gender equality (€470 million); citizen engagement and participation (up to €395 million); and gender-based violence (up to €80 million). The European Parliament raised the CERV program’s budget for 2023, adding €2 million to the strand for tackling gender-based violence and €1.5 million to the strand for citizen engagement and participation.

In 2023, €203 million was allocated to the CERV’s work program, with more than half going to its EU values pillar. In April, the citizen engagement and participation pillar received a funding increase from €17 million to €25.4 million for 2023–2024. Several non-EU countries—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, and Ukraine—expressed interest in taking part in the CERV program as full rather than associated partners, a position they currently hold.
The CERV program has been flexible to address different needs, particularly in its citizen engagement and participation pillar. It has funded projects that could increase voters’ interest and influence turnout at the European Parliament elections. Its 2023–2024 work program focuses on diversity and inclusion, and its first call was for projects looking into how children can engage and participate in a democracy.104

Another funding instrument to support democracy within the EU is the Justice Program managed by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers. In 2023, it had a budget of €41 million for three areas: judicial cooperation, judicial training, and access to justice—each of which has indirect relevance to democracy.105 Additionally, in the work program, an estimated €75 million from Horizon Europe was allocated to a call on “standing up for democracy.”106

During the year, a significant amount of new EU funding was released for work on media pluralism. A €9 million call targeted innovative content for young people, while €2.5 million was set aside to create a European streaming portal.107 Projects also prioritized counter-disinformation via grants amounting to €10 million for stakeholders to support the work of the European Digital Media Observatory and €8 million for the European Narrative Observatory.108 The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology supported independent media and journalists relocated from Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine.109 The Free Media Hub EAST project disbursed €2.2 million in grants, providing assistance and psychological support, investing in technological solutions, and strengthening cooperation between exiled media mainly located in the Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.110

**Sanctions and Democratic Conditionality**

The EU sought to tighten some elements of its sanctions policies in 2023. Still, as in previous years, its use of both sanctions and broader democratic conditionality was relatively sparing and selective.

**Sanctions**

Debate intensified on improving the EU’s enforcement policies across all of its sanctions regimes. At the end of 2022, the European Commission tabled a proposal to criminalize sanctions evasion and circumvention; the European Council and European Parliament reached a political agreement on this in December 2023. The union also made diplomatic efforts to persuade third countries to clamp down on the many sanctions evasion schemes that have blunted the impact of EU measures.
The European Council prolonged the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime until the end of 2026. After being inactive in 2022, this regime was again used in 2023. It was applied twice against Russian prosecutors and judges for their role in infringing rights and freedoms. Ahead of International Women’s Day, the EU sanctioned nine individuals and three entities from Myanmar, South Sudan, and the Taliban, among others, for violence against women and girls. In July, the EU imposed restrictive measures against eighteen individuals and five entities in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Russia, South Sudan, and Ukraine for serious human rights violations, with six individuals listed for sexual and gender-based violence. In September, the EU sanctioned additional individuals and entities for human rights abuses committed in Ukraine. Overall, the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime in 2023 was applied to sixty-seven individuals and twenty entities.

Figure 3. Overview of EU Sanctions on Grounds Related to Democracy and Human Right, 2023
In May 2023, the European Commission and the high representative proposed to expand the sanctions regime to include corruption as a listing criterion. To date, the EU only has corruption in its sanctions regimes for Haiti, Lebanon, and Moldova, in addition to three previous Misappropriation of State Funds sanctions regimes for Egypt, Tunisia, and Ukraine.

Reflecting a different set of priorities, however, much focus in 2023 was on making sure that humanitarian aid was not hampered in authoritarian states subject to sanctions. As a result of UN Security Council Resolution 2664, the EU introduced a humanitarian exemption to UN sanctions regimes adopted into EU law. This was applied to twenty-five regimes, nearly all for autocracies. The EU also introduced humanitarian exemptions within its own autonomous sanctions frameworks. The trend toward humanitarian aid making up a higher share of ODA continued, and major crisis-related disbursements of humanitarian aid went to nondemocratic governments in Afghanistan, the DRC, Gaza, Morocco, South Sudan, Uganda, Somalia, Syria, and Türkiye.

