

**CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACE**

**REFORMING PAKISTAN'S
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES**

WELCOME:
ASHLEY TELLIS,
SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
SOUTH ASIA PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT

SPEAKERS:
FREDERIC GRARE,
FORMER VISITING SCHOLAR,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT

ROBERT BOGGS,
PROFESSOR,
NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 2009

*Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.*

ASHLEY J. TELLIS: Well, good afternoon, everyone. And let me welcome all of you to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. I'm Ashley Tellis. I'm a senior associate here at the endowment.

And the subject of the conversation this afternoon, as all of you know, is going to be Frederic's Grare's new monograph that looks at the issue of the ISI and the prospects of integrating ISI better into civilian control. This is obviously a subject that has come back into the news media in a very serious way in the last several months because it's been linked primarily to the issues of Afghanistan and Kashmir. And it has raised questions about the relationship that ISI has to the military as a corporate institution, and by extension to the state itself.

What Frederic's monograph does is to make the argument that while all of these issues are certainly important and worthy of investigation, there is dimension of ISI that generally tends to be lost when we think of the institution and the United States, and that dimension is the role that ISI plays with respect to maintaining domestic control as an integral part of the military in the objective of the military of dominating the state.

And so what the monograph does in some detail is to sketch out, both through a historical analysis and a functional analysis as to how this form of control is actually exemplified in practice and how it has taken place historically. All of these issues are important to us because they bear on the fundamental question, which has to do with Pakistan's transformation.

And so if the argument – if the argument essentially is that Pakistan's disfigurement as a state is linked in part to the military's domination of its political life, and ISI is one of the instruments through which the military dominates political life, then any transformation of Pakistan over the long term must involve both realignment of the military's role within the state, and by extension, the subjugation of ISI, if I may put it that way, to civilian oversight and civilian control.

And it is in that context that the monograph raises a range of issues, offers a series of recommendations, and most interestingly does so in a comparative perspective; that is, it does not simply look at Pakistan alone, but looks at the experience of Pakistan in the context of looking at the experience of – comparable experiences in Chile and in Indonesia.

So without further ado, I will invite Frederic to lay out the key themes of the monograph, and then we will proceed to have Bob Boggs offer a commentary. Let me just say by way of brief introductions – I believe you have sheets of paper that give you more fulsome biographies of both of these individuals – but Frederic was until very recently our colleague at the Carnegie Endowment. He spent three years with us here as a visiting fellow, and published a series of papers, essentially, on Pakistan and Western strategies to Pakistan.

I've had the pleasure of knowing Bob Boggs for a very, very long time. He's been in government for – or has been in government for at least 30 years? Probably more.

ROBERT BOGGS: More.

MR. TELLIS: Probably more. (Chuckles.) He doesn't want to confess to it – most of it in the State Department. And we were colleagues together at the embassy in New Delhi. The reason I

asked Bob to be the commentator today is that he spent the latter part of his government career in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Analysis, and has been a very close student of Pakistan, including civil-military relations in Pakistan and the role of the intelligence services.

So we have today, between our two panelists, a really credible battery of people who will raise and discuss these issues for us. So Frederic, thank you.

FREDERIC GRARE: Thank you, Ashley. But since you have said things – explained the report in much better terms than I will ever do, I think I should eventually stop there.

Let me just – (inaudible) – briefly before starting that I wrote this report when I was in Carnegie. And whatever is in this report is attributable to me as an individual and as a scholar and to no other institution.

I should perhaps start with a word about the report itself and why I started it. This is something that – an idea that I had a long time ago. And I had this idea not out of the blue but simply because Pakistani people were constantly referring in discussions, interview, and so on, to the political role of the ISI, so what did it mean. Was there some exaggeration? Was it a fruit of the mind of some politician frustrated in the election? Was that in this case? Well, yes, perhaps. And that probably was the case a number of times, but perhaps there was more than that, and perhaps there was more to be studied there.

Initially, I was reluctant to start the study for a simple reason: I didn't think there was much on it. And then I started looking at the literature, and I realized that on the one side, you had the body of literature which dealt with the political role of the ISI under regional regime, okay – the ISI, the instrument of Pakistan's foreign policy. And whether we like it or not, in a way, every country is entitled to have its own intelligence agency. There is nothing we can really say about the principle itself. What was slightly more debatable – (inaudible) – the consequences of its involvement was in Pakistan political life. I'll come to that later.

So I realized there was a body of literature, a bit – a little bit of this and that here and there. And it was interesting to put it together. In a sense, the report brings really nothing new, nothing that has not been in the press in Pakistan, nothing that has not been in the literature about Pakistan. But what I tried to do is put it together and analyze the problem from a specific angle. So as you will see in the report, in any part dealing with Pakistan specifically, all of the sources are – at least for most of them – from Pakistan itself, and a great deal of them is the Pakistani press.

