

# The Fall of the Berlin Wall: a Time to Reflect on Why Things Are Not As They Should Be...

*Lilia Shevtsova*

I do not like anniversaries and discussions about them. But there are some dates that remind us of historic turning points and the price paid to achieve them. Such dates are worth remembering so as not to repeat past mistakes, and find ourselves paying the price once again – this time for our forgetfulness.

The twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall reminds us of an event that is worthy of reflection. It reminds us of the concessions Russia made, of what we were unable to do or did not want to risk doing, and of what simply turned out to be a failure. These are useful reflections, whatever be the case, to snap us out of our drowsy, self-tranquilized state or “don’t-care” attitudes.

In 1989, the former Soviet satellite states tossed aside the dogmas that Moscow had forced down their throats so stubbornly for so long and turned to the West. Their return to Europe was a difficult and in some cases tortuous process. When you talk with the “new Europeans” today, they always complain, grumble, and criticize, expressing all manner of dissatisfaction with their European lives. But none of them want to return to the past, much less to Russia’s embrace. They express dissatisfaction not about the principles on which their life is organized, but about how their elites implement these principles.

Russia has continued on its own road since then, but heading in the opposite direction, attempting to find a new embodiment for an old matrix. I will not describe this experiment at returning to the past and the results it has produced. Russian essayists have been busy examining Russian

post-communism from every possible angle for the last ten years, and few have any doubts today as to its result. President Medvedev's periodic statements about the failures of recent years show that something of a consensus has emerged in Russia – that we let one historic opportunity slip through our fingers and do not know if another will come our way.

There is no need to repeat the diagnosis. I suggest instead that we reflect on why Eastern Europe was able to return to European civilization, but Russia hesitated to move in that direction. My arguments are concise and repeat many well-known ideas, but the date we are marking offers a suitable occasion to try giving them a clearer logic.

Those who have already reflected on why the “new” Europe was able to make this move, while Russia could not find the corresponding resolution, usually advance three arguments. First, the “new Europeans” achieved national consensus on returning to Europe's fold. In other words, all political forces, including the communists, supported this move. The second argument follows from the first – nationalism in the Eastern European countries turned out to be pro-Western and made it easier for these countries to integrate into the united Europe. Paradoxically, the nationalism of the “new Europeans” made it possible for them to limit their own sovereignty in favor of supranational European organizations. As we know, Russian nationalism remains anti-Western and seeks to follow a completely different road. Finally, the third argument usually boils down to the assertion that the transformation of an empire always has its own specific nature. I agree with these arguments, but the question is, why was the “new” Europe able to achieve national consensus on its new road, while Russia failed to do so? Why were their elites able to unite around the idea of transformation, while in Russia the elite united around a completely different idea? I do not dispute the importance of an empire in the transformation process, but why was it that the Russian elite were able to cast aside this notion of an empire in 1991 and play a decisive part in bringing down a world power? Therefore, the empire factor, during the initial stage at least, does not play the part we usually ascribe to it in Rus-

sia. Consequently, there must have been other factors that pushed Russia in the direction along which it has been creeping these last twenty years.

Finally, what factors made the fall of the Berlin Wall a watershed for the former Soviet “younger brothers,” but not for us? I will outline a few arguments that seem significant.

There are four factors that I think had an impact on Russia’s development after the Soviet Union’s collapse: historical legacy, structural contradictions in the transformation process itself, the personal factor’s role, and the West’s influence.

Let’s begin with history. Everything looks clear here. Russia was unlucky with its history and traditions. The Russian state’s long centuries of a history built on strict centralization and suppression of individual freedoms could only obstruct any moves toward liberalization. Indeed, until Gorbachev, there were no attempts to abandon the system of power concentrated in a single source. Attempts to partially liberalize the system always ended in failure. Alexander II’s experiment with constitutional monarchy in the 19th century fell through, and his successor, Alexander III, realizing that any liberalization of the monarchy could lead to its downfall, returned things to their older familiar pattern. The Khrushchev Thaw in the 1960s likewise got reversed and strengthened the Soviet elite’s fears that any kind of thaw could undermine the state’s foundations.