Several country-specific regimes were updated or extended in response to human rights violations and serious democratic abuses, including those for Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, Myanmar, Nicaragua, and Syria. New sanctions frameworks were established for Haiti, Moldova, Niger, and Sudan. The framework for Sudan, approved in October, targets key actors in the ongoing war with travel bans and asset and bank account freezes. The United Kingdom issued sanctions against both sides in the Sudan conflict, targeting nine entities and two individuals. The EU amended its sanctions regime for Haiti in view of a worsening situation in the country.

The EU responded assertively to the coup in Niger in July, suspending financial support and security cooperation. This firm response reflected the tight security partnership that had developed between the EU and the ousted government. The EU backed the Economic Community of West African States in its efforts to pressure the junta that took power, and in October it introduced a new sanctions framework allowing the freezing of assets and travel bans. The EU also expressly backed the ousted president. France pushed for a particularly tough line against the coup, initially being sympathetic to regional bodies’ plans for military intervention. Some donors have been more equivocal on how to approach the new junta: Belgium initially suggested it would suspend its aid but ended up only partially doing so, Denmark announced that its aid would restart after having been suspended, Italy said it preferred a negotiated diplomatic solution, and the European Commission reflected on whether to continue any areas of aid to Niger in 2024.

In similar fashion, after a postelection attempted coup in Guatemala, the EU looked set to adopt a sanctions framework that would enable measures to be targeted at the actors involved. As a general trend, it is becoming increasingly common for the EU to adopt sanctions frameworks without actually designating any individuals for targeted measures.
The EU added several times to its Iran sanctions regime, on issues related to gender and human rights, in addition to the country’s support for Russia and noncompliance with the nuclear nonproliferation agreement. Overall, the EU introduced measures against 216 individuals and thirty-seven entities. The EU issued seventh and eighth rounds of sanctions on Myanmar; 103 individuals and twenty-one entities have now been subjected to asset freezes and travel bans, among other restrictions under the Myanmar sanctions regime.

Additional EU, United Kingdom, and Swiss sanctions relating to human rights abuses were used in response to the escalation of violence in Belarus and the DRC. Gender was also a factor in the United Kingdom’s 2023 sanctions, with two Syrian and two DRC officials sanctioned for their role in systemic sexual violence. Under its DRC sanctions regime, the EU added restrictive measures against nine individuals responsible for serious human rights violations and for sustaining the armed conflict, instability, and insecurity in the country. The EU also introduced sanctions on Kosovo as a result of its government’s measures relating to ethnic Serb communities.

**Aid Reductions and Conditionality**

Alongside these different sanctions regimes, there were some efforts to tighten political conditionality attached to European trade and aid benefits. The EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which grants eligible developing countries access to the single market, expired at the end of 2023. The European Commission’s proposed scheme for 2024–2034 increases from fifteen to twenty-seven the number of international conventions to be implemented by countries to qualify for Everything but Arms and GSP trade preferences, and from twenty-seven to thirty-two for the GSP+ scheme. With agreement still awaited on this, the Commission extended the current GSP in late November.

The Netherlands paused its aid to Afghanistan following the Taliban’s decision to bar women from working for CSOs. It also ended its participation in law enforcement programs with the state in Uganda over the government’s anti-homosexuality bill. Norway announced that it would review its cooperation with all partners in Uganda for the same reason. Following the elections in Zimbabwe, the EU suspended funding to the Electoral Authority due to concerns regarding transparency. It also temporarily suspended funding to the World Food Program for Somalia over concerns about the possibility of misappropriation of aid funds in the country.