What decided me actually to start writing about it was a very long conversation with Benazir Bhutto. And I did not volunteer the topic. I – this is a bit sensitive, but she kept referring to it again and again and again, insisting on the fact that no democratic experiment in Pakistan was likely to be successful unless there was some sort of a reform of the intelligence agencies. So that decided me to start with that. But, again, I was still a bit hesitant.

And then I realized that there were at least two countries – there were probably more than that – but there were at least two countries which had gone a similar way, or which had gone that way because at that time Pakistan had not even started to democratize. And these two countries were very different. One was Indonesia in Asia. One was Chile on the other side. And two had the

reputation of being absolutely – (inaudible) – regime. Two had the reputation of being countries where the army was as dominant if not perhaps more than in Pakistan.

And then it was interesting to see how they had managed to go from one stage to another without really affecting the security of the country, without affecting its well-being, and to manage to go from one hard situation to another one, which is, you know, the life of any other country, but where the army and the intelligence agencies still have their role. Again, this is just normal. But it doesn't disrupt the normal life of things, and there – a lot of economic problem and political problem and so on and so forth.

So, yes, there were two interesting experiences there. The two experiences were definitely not directly applicable to Pakistan, but there was some lessons to be drawn from them. And the first one, and probably the most important of them all, was the fact that the situation that we were facing in Pakistan was not just a fact of life, that something could be done about it, that something had been done about it elsewhere, and that when we told – you talked to – in those countries to people who had been in charge of the organization, were now – were in totally different political set up, were not really unhappy about it.

So there was something to be drawn from there, and this is the first lesson that I did draw from it. And this is truly the objective of this report. The idea has never been to indulge in any conspiracy theory. If you want to have some anecdote, if you're looking for any James Bond type literature, then this is not the report to look at.

Again, I don't even question the need for intelligence agency. I don't – in Pakistan, like any other state and so on. But I started this work with different conviction as well, and I insist on that, that the fact that intelligence agency do play a role in the political life of a country and the nature of this role – and I believe there is a specificity of Pakistan – does impact not only the nature of the system but the very stability of the country as well. And I do believe in that in the situation that we are facing today in the country security wise, and the sort of slow degradation of the situation, they do have a responsibility which is much more important than any problem related to development. I'll explain that later in the thing.

Finally, let me say to conclude this brief introduction, that this report is no more than a preliminary study, and I do not stay that as sort of a coquetry; this is true. I'm aware that – (inaudible) – that information may be flawed occasionally, but it's the beginning of this thinking out – plan to do no more than just open a debate, but also plan to do no less than open a debate. And this is what I had in mind by writing this.

So what is the – what is the issue? What is it exactly that we are talking about? Let me say that because intelligence agencies are an instrument of the state, their political role can be appreciated only in relation with the nature of the regime with or without a democratic façade, by the way, and perhaps even more with a democratic façade because the need for manipulation is perhaps more important than otherwise.

Most of the interest, if we consider the case of Pakistan, okay, most of the interest at the military – what the military consider essential are linked to national security as defined and controlled by themselves. In practice, it means that Pakistan's military has a complete monopoly of

a nuclear policy, tight control over weapons and equipment procurement, and decisive input on foreign policy.

And this is not – I'm not even questioning that in this specific report, but in order to do what they think is good for this, the military official also expects civilian governments to ensure sociopolitical stability in the country. But there they are faced with a constant dilemma. On the one side, their interest is their – in this matter stem from the assumption that a polity in turmoil cannot sustain a professional military. But at the same time, the military can preserve its position and privilege only if the polity itself is sufficiently weak and divided. And this is precisely where the intelligence agency come into play.

So how do they act? How do they in effect manage to subvert the political system? I will not go into detail. I'll let you read the report and come back with your comments. Funding of political parties – well, this is classical, nothing specific to Pakistan. There is a very famous case, however, which is the Mehran Bank scandal. When state-owned bank did give money to an intelligence agency, I've never heard anywhere of such things. But I mean, then came a lot of problem as to what this money was used for. I mean, remember the chief of army staff was interrogated in this issue. The whole scene went public and so on.

Political engineering through the setting up of political alliances – the IGI in 1988, the fear that Benazir Bhutto at that time would just sweep up the elections, and then the need to counter her by creating an alliance of Islamist and – of course every party engineered by the ISI. Specific? Probably not. Effective? Probably yes. Two thousand and two – the MMA coming up victorious in the LFWP – not victorious but still in government in Baluchistan again, what was it.

Influence of the media through all kind of means – well, the influence of the media is perhaps a more difficult concept to deal with because there is a lot of corruption there; it's not just manipulation, and this has to be recognized as well. But you also have means which go from very kind and simple pressure to the most – (inaudible) – means. And I'm sure that many of you in this room have some example in mind, not all of them so historical, if I may say so.