Russia avoided the revolutions that shook Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in the post-war period and helped create an opposition movement in those countries, as well as pragmatists within the ruling class, willing to accept political pluralism. At the decisive moment, when Gorbachev opened a window on the world and the country awoke at the end of the 1980s, there was no responsible opposition force in Russia and no responsible pragmatists able to live in a free society.

Equally significant is that Russia missed the historical period when the spirit of constitutionalism and awareness of the importance of the supremacy of law and the state’s duty to submit to it took shape in Europe. To use the late Ralf Dahrendorf’s words, Russia “missed the lawyer’s hour.”

The emergence of the “state of law” (Rechtsstaat) was one of 19th century Europe’s greatest achievements before European society actually reached the democratization stage. That Russia never got around to accepting the principle of the supremacy of law is reflected in the fact that after the fall of communism even liberals chose to follow a line of political expediency. Russia did not adopt other liberal principles either, such as civil freedoms, independent institutions, the guaranteed immutability of private property, and the complete separation of church and state.

The tradition of the state taking precedence over the individual and society in Russia always went hand in hand with state expansionism. Originally, the need to defend the people and a weak state organization against attacks by hostile tribes dictated the drive to create a buffer zone of colonized lands to serve as protection. Then the centralized state organization, which became a blend of Byzantine autocracy (only with no limits) and the traditions of the Tatar-Mongol Golden Horde – and which was given a superficial makeover by Peter the Great later down the line – could not but continue this expansionist course, bringing in new territories and peoples, which meant constant wars and, during the periods between wars, the search for the next enemy.

The centralized state kept society suppressed, called for constant reinforcement of the state’s power, and maintained suspicion towards the outside world. The power thus created only served to further encourage centralization. State power remained the means for uniting society after the fall of communism. The stereotype of a state organization based on territory, military force, and prestigious international status still fills the Russian elite’s minds today, along with the personified power system used to achieve these goals and the search for an enemy that justifies such power. Communism fell and the Soviet Union collapsed, but a centralized state organization not based on the rule of law – principles alien to the European tradition – continues to live on in the Russian ruling class’s political consciousness.

Let’s turn now to the second reason for our failure to seize the historic opportunity – the difficulties that Russia clearly experienced in its

transformation process in the 1990s. Russia found itself facing an unprecedented challenge after the fall of communism. Never before had an attempt been made to transform an empire as well as a nuclear superpower with a messianic ideological tradition all at once – simply because such a state had never existed before. To further complicate matters, the task involved transforming a state that had survived by militarizing daily life. Igor Klyamkin describes in convincing detail the unique features of Russia's militarized state. I will not repeat his words.

Furthermore, the Russian elite had to work on building a new political regime all at once, mastering along the way the mechanism of its legitimization through elections and building a new state. State-building and democratization are hard to carry out simultaneously, and trying to fit them together often leads to tragic results, as in the collapse of Yugoslavia. Danquart Rostow and Robert Dahl, followed by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, were apparently right in warning that successful democratization requires a consolidated state, which Russia did not have at the start of the 1990s.

But the difficulties do not end here. Yeltsin and his team had to carry out four revolutions all at once: create the market, democratize power, reform the empire, and find a new geopolitical role for a country that until recently had been a nuclear superpower. Some of these reforms ran counter to each other. For example, it was difficult to build the market and democratize the political regime at the same time. Moreover, what the rest of the world had accomplished one stage at a time (nation-building, developing capitalism, political democratization), Russia had to accomplish all at once. This was an unprecedented undertaking in history. All of the successful post-communist transitions began by building a new political system, but in Russia the transformation began with the privatization of property without having first established independent political institutions.

Upon further reflection, another factor hampering our progress came to mind. Turning now to Francis Fukuyama, and no, I am not going to talk about the “end of history,” on which Fukuyama was mistaken after all, but he offered some more subtle observations about transformation in

Southeast Asia. He came to the conclusion that traditions are not always an obstacle to political liberalization but, on the contrary, can actually speed up its progress. As Fukuyama said, “traditional political gentlemen-scholars, could be jettisoned relatively easily and replaced with a variety of political-institutional forms without causing the society to lose its essential coherence.”<sup>1</sup> In other words, democracy can be built not on the basis of civil and individual rights, but on the basis of a “traditional moral code” and old forms of collective life. In Russia, however, traditional forms of social unity and old moral codes were long since eradicated. Stalinism was the radical instrument that uprooted old Russian traditions. However, it turned out that the resulting vacuum did nothing to speed up the formation of new political institutions. Attempts to build a new political system in the absence of mechanisms ensuring social unity led only to the further fragmentation of society.