The EU redirected more of its aid in Türkiye from the government to civil society, where CSOs continued facing increased pressure and beneficiaries ran the risk of having their activities criminalized because of receiving foreign funds. In particular, the EU provided direct financial support to civil society with €25 million from its Civil Society Facility and Media Programme.
Limited or No Measures

As in previous years, the EU did not consider sanctions or democratic conditionality in relations with most politically troubled states. In the Middle East and North Africa, it maintained cooperation with regimes despite democratic backsliding, and it did not impose sanctions or other punitive measures on either Israel or Palestine.

In the first half of the year, weekly pro-democracy demonstrations took place in Israel against the introduction of reforms limiting judicial independence. Some member states like France criticized Israel’s reforms as undemocratic, but the EU took no measures in response.\textsuperscript{126} Before the eruption of violence in October, EU leverage on democratic reform was undercut by the United States’ efforts to promote the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. This undermined any pressure on both countries, with Washington offering the latter a mutual defense pact in return for recognizing Israel. At the end of the year, the EU and the United Kingdom moved to introduce restrictive measures on Israeli settlers involved in violence against Palestinians, but they did not impose measures against the Israeli government.

Throughout 2023, the EU continued to fund the Palestinian Authority, including with €10 million to pay the salaries of civil servants and €5 million to support legal aid and strengthen the rule of law.\textsuperscript{127} Two days after Hamas’s attack on Israel in October, Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi announced the immediate suspension of all €691 million in aid to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, a statement that was followed by a correction hours later.\textsuperscript{128} The European Commission then proceeded to increase EU humanitarian funding to Gaza from €25 million to €100 million.\textsuperscript{129}

While the EU extended its 2021 sanctions framework for Lebanon until July 2024, it did not invoke any measures under this.\textsuperscript{130} On the contrary, it announced €205.5 million of support for Lebanon’s stability and recovery.\textsuperscript{131} The EU agreed to a €1 billion funding deal with Tunisia focused on controlling migration, despite the country’s dramatic democratic backsliding.\textsuperscript{132} The deal caused substantial division within the EU: a letter from thirty-seven members of the European Parliament called it “cash for migrant control” and the European Ombudsman opened a case regarding its human rights implications.\textsuperscript{133} In November, Tunisia returned the first €60 million it had received from the EU under this initiative, accusing the union of breaching promises made in the agreement.\textsuperscript{134}

Smaller schemes were agreed with Egypt and Morocco, providing the countries with €80 million and €152 million, respectively, for border and migration management. In July, Italy launched the Rome Process, which it described as a comprehensive platform for collective action on migration. Although the language surrounding this contained references to human rights and international law, democracy support was absent from the discussion and the outcomes were widely condemned by human rights organizations.\textsuperscript{135} Toward the end of the year, the EU agreed to a new aid package for Egypt as it sought to cooperate with the regime of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on the conflict in Gaza.
The EU failed to take action in some notable cases of democratic regression in sub-Saharan Africa, too. It did not impose restrictive measures after the military putsch in Gabon in August. The EU condemned the putsch but stated that it was different from the one in Niger the previous month, as Niger had a legitimate leader while in Gabon there had just been irregularities in elections.

The EU did not take action regarding the removal of presidential term limits in a constitutional referendum in the Central African Republic. Fearing the spread of Russian influence, France dropped its objections to President Faustin-Archange Touadéra potentially seeking a third term in office. In Chad, despite the coup in 2021, the EU launched the first phase of a support project for the parliament and electoral processes. Due to alleged comments over delays in holding postcoup elections, the authorities asked Germany’s ambassador to leave. Despite tensions, the EU restarted military aid after a brief pause.

In April, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council called for the progressive normalization of relations with Ethiopia, and, in October, the EU pledged to resume a €647 million aid package to the country, which had been suspended after the outbreak of the civil war in the north. As part of its Global Gateway initiative, the EU also announced a €156 million Governance and Peacebuilding program for the country, which included a focus on democratic governance. These aid injections were despite Ethiopia’s government declaring a state of emergency and making mass arrests and the UN warning of a heightened risk of genocide. The United Kingdom allocated increased aid to Rwanda’s government in return for a migration deal, despite the United Kingdom’s own Supreme Court ruling against the deal due to the lack of political rights in Rwanda.