But – but where perhaps Pakistan is specific is in the manipulation of political violence, and not so much in the use of political violence, that it's the way it's being done. Every territory and regime use violence against the opposition. Well, the big difference is in Pakistan it's done through proxies, and that definitely has an impact on the political and social fabric of the country. The fact that no one – let's mention, for example, the promotion of sectarian violence. Okay, initially done in order to counter the growing assertiveness of the Shia minority after the Islamic revolution in Iran, but then used for other perhaps, from putting pressure on the domestic political opposition to fitting the militancy elsewhere in Kashmir or even in Afghanistan, and with of course some – (inaudible) – back in the process.

The creation in the MQM, and then the division of the MQM, and then against the use of the MQM, initially to counter the PPP and then to counter the PPP and the Jammat-e-Islami, then to counter just everybody else we need to be countered at some point, and then becoming so strong and so powerful that it needed to be divided. And this division again was done by the ISI. So the organization – (inaudible) – created a monster that it needed to control at some stage and the most difficult to control, by the way.

So, you know, this kind of thing is not something which is very common because the sort of cynicism that we see in most of the authoritarian regime, or simply authoritarian regime is nothing specific. But what is debatable is the systematic use of proxies.

As I said, the agencies typically encourage one group to pressure another existing organization each time generating a new probably that will ultimately have to be dealt with in the same fashion. So it's creating sort of a vicious circle largely responsible for the current disastrous security situation in Pakistan. While this situation benefits the regime only as long as it is able to control its various proxies, but it becomes vulnerable as soon as the balance created among the diverse organizations supported by the agency is upset by internal or external factors.

But worst of it, the long-term political impact is even more devastating. As I said, in most totalitarian or authoritarian regime, the confrontation between the state and the opposition is direct, not mediated through proxies. In Indonesia and Chile, for example, no matter how ruthless or vicious the repression, the regime's primary intent was the brutal reaffirmation of the monopoly of the state on – (inaudible) – made violence.

But when – in a country like Pakistan, the state itself engaged in a proxy war against its own citizen, pitting community against one another. It turns violence into an acceptable means of management, over managing social and political relation, resulting in a weakening of the state, in effect resulting in the weakening of the old country.

In a country where following decades of indoctrination, jihad is still sort of a romantic notion, this de facto legitimation of violence is destructive to the social and political fabric on an already fragile state and could prove ultimately to become suicidal. While this alone would plead for reform and better control of the intelligence agencies.

And if I – you know, one of the things that I do all of the time when I write about sort of the issue is, well, is that the point of view of some Westerners. I think that this is something the Pakistanis themselves feel very deeply. That's something I've been constantly talking with them about, and I don't think that we measure really here the impact what it can have. It's too convenient to treat a number of the arches (?) that Pakistan is facing through the question of development and so on because it's always easier to pay than to try to do something else.

Having said that, the question is what can be done about it, and what are the obstacles to that kind of problem? In effect, reforming intelligence agencies in the sense of reasserting control over it is not exclusively and perhaps not primarily a legal and constitutional issue, nor is it purely a matter of organizational restructuring. Reform should start with clarifying the philosophy and redefining the mission, focus, and priority to establish a new culture of intelligence. In practice, this is done by doing it through the process itself.

The military, who in Chile studied the reform were extremely reluctant at the very beginning, did not want to cooperate. Yet, 18 years later, not one single military that I've spoken to within or outside the agencies would even think of going back to the previous situation.

It also requires not only a change in the state, but a change of the state of mind of the actors involved. And perhaps more importantly, the process contained its own contradiction too because

it requires building trust between, in this case, civilian and military when the lack of trust is precisely why the intelligence agency need to be controlled.

So most specifically, we can name difficulty again. I won't go into detail. Their institutional intelligence reform is difficult because it involves the coordination of multiple intelligence agencies, specification of authority between the military and the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, always in the context of promoting national security while assuring human rights. Well, it's difficult also because whenever a new administration comes in, there is a lack of intelligence culture.

I mean, Chile is extremely interesting for that. First of all, this is the first country that I know where intelligence agencies are run by lawyers. This is not specific; this happened in this country too, but are run by lawyers specializing in human rights, which I think is much less common.

But when those people tell you how it did happen right after the end of the dictatorship, they were in the same room sitting with the former chief responsible of the military agencies, sitting in front of them, refusing to cooperate, refusing to speak even sometimes. And gradually they did have to build up – they had no experience whatsoever of the job, and they were faced with the ultra left in their back with whom they had been cooperating partly against Pinochet but who is now threatening their own stability.

And in this context, they had to rebuild links gradually with the ultra left, with the military, through the use of individuals, establish links, contacts, and so on. So it was a very, very difficult process, a very long one, but it was successful ultimately.

Another difficulty of course is timing, and timing is never good for any reform because there is always a good reason not to do things. And any reform process, whatever it is, implies disruption. And when your country is torn by terrorism, obviously destruction is seen as more of a threat than anything else. Well, this is to an extent a true and a false problem. Why? Partly because the problem is not so much a question of professional skills than a question of orientation. So it doesn't totally eliminate the problem, but I believe we shouldn't overemphasize it.