Finally, there is one more factor, purely political this time, that perhaps played a decisive role at the critical moment, preventing the old matrix from falling apart. The factor in question is the emergence of two legitimate power centers in Russia by the time of the Soviet collapse – the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies, inherited from the Soviet past, and the presidency. They vied for a monopoly on power, and this led to a split in the political class and society. The resulting confrontation was an insurmountable obstacle on the road to forming a new national consensus on reform.

Russia was unlucky not only with its history and the contradictions in the transformation process that complicated its transition to a liberal model, but also with the personal factor. Yeltsin came to power at a moment when the society and the political class had become aware that the old system had no future, but were not yet ready to make a conscious choice to work on building a new system. The events of 1990-1992 showed that even progressive members of the political class were not ready to carry out liberal-democratic reforms. The mixture of naïveté, self-doubts, and excessive self-confidence, as well as the social insensitivity that character-

ized Russia's elite, only hampered Russia's progress toward new values. In the 1990s even Russia's democrats understood democracy primarily as elections, which were to guarantee their power, and refused to even consider that the same elections could bring their rivals to power. Not surprisingly, with this sort of a mentality, the elite were incapable of making the compromises and entering into the pacts that form the foundation of successful democratic transitions. The elite were unable to agree either on Russia's past or on its future, and yet they were trying to build a new Russia. The fall of communism was not perceived in Russia as a defeat of Russia's traditions, and this made it impossible to reject the old rules of the game once and for all.

It is the political elite that bear responsibility for the fact that Russian society did not do any critical reassessment of its history. Not only did the elite not try to find new principles for uniting the society, but on the contrary, through their selfishness they only widened the divisions and sparked battles between clans, fighting not for their vision of Russia's future, but to grab their share of assets and power.

Thus, there was no real force able to carry out the needed transformations in Russia in the early 1990s. The intelligentsia was the source of the democratic revival during Gorbachev's *perestroika* years, but after Yeltsin came to power, the intelligentsia lost out and ended up reaping neither political nor economic dividends from communism's fall. On the contrary, intellectuals saw their status decline and were relegated to the margins of political life. The new people in power had no need for intellectuals. This marginalizing process was accelerated by the collapse of the budget in the sectors in which the intelligentsia worked: science, education, and the arts. Those intellectuals who did find their way to power had to play by the *nomenklatura's* rules, confirming the general rule that intellectuals lose their social and political role if they go into politics. Russia in the 1990s had not yet developed a middle class with an interest in liberal-democratic reform. The emerging groups that had the appearance of a middle class were those servicing the bureaucrats and oligarchs. The elite – brought to

the top after the Soviet Union's collapse – fragmented into rival groups, each competing for a monopoly on power. Under conditions in which an alternative to the elite still had not been able to form, the experienced Soviet *nomenklatura*, injecting a bit of fresh blood into its ranks from other classes, managed to become the backbone of the new ruling class. Not only did this “old-new” ruling elite restore its hold on power, but it also gained control of assets and thus became even more powerful than it had been during the communist period.

During the Yeltsin years, the public could not develop civil society all on their own – they had no experience. The new rulers in the Kremlin, brought to power on the democratic tide, not only gave no consideration to how to help the emergence of civil society, but obstructed the process, turning their backs on the democratic forces that helped put them in power, above all the Democratic Russia movement. Society was forced to hand power over to one man and give him their trust, but the public gave Yeltsin this power on the condition that he would not take away the new freedoms they had won; this was the new social contract between Russia and its leader. This contract was never given any institutional embodiment, however, and thus remained fragile.

The Marxist approach taken by the technocrats who launched reforms together with Yeltsin also played a part. They thought capitalism alone could play a decisive role and ignored the need to establish new institutions, and all the more to place the state under the rule of law. As a result, Russia's example confirmed Adam Przeworski's observations on the interaction between democracy and capitalism in Latin America, namely, that there could be no liberal economy without stable liberal institutions. On the contrary, without liberal institutions, economic reforms could become a factor pushing the ruling class towards authority in a bid to protect its own interests. Russian practice confirmed this conclusion.