The European Commission renewed its efforts to deepen ties with Cuba despite the regime there becoming more authoritarian. In July, the EU signed an agreement on bilateral cooperation with El Salvador’s highly repressive regime. The EU further refrained from condemning accelerated democratic backsliding in Mexico and also moved to review its sanctions on Venezuela after a tentative diplomatic rapprochement with the regime of Nicolás Maduro and partial sanctions relief offered by the United States.

The European Commission announced investments of approximately €12 billion under the Global Gateway initiative. Many of these went to nondemocratic regimes, and twenty-three of the eighty-one states attending the first edition of the Global Gateway forum in October were autocracies. The EU signed notable Global Gateway agreements mainly with nondemocratic countries such as Bangladesh, Rwanda, and Vietnam.

European arms exports increased, with France and Italy selling the most arms to nondemocratic countries. France looked set to replace Russia as the second-largest arms exporter in the world as it pursued deals with Egypt, India, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, and the United Arab Emirates. Germany’s arms exports rose by 12 percent compared to 2022 in the first six months of the year; most significantly, Germany loosened its arms embargo on Saudi Arabia. Germany and Spain agreed to provide new supplies to Türkiye’s navy. Italy began drafting a new law aimed at easing arms exports.
Internal Measures

On internal measures, the EU was in wait-and-see mode for most of 2023. After the European Commission held back funds to Hungary and Poland in 2022, there were no new measures adopted in 2023. Then, in December, the EU institutions signaled their willingness to start unfreezing some of the blocked funds for both countries. After the election of a new government in Poland that committed to restoring democratic rights, the commission released a first tranche of €5 billion to the country.

More controversially, in December, the European Commission released €10.2 billion of aid to Hungary. Formally, this decision was the result of the government in Budapest adopting reforms on judicial independence; to most observers, it looked like a quid pro quo for it not blocking the opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine. The Hungarian government pushed for the remaining suspended funds of approximately €20 billion to be released; this was linked to its refusal to sign off on new EU aid for Ukraine. The commission insisted the release of these funds remained subject to Hungary fulfilling reform requirements related to corruption, academic freedom, and equal rights for LGBTQ people and asylum seekers, among other things. Many Hungarian universities remain suspended from the Horizon research program and other EU funding schemes.147

Infringement actions, the other sanctioning tool in the EU’s rule-of-law toolbox, continue to work their way through the European Court of Justice. In April, a record fifteen member states joined the European Commission in a lawsuit against Hungary’s anti-LGBTQ law. In presenting its case, the commission relied on Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, which sets democracy and the rule of law as foundational values of the EU, opening the way for a significant expansion of EU oversight in the area. Separately, the European Court of Human Rights found Hungary in noncompliance over the treatment of asylum seekers, the segregation of Roma students, and the violation of transgender people’s rights.148

In June, the European Court of Justice ruled that Poland’s 2019 judicial overhaul violated EU law, and the European Commission launched infringement proceedings over a new legislation investigating Russian influence and targeting the opposition ahead of elections.149 The European Court of Human Rights ruled in July that the suspension of a high-profile judge critical of Poland’s then governing party violated his rights.150 The new Polish government has committed to making the changes necessary to remove these infringement processes.
Security and Peace-Building Interventions

There was some progress toward ensuring that the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations and missions comply with human rights and international humanitarian law. Gender issues also gained prominence within security missions.

In late 2022, Operational Guidelines on Civil Society Engagement were issued to civilian CSDP missions, supposedly to make local activists a “key partner” in security operations. Twenty years after the EU launched its first civilian mission, a new Civilian CSDP Compact was adopted in May promising gender and human rights mainstreaming, a focus on youth and child rights, and a new human rights impact assessment—this after the European Parliament noted that human rights and gender elements of missions remained weak. The European External Action Service issued its first Annual Report on Human Rights and Human Rights Mainstreaming Implementation in security missions, based on operational guidelines adopted in 2021.