And the other problem that I've seen – perhaps more in the case of Indonesia than in the case of, for example, of Chile was political consolidation versus counterterrorism, especially that when the army that you're dealing, and which basically is the patrón of the intelligence body that you're faced with – is quite ambivalent, to say the least, about what should be done about terrorism.

Finally, to be a little more specific, what lesson could be drawn from the Chilean and Indonesian cases? Let me say first that because all democratic transitions are different, the process by which a new democratic government establishes control over its intelligence agencies – inevitably unique and depends on a number of variables. Therefore, it would be totally futile to compare the experiences too narrowly. I don't think it would make sense. Well, some lessons could nevertheless be drawn.

Well, I'm stating the obvious here, but establishing control over intelligence agency is a long-term process. Well, it took, for example, 14 years, before Chile could pass a law establishing a civilian agency ANI with real, although limited, power over its military counterparts. What is

interesting, however, in the Chilean case is that the institutionalization of democratic control follows very closely the evolution of the balance of power between civilian and military.

Indonesia, by contrast, as institutionalizing control of its intelligence agency much faster than it's established the – (inaudible) – of civilian. As a result, the control is formerly more complete; in effect, it is less effective.

Another important – and this is linked to what I just said – reform of the institutions must be consistent with the reality of the political system. The degree of institutionalization of a controlled system of the intelligence agency is not an absolute indicator of the validity of this control. I was referring to the Indonesian example a second ago. This is exactly what I have in mind.

And we are back here to the sort of the inherent contradiction of the reform process that I was mentioning before. No control of the intelligence agency has ever been established without the military cooperation or at least assent. For example, it's only when he understood that he no longer had the support of the military that Suharto decided to step down. Of course, stepping down was not the beginning of the reform but it did allow the process to start with.

Second, even in Chile, the transition had to some extent been prepared by the military themselves. So this is something that again is complicated because this is a sort of a contradictory process.

And perhaps but not least, civil society and public opinion do and must play a role in the reform. And here there are two obstacles to avoid: a public opinion, which is too involved and expect too much so expectation management is definitely an important part of the process, and a public opinion which is totally indifferent. And this is just as bad because there is no way of ensuring the control. Given the fact that at the end of the day, the ultimate control, the only guarantee that there will be some sort of a control is a vision also of the population itself and its absolute absence of tolerance for whatever abuse is being done.

So I won't go too much into the recommendation. I speak of the role of the international community. In a number of cases, the international community has been a facilitating factor. In the case of Chile, it has been both the source of the problem – one source of the problem and a facilitating factor in a very, very short period of time.

If you look at Pakistan more specifically, we are all caught in the same deal – (inaudible). On the one side we need a cooperation of the intelligence agencies that we would like to see better controlled somewhat. And at the same time, we need to work with them. The problem is – this is always the same thing – the problem will persist as long as the same agency will on the one side cooperate and keep supporting a terrorist group on the other one.

Would better control or even absent control mean immediately the – (inaudible). Definitely not. But it would definitely allow a better cooperation between just the various countries if there was a degree of certainty as to the fact that we are really working in the same direction.

So – (inaudible) – for the Pakistani – through the Pakistan government – it's only one thing. What I mean by that is not that everything at the technical level – at least nothing should exist at the

level of – between agencies themselves – is that we can't bypass the political level. In this stage, that should constantly be avoided, otherwise we end up completely ignoring and – (inaudible) – taking out legitimacy of the very government we are supposed to work with.

Well, in the specific case of Pakistan, mobilize all of the countries who have some degree of influence on this specific issue. They may have other interests as well, but I mean, they can be – perhaps be mobilizing this case, conditioned, perhaps – (inaudible) – to Pakistan military to this aspect just as well. This is not – terrorism and the control of the agencies are not two different issue in any case. That's what I've been trying to demonstrate. I'm not sure I've been very successful, but this is the same problem. So if you condition one, you condition the other as well.

And I could go on and on and on, but I will definitely stop here. To the government of Pakistan, there are easy recommendation – I mean, easily to formulate at least, maybe not easy to implement – I mean, get a better balance of your armed forces, strengthen and develop the police, for example. A lot of work which is today done by the intelligence agency in Pakistan should be done by the police. Why is the police so weak when the agencies are so strong? Why have we seen a constant diminishing of the police when at the same time, the ISI, for example, was present at every single administrative level in the country, which was not the case even 10 years ago?

Reinforce the separation between civilian and military intelligence agencies. Civilianize the debate on foreign security policy. This is perhaps not the most technical thing, but this is extremely important because you need to get a consensus on the direction on what an intelligence agency should do. I mean, and I doubt that you will ever get a consensus on the fact that any intelligence agency should work against its own citizens. So you are likely through that civilianization of debate, you know, to influence the process as well. It may not be decisive. I don't think it's unimportant as well. And stand up whenever necessary.