Russia did not have the right set of initial conditions for a successful transition. However, it is important to remember that history offers us a number of examples of successful democratic transformation when



effective leadership, “political engineering,” and the elite’s willingness to break with the past have made up for the absence of certain conditions for democratization. The cases of India, Taiwan, and South Korea show that democracy can take root in non-European, non-Christian, and even poor (as in India’s case) societies if they have leaders and elites that understand that democracy will better serve the national interests. Suarez, de Klerk and Havel facilitated democratization in Spain, South Africa, and Czechoslovakia, even though the right conditions were lacking in these countries. The presence of a democratically oriented elite in Poland helped to neutralize the authoritarian tendencies of its leader, Lech Walesa. As Giuseppe di Palma and Albert Hirschman showed, the absence of democratic leaders and democratic elites is also not always a critical factor, because democracy can also be built by non-democrats, i.e., pragmatists who realize that keeping the old system in place will only lead to their own and their country’s doom.

It is hard to gauge the extent to which a reform-minded leadership and a responsible elite in Russia could have offset, at least in part, the absence of the conditions required for transformation. Transformation of a communist country, empire, and superpower has its own specific nature that differs from transformation in Latin America or in Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe. However, we can assume that the existence of a leader in Russia, who would be ready to build independent institutions and recognize the importance of the supremacy of the law, could still have facilitated the country’s transformation into a state operating under the rule of law.

In my opinion, autumn 1991 was the decisive moment for post-communist Russia. It was specifically at that time, following the defeat of the old *nomenklatura*’s August coup, which attempted to stop the Soviet Union’s collapse, that Yeltsin won a huge amount of public confidence: around 70 percent of Russians were ready to support the country’s movement towards liberal democracy. Many of these people did not know what democracy specifically entailed, but they saw it as an ideal and a form of

existence. People in post-Soviet society sought individual freedom, Western living standards, and a Western way of life. In 1917, Russian society had not been ready to support freedom, and this had cleared the way for the Bolsheviks' rise to power. But in 1991, society was no longer an obstacle in the way of breaking with the Russian system. Society gave Yeltsin its support, and he could have used this to build a new Russia. This would have entailed adopting a new constitution that introduced a system of checks and balances, and holding new presidential and parliamentary elections on the basis of the new constitution. Without a doubt, Russia would have supported these reforms in the autumn of 1991, and the Russian parliament would have legitimized them, following the example not only of its Spanish counterpart, which did the same in its time, but also the communist parliaments of Eastern Europe that legitimized their countries' transitions to political competition.

However, Yeltsin took the opposite road and set about consolidating his own power. At the same time, he retained elements of the Soviet system, such as the parliament, which, under the old constitution, was the main center of power, and this made the confrontation that went on between the legislative and executive branches in 1991-1993 inevitable. Yeltsin gave his support to economic reform, but refused to build the independent institutions without which this reform was doomed to become what it did – a chance for the old-new ruling class to privatize assets in its own interests. The only real excuse for Yeltsin is that not even the liberals and democrats understood back then the need to abandon the parliament and constitution inherited from the Soviet period and carry out political reforms.

The liberals and democrats believed that it was enough to rely on the leader. Soon enough (in 1992), the government liberals had the chance to see whether it had been wise to place such trust in Yeltsin when he dismissed their government and formed a new government with Viktor Chernomyrdin as prime minister. The liberalism pursued by Yegor Gaidar and his team boiled down to privatization, and they carried this out in such a way that they, more likely accidentally rather than by design, laid the foundations

for the authoritarian-oligarchic regime that followed. Without independent institutions and respect for the rule of law, this fate was sealed.

Thus, Yeltsin and the Russian elite let the opportunity slip to lay the foundations of a system that would have guaranteed liberal freedoms in Russia. Even with all the obstacles in the way, if Russia had had a leader and a team aspiring to go beyond the old autocracy, it could have taken more decisive steps towards a new life. There is no possible answer to the question that remains as to the extent to which the leader and the elite, given their origins in the Soviet system and lack of any other experience, could have behaved any differently. But Gorbachev was also a product of that same communist *nomenklatura*, and yet all by himself, acting on his own initiative, he had begun undermining the Russian tradition! True, Gorbachev started dismantling the old tradition without foreseeing the consequences. But reformers never can foresee all the consequences of their efforts to shake up the status quo. If they could all foresee the future, how many of them would even have started out on the road to reform? Looking back over the Yeltsin years, we can conclude that autumn 1991 was the brief historic moment when Russia could have tried to cheat history and tradition (and geography) and bypass the Russian mentality and habits. But the fact that Yeltsin and his team didn't even try to make use of this opportunity suggests that tradition and history in Russia proved a stronger force than chance.