The EU raised the ceiling of the European Peace Facility (EPF) through two top-ups during the year to €12 billion. Apart from Ukraine, EPF funding went to Benin, the DRC, Georgia, Ghana, Jordan, Niger (though security and military aid was then halted due to the coup), North Macedonia, Moldova, and Somalia, as well as the Gulf of Guinea for maritime security (Cameroon and Ghana). The EU frames the EPF as support to increase the defense capacities of countries that have advanced reforms and whose fragile democracies are under threat; in practice, this military support does not directly contain democracy support elements.

Despite the presence of EU missions in Gaza and Nagorno-Karabakh, the EU and member states did not succeed in protecting human rights and democracy as conflict flared in these places. In the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the EU’s police and border assistance missions were extended until June 2024, and, in August, the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support suggested engagement with civil society on human rights, gender, and “the locally shrinking civic space.” These steps did not help in keeping authoritarian dynamics at bay or containing the violence that erupted in October.

The EU’s democracy support in Armenia and Azerbaijan was significantly impacted by the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. The EU Mission in Armenia began, with a two-year mandate and around 100 personnel. Despite running this border mission, mediation efforts, and high-level meetings throughout the year, the EU struggled to protect Armenia’s democracy and the human rights of ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.

In September, Azerbaijan’s military attack resulted in the exodus of over 100,000 people, mostly ethnic Armenians, from Nagorno-Karabakh. In October, the European Commission outlined further support measures, doubling its humanitarian aid to just over €10 million. The EU’s new package included democracy support for Armenia, but it was focused mainly
on economic and investment measures, alongside humanitarian relief. In December, the EU supported a normalization accord between Armenia and Azerbaijan and pushed the two countries to reach a comprehensive peace deal.\textsuperscript{156} It beefed up the CSDP mission from 138 to 209 staff in an effort to guarantee border stability.\textsuperscript{157} Still, the year ended with fears growing over the fragility of Armenia’s democracy.

The EU’s civil and military missions in the Sahel retrenched further. Borrell acknowledged that EU democracy support in the region had failed and that a wider reassessment of EU strategy was in order.\textsuperscript{158} France withdrew its troops from Niger after the coup there and from neighboring Burkina Faso. The Nigerien junta deepened defense ties with Russia and revoked the two CSDP missions in the country. The EU suspended aid to the Burkinabe and Nigerien contingents of the G5 Sahel initiative.\textsuperscript{159}

Despite the lack of democratic progress in Mali, Borrell stated that the EU would not abandon the country.\textsuperscript{160} The EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali was prolonged until 2025, with a revised mandate. In cooperation with the country’s internal security forces, the mission offered deontology training to police officers and gendarmes, in which gender and human rights were included. The EU Training Mission in Mali, which among other things supported gender awareness in 2023, had its scope reduced. Germany withdrew from the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

In September, Germany pledged €81 million to support the Economic Community of West African States in its peace and development efforts in the region, including mediating for a transition back to democracy in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. France also increased its support to the organization to restore democracy in the region. Despite the poor democratic record of Chad, Hungary approved the deployment of troops there until 2025 in an effort to counter migration and a potential refugee influx. France came to see Chad increasingly as its primary security partner in the region.

Developing a wider geographical scope beyond the Sahel, the EU launched a security and defense initiative in support of four West African countries—Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo—to counter terrorist armed groups and strengthen civilian and military cooperation. It moved to hire four civilian crisis-management advisers, with a (minor) focus on gender and human rights. The EU handed over 105 armored vehicles to Ghana’s armed forces as part of a €20 million support package.\textsuperscript{161} It framed these initiatives as a means of shoring up democracy and the rule of law.