And finally, I'd like to discuss very briefly one last thing. I've written in the report, restore the supreme court and bring ISI valuation of legality to the court. Well, first of all, I'm referring to a few cases that was mentioning the Mehran Bank scandal the other – a few minutes ago. But what I had in mind writing that was this Chilean case. And Chile was very interesting for that because they never, never did bargain the legality of a case for some political advantage at some point.

So the law-and-order system was one thing on the side, was preserved by all politicians no matter the cost on the one side. And the political system was something else. So the judicial and the political were depoliticized and separated. It could happen only because there was a strong willingness of the actors to do so. But I think there is something to be thought about and eventually used in the case of Pakistan.

I'll stop with that. There will be other things that will probably come up in the discussion. They are present in the report, and I thank you for your attention.

(Applause.)

MR. TELLIS: Thank you, Frederic. If I can ask Bob to say a few words.

MR. BOGGS: That's fine. Thank you, Frederic. I think that's Anya's (ph).

First of all, I want to thank Frederic for his very solid contribution to the admittedly meager literature on the subject of ISI. I think I have to congratulate him even for bravery in trying to analytically get his head around this very shadowy organization, which, not only by its very nature being a clandestine organization, but also it's because it's surrounded by myth and rumor and just a lot of I think misconceptions.

But I may start out – this sounds a little bit official, but since I've been touted as a former government official, let me just say that these remarks are my own alone. I've been, myself been interested in ISI for a long time, and I'm not sure that I myself really understand what's going on. But anyway, this is a great opportunity to talk a little bit about it today and hear your views as well.

All of you may be interested – I mean, clearly I think probably there is nobody in this room who would deny that the U.S. unwittingly did Pakistan a great disservice by funneling such enormous resources through Pakistani government, through the government of the Zia-ul-Haq and the ISI during the 1980s in the great anti-Soviet jihad. Clearly, by doing that, we strengthened the role of the military in Pakistani society and particularly the ISI and by so doing strengthened or further unbalanced the equation between the military and the sort of quasi-democratic system, so for that we have to be – we owe the Pakistanis a lot. And I think we – our policy toward Pakistan and the intelligence community ought to be informed by that realization.

That said, however, I think – maybe this is just a reflection of my own inability to totally understand the situation, but it's my strong suspicion that the story of ISI is even more complicated than many people believe. You may be interested that within the U.S. government, and the analytic community in particular, there's a very active debate – it's been going on a long time – without any conclusion – I mean, there are people, given our past association with ISI, the U.S. government's association, you might be surprised how many commentators, government commentators consider – I mean, have a very, very dim view of the ISI.

You've read in the newspapers there are strong accusations made that while the United States is working with the government in Islamabad on counterterrorism, particularly in Afghanistan, there are charges that ISI is working at the same time completely counter to our interests. I've encountered these charges, even, for example, on Capitol Hill. Congress are always asking us, is it true that we are helping – we are funneling all of this money into Afghanistan through Pakistan at the same time that ISI is working against our interests. So that is a perception that is widespread and fairly persistent in the U.S. government.

I think the situation is really complicated. And I know there are people who argue that because ISI is a military organization then ipso facto, it is an organization that has a clear hierarchy and a coherent command structure so that if we have some sense of what ISI or certain members of ISI are doing at the local level, then we can infer from that those people are accurately reflecting the policies and the orders of people at the top.

I personally don't think so. I think that ISI, there's a considerable amount of what I might call bureaucratic infestation (ph). You have elements of ISI who have their own views of Pakistan's national security, concepts of national security that often don't necessarily coincide with those of the top leadership.

I mean, there are people clearly – there have been people in ISI who really believe that it is important for Pakistan's long-term security, particularly along its western frontier, that the ISI maintain all of the capital that it invested in jihadi elements in Afghanistan when the Taliban and the old Mujahedeen, that those linkages must be preserved against the day when the United States and the West withdraws from Afghanistan and once again leaves a huge power vacuum there, a power vacuum that would be – they would argue would be filled by Pakistan's enemies including India and potentially Iran, Russia, whoever.

So I think there are people who really feel that. And they will pursue their strategic vision regardless of what the top leadership says. I can't prove this, but I strongly suspect that even people like General – well, Generals Musharraf and Kayani with their long-term associations with ISI. I don't believe that at any time did they fully understand what everyone in ISI was doing, nor had the ability to – well, to countermand all of those activities.

I think that when General Kayani was put into the ISI, the DG ISI position, he made some good-faith efforts to reform – to get better control of the organization, but that can only be done, even in that context I think only can be done gradually. Part of the problem, and then do we step back a little bit – part of the problem I think with ISI is that in many ways it's effective. It's effective because it's well-resourced in many ways, because it's clandestine in many ways. But also, it's powerful because other parts of the Pakistani government are not.

It is a sad commentary I think that one government after another in Pakistan, whether democratically elected or not, have tried to politicize the intelligence agencies. And that goes back to, for example, the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who tried to use the various intelligence agencies against one another, trying to gain more control himself over – I think he was over the military intelligence because they were – these are – because these are powerful, they're well-organized, they have committed professionals, they can be used politically in the partisan struggle.