Yeltsin's limits as a leader were determined not only by his background and mentality as a product of the Soviet political system, but also by the way in which the Soviet Union dissolved. The Soviet Union was dissolved by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus – Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk, and Stanislav Shushkevich – who carried out a constitutional coup, toppling Gorbachev. But the fact of the matter was that for the majority of Soviet citizens, the Soviet Union's collapse was a tragedy. Yeltsin was aware of this, and, as one of the leaders who made the decision to dissolve the USSR, he could not allow the possibility of power falling into the hands of an opposition that would have held him responsible for

the Soviet Union's collapse. The majority of Russians still feel nostalgia for the Soviet Union to this day, seeing it as a symbol of a more stable existence. Survey results show that 71 percent of Russian respondents regret the Soviet Union's collapse, while 22 percent feel no regret; 24 percent think the collapse was inevitable, and 65 percent think it could have been avoided. Involvement in the Soviet Union's dissolution was one of the factors (but not the only one) that forced Yeltsin and his team to attempt to hang onto power at all costs. Events soon followed that made it impossible for Yeltsin to establish the conditions for genuine competition.

I am referring to Yeltsin's decision to shell the parliament in 1993. The Russian parliament became the focus of national-populist opposition after the Soviet collapse, but its liquidation and the accompanying bloodshed ended the hopes for a national consensus and signaled a return to force as the means of conflict resolution. Survey results show that 60 percent of respondents blame Yeltsin for the parliament's dissolution and think the use of force was unjustified (in 1993, only 30 percent held this view). Yeltsin, together with the political class (including those who supported the parliament and those who supported the president) led Russia into a trap, forcing it to choose between a return to a new version of the Soviet system on the one hand and a new model of anti-communist authoritarianism on the other. Russia found itself choosing between two forms of non-democratic power in 1993. It was then, after liquidating the parliament inherited from the Soviet past, that Russia closed the door on hopes for greater political freedom in the near future, if only because bloodshed is the most unlikely soil for producing a pluralist democracy. Thus, Russia could have chosen liberal democracy only in 1991, and then during only a brief moment. Having used force to eradicate the opposition, Yeltsin was no longer ready for free elections.

The super-presidential regime that emerged in Russia after the end of the confrontation between the legislative and executive branches was cemented in the new constitution of 1993. Yeltsin went through this constitution personally and the authoritarian leanings of its provisions were

partly his doing. The new regime emerged from the victory of one political force over another, and the “all or nothing” nature of this victory meant that those who had liquidated their opponents were hardly likely to feel a need for political competition. The new constitution declared the sovereignty and freedom of the people, but in practice it consolidated a super-presidential regime that undermined these same principles. According to the constitution, the president does not represent any of the branches of power but stands above them, “sets the main outlines of the country’s domestic and foreign policy,” and “is the guarantor of the Russian Federation’s constitution and human and civil rights and freedoms.” The president’s powers are on a level similar to those of the Russian monarch from 1906 to 1917. The Yeltsin constitution laid the structural foundation for a regime of personal power, and Yeltsin supporters who worked on the document admit this.

In analyzing Russia’s transformations it is worth recalling Joseph Schumpeter, who gave particular importance among the five conditions for democracy to “the role of human material” in politics – the role and mood of the people who lead parties and get elected to the parliament and are appointed to the government. Schumpeter said that these should be people of “exceptionally high quality.” But in Russia, the quality of the “human material” in question – the country’s elite – precluded it from seeking greater public freedom and competition. This applies to the “quality” of Russia’s liberals and democrats, too. Finally, post-communist Russia gave rise to no new figures of the likes of Witte or Stolypin, because the system did not give modernizers the kind of independence the tsarist regime had been willing to offer.