The EU extended its naval IRINI military operation and its Border Assistance Mission in Libya until 2025.\textsuperscript{162} The latter’s revised mandate no longer mentions support to institutional reform, and the focus on containing migration is more prominent.\textsuperscript{163} A memorandum of understanding between the EU’s mission in the country and the Libyan authorities concerning cooperation in border control and terrorism was signed in October.\textsuperscript{164} In December, high representative Borrell and the vice president of the Libyan Presidential Council also discussed regional cooperation between the country and the Sahel.\textsuperscript{165}
Prior to the outbreak of war in Sudan in April, the EU supported peace-building efforts, including the promotion of a civilian-led transition to democracy. The EU then responded to the mass displacement and allegations of human rights abuses with calls for the end of violence and the provision of humanitarian aid, while still emphasizing support for a democratic transition. Yet the EU did not deploy a CSDP mission in the country and rather supported the African Union’s efforts in Sudan.166

Somalia emerged as a priority in 2023. In April, the EU launched a €4.5 million Rapid Nationwide Stabilization program for the country, which includes a rule-of-law and local governance component, and a two-year joint operational road map, the first pillar of which is democratization and inclusive politics.167 The EU Capacity Building Mission in Somalia also contributed to the launch of the country’s Women in Maritime Sector National Action Plan. In November, €1 million from the EPF was dedicated to providing military lethal equipment, though the EU stressed that ammunition “will be used solely for training Somali National Army personnel in conjunction with EU Training Mission.”168

In the Central African Republic, the EU’s advisory mission supported police reform and the incorporation of gender equality and human rights in the process.169 The mission’s human rights adviser worked with civil society actors to compile a list of NGOs working on human rights, so as to allow the security forces to refer human rights victims to these.

Despite some attempts to build gender and human rights elements into CSDP missions, the spate of military coups weakened the EU’s security presence in the Sahel. Its security operations did not have a remit to stem autocratization or the spread of coups, and they reflected a lower profile and less ambitious strategy in the region. The EU’s claims that its security operations helped protect democracy were not always fully convincing. The CSDP missions that continued or started had mandates with few democracy-related elements and focused instead on containment and standard anti-insurgency security approaches.

**Conclusion**

The year 2023 was one of modest consolidation of internal and external European democracy support. Overall, the EU and its member states were less active in advancing new democracy strategies, funding, and other actions than in recent years. They took forward some existing policies and instruments in steady fashion, which involved useful fine-tuning. However, democracy policy lost some of its prominence compared to in the previous year. In 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine propelled democracy commitments to the forefront of the EU agenda; even if these commitments were not necessarily fully carried forward, they provided a strategic framing and direction to democracy support. In 2023, some of this clarity was lost.
In relation to Ukraine, the EU used the leverage of pre-accession preparations to incentivize judicial and anti-corruption reforms to some effect. At the end of the year, the EU’s decisions to take enlargement a step forward with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia opened the way to stronger EU influence over democratic norms in these states. Yet, as the war dragged on, some of the initial sense of existential urgency evaporated. And as the internal EU politics around the conflict became more complicated, European leaders spoke less frequently or boldly of this being a conflict about the global defense of democratic values.

As the shock of the 2022 invasion receded, EU member states turned their attention to longer-term reforms and to other priorities, sometimes related to democracy but most often not. The international context presented the EU with numerous trade-offs and in many of these cases it placed other policy aims above democracy and human rights. While such trade-offs have always been evident, in 2023 the tilt toward other strategic goals was especially marked. This relates to the contextual factors identified at the beginning of this review: the EU homed in on its geopolitical positioning, and it hesitated unequivocally to back the multiple pro-democracy protests that took place around the world in 2023.

While Ukraine struggled to push forward with its military counteroffensive, the year saw other conflicts become more violent and unstable. These conflict dynamics weighed heavily against any democratization dynamics in the Middle East, the Sahel, and the South Caucasus. While the EU defined democracy support as a central pillar of its conflict-resolution strategies in these regions, in practice, war and instability displaced democratic values as a priority. Even if in some of these places European donors sought to introduce some new democracy programs, more generally they increased their focus on conflict containment relative to democracy support. The EU’s security missions were largely devoid of democracy elements, although the union has made formal commitments to rectify this in the future.