So in a sense – and again, I don't want to come across as being defensive of ISI or justify their behavior, but in some ways ISI has been exploited by democratic parties just the way it has become – it has manipulated political parties at other times. It's also a sad commentary that political parties – and this last election was an example of that – they will use violence with or without the ISI. So bribery, intimidation, kidnapping, all of that is part of the – kind of the natural arsenal of political parties. Certainly the MQM I think probably was a creature of ISI, but it certainly has no problem – had no problem using many of those tactics on its own as an independent political party.

In Frederic's piece, he made some interesting – useful suggestions with which I agree. One of them is that for Pakistan's democracy to gain more strength and more self-confidence, certainly the ISI officialdom have to be held responsible for their – legally responsible for their actions. So that means that extralegal arrests, torture, intimidation, all of that, it has to be – it has to be brought under the cover of the law.

But keep in mind please, all of you – and we've seen this just in recent years, that the even democratic political parties have repeatedly politicized the judiciary. So the judiciary is not as independent in serving as a – kind of a control on the activities of the clandestine services as it might be.

You may be aware that right now, today, there is an official order preventing the lawyers in Pakistan from demonstrating in the streets because they are supported by the political opposition. And it's no secret that the president of Pakistan was not very happy about bringing back the former independent and outspoken chief justice, a chief justice who had a record, I might add, of wanting to bring the ISI under greater judicial control.

The judiciary has a – I mean, if we are concerned about Pakistan's development, I think we should be equally concerned about institutions being created which given the judiciary more independence from political manipulation.

And finally, Frederic started out by quoting Benazir Bhutto, Shahid Benazir Bhutto. And I might just add something along those same lines. One of the things I think that Benazir said, and that may have contributed to her murder, was that Pakistan has a number of problems. One of them certainly is this imbalance between military and civilian power, absolutely true. But she also said the country is facing an enormous and unprecedented threat to its constitutional order from extremism – from domestic violence.

And she said – no, maybe she said this because that at one point she was kind of working out an alliance with Musharraf's party, but she said that the threat of extremism is the clear and present – the more urgent threat to Pakistan's democracy, and that that would have to be – the nation would have to focus on that threat first, that menace, and then later, once democracy has been saved from extremism, they could turn their attention to the sort of restructuring the political system.

Actually, I agree with that. And I think that restructuring the ship of state as it's sailing into a minefield is probably not the greatest timing. And there is real evidence that certainly for the immediate future that what the country needs is not a new confrontation between the military and the civilian government but a new partnership. There has to be greater collaboration, greater coordination between the various intelligence agencies.

One of the big problems about Pakistan – the biggest impediments to Pakistan being able to carry out counterinsurgency activities on its own has been that – and there's evidence of this – that the various – for example, military intelligence doesn't like sharing information with ISI and ISI with IB. So those problems have to be worked out just as they have to be worked out in this country as well, I might add.

I think that – and also the military right now, who I think understand the magnitude of the threat to Pakistan that's posed by militancy spreading from the west, doesn't want to get out ahead of the constitution of the democratic leadership for fear that it will do something that will be unpopular among the – within the population, and that that will be used against them by the politicians.

On the other hand, the politicians would like the military to do it. Basically, you do the dirty work; we'll – now it's – if you believe census data, it seems quite clear to me that most Pakistanis do not want the Pakistani army, military, to be used against Pakistanis on Pakistani territory. At the same time – and I don't know if you also know this – that the Pakistani parliament across the political spectrum has also ruled that they do not want the military used inside Pakistan for counterterrorism, by and large.

I think what's needed right now would be military needs support from the civilians and vice versa, and I think certainly the military needs the elected politicians to begin to shape the perceptions of the Pakistani politicians thus, that we as a nation, that our constitutional order, the kind of Pakistan that Qaid-e-azam had envisioned is under threat from extremism and we as a people are going to have to muster the military, economic and political resources to meet this or we're not going to have a democracy at all. And our military, along with the intelligence agencies, must do what is required to save us, and I think, again – now, how do you do that?

I talked to some parliamentarians from Pakistan just this week and they were telling me with great pleasure that they have actually received briefings from – the National Assembly has received briefings from the military leadership. I asked them, well, have you heard – have you been – have you had briefings from ISI and they sort of, well, not really; not in plenary certainly. But I think that the United States, if we want to help Pakistan, we should encourage them to forge this new alliance, even if it's only a tactical alliance between the civilians and the military. And that would involve such things as a national security council where the military can sit down on a regular basis with the civilian leadership and talk about a national strategy.

Anyway, that's the kind of thing that's required right now, and I think, again, in having – institutionalizing, perhaps, briefings by the intelligence community with members of the National Assembly because there are many people in that assembly who don't seem to really fully understand the magnitude of the challenge posed to the military forces.