But it is Boris Yeltsin who bears the main responsibility for letting the opportunity for democratization slip. A leader’s quality is measured by his ability to rise above society and political class and offer them a new vision. Yeltsin did not display such qualities, and his leadership was soon reduced to simply reacting to events that he could not always predict and with which he failed to keep up.

Yeltsin's second presidential term not only turned politics into a farce, but discredited the elements of liberal democracy that he himself had helped to establish in Russia. In 1995-1996, Russia faced a new dilemma: hold honest elections with the possibility that the communists would come to power, or keep the ruling group in place by "managing" the elections. The experience in Eastern Europe showed that when communist parties came to power through honest elections, it did not automatically mean a return to the past. On the contrary, the "new European" communists were forced to carry out liberal reforms. The same was seen in Moldova, where the ruling Communist Party proclaimed the goal of taking their country into the European Union. True, these are communist parties that have evolved towards social democracy. It is hard to say what direction Gennady Zyuganov's Russian Communist Party would have taken if history had given him the chance to take power. But it is worth noting that the government led by Yevgeny Primakov, supported by the communists in 1999, did not abandon market and democratic principles. Yeltsin's efforts to maintain his hold on power by giving up free elections had obvious consequences that laid the foundations for strengthening the system based around a single center of power – this time in anti-communist packaging.

Sadly, looking back on those days, we have to recognize that Yeltsin did not become Russia's Suarez. Russia's liberals and democrats were likewise not ready for the role that their counterparts played in Eastern Europe in the 1980s-1990s. There were also no pragmatists ready to follow a new line of thinking in the early 1990s in Russia. As a result, the country failed to pick up the pace in the "maturation" of its civilization, but this does not mean that Russia had no basis at all for straightening out its road toward freedom.

In this context it is also worth noting the West's role at the start of Russia's transformations. The second and third waves of democratization in Europe showed that integrating the transitional societies into the European community framework was the most important guarantee for the success of their democratic reforms. But Russia's integration into the Eu-

ropean community proved impossible. Europe was having enough trouble digesting East Germany and was not ready for new sacrifices. Moreover, the Russian elite, having started to build a new state, were not able to abandon Russian sovereignty in favor of supranational structures. Such a possibility was not even considered in Moscow at that time.

However, the West did have considerable opportunities to influence Russia's development at the start of the 1990s. Russia depended on the international financial institutions and the Western community at that moment. Moreover, Yeltsin and his team sought rapprochement and partnership with the West, and this made them open to Western advice.

But what was the West's response to the new Russia? The West concentrated its efforts primarily on forcing through privatization in Russia, which Western politicians, together with Russian liberals, thought would create the conditions for developing both the market and democracy. For understandable reasons, Western political circles did not insist that Russia strengthen independent institutions; they feared that communists would return to power or that nationalists might come to the fore, and Russia's liberal-technocrats energetically supported them in these fears. The result was the emergence of oligarchic capitalism under a democratic facade and an elected monarchy that the Russian public came to associate with Western influence, which gave rise to a stubborn mistrust of liberal democracy and the West in general.

There was also a particular moment in 1993, when Western leaders had a direct impact on the development of events in Russia, though they perhaps to this day do not realize the role they played. I am referring to the moment when Boris Yeltsin tried to clinch the West's support for his battle against the parliament. Judging by the evidence, it seems either that he received Western leaders' support for his use of force to end the conflict with the opposition, or that he assumed he had their support. Without the West's support, particularly if Western leaders had warned Yeltsin that it would not be wise to use force against the opposition, Yeltsin might not have resolved to move against the parliament as he did. At that time he

still listened to Western advice. He might have found himself forced to agree to the “zero option” that was being discussed in Russian political circles in 1993, namely, the adoption of a new constitution that would establish a system of checks and balances while keeping a strong presidency. But the West still considered the communist opposition in Russia a sworn enemy. By supporting radical measures against the opposition, Western leaders helped to push Russia onto an authoritarian development track without even being aware of it.

Such are the thoughts that come to mind upon this anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The past cannot be changed, and so it is pointless to try to wonder “what might have been if...” However, a study of the past helps us broaden our options for the future. These kinds of anniversaries that force us to reflect on past events and why they happened can be useful, but only if we use them to recall our past mistakes and examine our present direction.

## Note

- 1 F. Fukuyama, “The Primacy of Culture,” *Journal of Democracy*, N° 6:1 (1995): P. 12.