At the level of funding, support for gender rights and women’s empowerment became even more of a priority for European donors in 2023. In a striking trend, the EU and its member states have given a firmer and more explicit priority to gender rights and women’s empowerment in their development aid. The gender rights and democracy agendas overlap with each other; the focus on gender is normally understood to be one specific element of democracy support. But the overlap is not perfect; advances in gender rights often do not involve any democratic improvement, and democratization does not automatically improve gender rights. Given this, it is highly significant that European donors’ focus on gender is now far stronger than their concern with democracy. They now set ambitious and clearly defined targets for gender rights spending in a way they are not willing to do for democracy. The complex relationship between feminist foreign policy and democracy support is set to become a significant factor for the future.

In Europe, 2023 saw notable electoral shifts and growing concerns about a rise (or return) of the far right. Political actors also began to stake out positions ahead of the European Parliament elections in June 2024. The EU moved forward with important democracy initiatives, although several of these were delayed or diluted. After withholding funds to Hungary
and Poland in 2022, in 2023 the European Commission and the member states engaged in drawn-out talks with these countries’ governments about what changes would suffice for the funds to be released. The defeat of Poland’s illiberal government in October suggested that some of this pressure had at least some impact. While it was the Polish electorate that defended the country’s democracy, the holding back of sizable EU funding almost certainly contributed to the result. The decision to release some funds to Hungary was a more expedient deal that seemed set to cushion the country’s increasingly authoritarian regime.

**Looking Ahead to 2024**

Billions of people will vote in elections in 2024 in Europe as well as in India, Indonesia, Mexico, and the United States. For democracy supporters, the outcomes will be an important test given the rise of forces that are hostile to democracy and human rights across the world. But equally important will be the integrity of the electoral processes themselves. If elections are not free and fair or if politicians refuse to accept the results, this will deal another blow to elections as the central political process that underpins democracy and to democracy supporters.

The European Parliament elections in June 2024 will directly impact democracy support across the continent. Far-right parties with hostile positions on independent civil society, the independence of judges, free media, and development aid could do well. It is far from certain that the next European Commission, appointed after the elections, will continue the “push for European democracy” started by von der Leyen during her presidency. One indicator to watch is whether the member states will take steps to initiate an Article 7 procedure against Hungary, now that the change in government in Poland has removed a key ally of Viktor Orbán’s regime.

The spread of extra-constitutional changes of government in recent years, predominantly in Africa, poses a clear challenge to democracy supporters. European governments have struggled to come up with an adequate and coherent pro-democracy response. If coups continue to spread, this will deal a significant blow to democracy unless paths back to democracy can be agreed upon by the key players.

Expectations for the third Summit for Democracy in South Korea in March 2024 are low, and many states have already disengaged from the process. Yet, the summit still offers a dedicated forum for discussing democracy on the global stage that did not exist before the Biden administration launched the initiative. Within the wider framing of a clash between democracy and autocracy, cooperation between democracies has gained some momentum in recent years, particularly in the security arena. With economic and security challenges deepening and the potential return of Donald Trump to the presidency in the United States, maintaining such cooperation is likely to become tougher in 2024.
The final issue to watch is the development of generative AI on democratic processes. Since the release of ChatGPT in late 2022, there has been considerable debate about the benefits and threats of new forms of AI for societies. In the realm of politics, the prospects are rather bleak given the potential for AI to supercharge disinformation campaigns and malign influence operations. Yet, generative AI also offers new potential for experimentation with improving democracy and challenging autocratic governance. Even if the ledger is mostly in the red so far, 2024 is sure to bring new developments that will have a far-reaching impact on democratic politics.
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Acknowledgments

The authors thank Bronwen Mehta for her research assistance.
Notes


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European Partnership for Democracy

The European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) is a not-for-profit organisation with a global remit to support democracy. The EPD network brings together 18 organisations specialising in the different parts of a democratic system and supports democracy in over 140 countries around the world. See www.epd.eu.