Anyway, so my point is not that – all the pathologies, the organizational and political pathologies that Frederic outlined are not true. They certainly are and they're a big problem, but I think that for right now, for the immediate future, I think that the important thing is for the two sides of the house to sit down and put aside their past histories of working against one another and begin to work together for the national security. Thank you.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you, Bob. I think this was a very fascinating discussion because of not only differences in nuance but also differences in perspective, which on some issues I thought were quite stark. Let me just flag four points before I open the floor for discussion.

The first is I think the consensus, at least of this table, that we know very little about the ISI as an institution, that it is surrounded by a mystique because of the very nature of its business, which prevents a conversation that might be more coherent. This is simply a factual issue.

Second, there are strong and polarized views about the institution within the USG and certainly on the outside. And, broadly speaking, these polarized views have traditionally taken the form of, is the ISI the instrument of state power or the instrument of military power; the instrument of the military's ambitions in all its detail, or is it a rogue actor? I mean, that's traditionally been the kind of plurality that has been posited. And Bob made the point that there may be a gray area in the middle, which is that it may be a sort of a muddled bureaucratic actor, which may account for some of these issues. Now, I think that's an interesting perspective. It needs to be tested, both against external actions and against internal control, and so this is something for us to think about.

The third is the question of the ISI is suddenly powerful in an absolute sense, but is it powerful simply because it is the most coherent institution of state or is it powerful because other

state centers of power are very weak and therefore it becomes the object equally of manipulation not only by the military but also by civilians, and I think there is an interesting record on this issue as well.

And the fourth issue, which is the perennial problem that troubles U.S. policy, which is while there is an understanding that the near-term challenge is extremism and how one uses all the organs of state in Pakistan to deal with the near-term challenge of extremism, how does one simultaneously pursue the longer-term objective, which is to inculcate in Pakistan a proper constitutional order, and at what point do the near-term objectives and the long-term objectives become competitive in way that we can actually avoid the problems of the past? I mean, traditionally we've dealt with this dilemma simply by emphasizing the near term and leaving the long term to take care of itself.

And so the question I think for the future is, is there a better way to manage this tradeoff? So even while we get the partnership between the civilian and the military to deal with extremism, there is slowly being put in place an alternative vision of what a proper constitutional order is, and both civilians and military accept the responsibility for moving towards that appropriate order even while they join hands to defeat extremism in the near term. I thought there is at least four themes that we could profitably explore in the discussion.

On that note I'm going to open the floor. Just one rule: When you're recognized, please identify yourself so that our speakers know where you're coming from, and be brief in your questions so that they get a chance to interact with as possible.

Bob? Go ahead.

Q: Yeah, good afternoon. I'm Bob Dreyfuss with the Nation magazine. I wanted to ask Robert Boggs two very short questions. One is he said that he does not have evidence – you do not have evidence that the ISI is, well, as Ashley said, kind of rogue-oriented or that it's pursuing this kind of independent vision of its national security, but if you say that you – you know, what you believe, maybe you could outline some of the evidence, some of the indications that explicate that one way or the other, some of the predicates involved in that.

And a second question related to that is does the ISI or the proponents of supporting these Islamist groups, to what extent are the Islamists themselves, or are the Islamists simply a tool in their toolbox that they use cynically, you know, the way any intelligence agency might use agents, or do they have an ideological affinity, and how important is that in this discussion?

MR. BOGGS: I had mentioned before I thought that in many ways ISI is very effective, and I think one index of that is still to this day how little we know about it. It won't surprise anyone in this room that quite a bit of attention has been given in our analytic community to trying to decipher it. I mean, how is it organized? Who reports to whom, and so forth and so on. So I can't – for reasons you understand I can't introduce a lot of specific information, but what Ashley said is true. Those people who really feel that ISI is an accurate reflection of the highest-level policy use the expression "rogue." They will say – and this is almost a mantra – that the ISI is not a rogue organization, and I totally agree with that. It's not. It's clearly not. It has a very well-organized professional structure and a wide ambit – I mean, it's organizationally in fact actually pretty impressive. But, as Ashley said, though, there's a huge gap between it being this perfectly faithful reflection of policy on the one hand and a rogue on the other.

And I'm saying – I can't give you a lot of evidence, for a lot of reasons, but one of them is that this is a very lively debate within U.S. government circles. I mean, I was telling Ashley that I just met a State Department colleague yesterday who is looking at the same issues and she was telling me the same thing, that within different agencies here there are people who look at the same information and come to different conclusions. So, again, you've got to give sort of hats off to the ISI for being so really opaque.

MR. TELLIS: For having confused us.

MR. BOGGS: Yeah. And the second question had to do with –

Q: Are they Islamists?

MR. BOGGS: Oh, no, I think you said that – this is being, perhaps, cynical on my part, but you said are they using Islamist organizations, or at least are parts of the organization using Islamist organizations as sort of power projection surrogates? I would say it's probably that. It's not that they are sympathetic – now, there are exceptions and those exceptions actually are well-known in Pakistan, I mean, except in terms of individual personalities, but I would say that, in general, those who believe that maintaining links with Islamists are good strategy are people who are doing it in a strategic way. They're using, I mean, a cynically but in a calculating way, not because they – probably not because they share the Islamists' vision of those people for the way Pakistan ought to look.

Although there is – I believe that there are people throughout Pakistani Society, and perhaps increasingly so, who so see Pakistan in a new way, who see it as a more Islamic society, more purely Islamic society, and who look upon Taliban, the fighters with black turbans, as religious and people to be emulated.

MR. TELLIS: Raghbir? Right at the end, please.

Q: Thank you. Raghbir Goyal from India Globe & Asia Today. My quick question is that how do you see the new Obama administration comparing with the previous Bush administration as far as dealing with Pakistan or their intelligence and relying – because in the past some administration officials were saying that they were misled by the Pakistani intelligence, and ISI and the military, they were at odds. So what, in the future now, what will be new under this new administration dealing with the Pakistani military and ISI? And now there is no one-man rule. General Musharraf now – you have to deal with the army, ISI, and the civilian, Mr. Zardari.

MR. BOGGS: I think you should take it –

(Cross talk.)

MR. TELLIS: I'm tempted – since I don't work for the administration I'm tempted to speak for it, but I think I should just rule this one out because I don't know if either of you want to actually engage the question. I really think this is somewhat far removed from – do you want to take it?

MR. GRARE: No, but I wanted to come back for a second on the previous question because – and that’s definitely not a decisive argument, but on this question of control of the ISI by the ISI. I mean, that’s a question that is often asked to ISI people – former DGs – and it always got the same answer: It’s a disciplined organization. It is not a rogue organization. There are no more rogues in ISI than there are in any other organization. And I tend to believe that. So I think that to a large extent this is a false debate.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you. Would you like to –

Q: Yes, my name is Kami Butt (sp). I write for the Pakistani Spectator, and my question is how fair it is to be too critical of ISI without putting things in context because, like Mr. Boggs said, that it was helped by U.S. – it’s creating some problem in Iranian Balochistan and we don’t criticize that because – (unintelligible) – in our national interest. We don’t want to discuss the Kashmir issue. That is the kind of mother root of all these problems and they just – (unintelligible) – ISI. We don’t criticize the Reagan administration who equated these mujahidin with the founding fathers of America because they were fighting the aggression of our enemy.

We don’t criticize Saudi Arabia, who pumped billions of dollars to promote ISI interests. We don’t criticize that who is creating problems in Pakistani Balochistan? We say, oh, we know very little about ISI, but how much we know about RAW? I mean, Pakistan leaders – private leaders say that the problems that are created in Pakistan, they are created by RAW but we don’t want to talk about that. Doesn’t that make our whole orientation kind of very unfair to Pakistan just because the Pubarat (ph), somehow they are not seen to making their case very properly? Thanks.

MR. TELLIS: Frederic , do you want to –

MR. GRARE: Well, I don’t mind answering that because, first of all, we do criticize a number of the things that you said were never criticized, including the policies of the Reagan administration, including a lot of things that you have mentioned. But just remember one thing. I said from the very beginning of this conversation that the object of this report at least was not about, you know, the ISI as an instrument of foreign policy. There we can agree or disagree, but I think it’s much more debatable, however, including from a Pakistani perspective. When you are talking of practices which pushes one part of the national community against another part of the national community through a constant war of proxies, then you undermine they were use of legitimate violence, okay? Then you constantly are weakening the state itself in the name of national interests. I think that there is a very distorted view of national interests there and that is what is at stake.

On the rest of what you have mentioned, we would probably agree on much more than you believe we do, okay, but this is a different matter. What we are talking here is the organization within the national context, acting in the name of national interests while against the Pakistani citizens, and this is totally different story. And in terms of what it means for the security of the country today internally, no matter the original factors, I mean, I’m ready to agree on the vulnerabilities of the – at least some of them; not everything that you’ve said but at least some of them. Then this is a totally different perspective and this is precisely the reason why I chose that angle to analyze the thing.

MR. TELLIS: Okay, go ahead.

MR. BOGGS: Well, I just – of the many charges that can be leveled against U.S. foreign policy, consistency is not one of them. (Laughter.) So, you're right. And even among practitioners of foreign policy in the city, I mean, we're painfully aware that there are all kinds of blind spots, areas where we exaggerate fears in one direction and ignore problems in others, and anyone – I have no financial interest in this, but anyone who has ever read Steve Coll's book on "Ghost Wars" – I mean, it's clearly obvious that a major part of the U.S. government was pursuing the anti-Soviet program through Pakistan with no concept that we were creating – helping, not – but helping to create a monster that would come back to bite us. I mean, but it's easy to see that now but, I mean, we were wrapped up in a totally kind of Cold War optic and it was just – it never occurred to us, and frankly we will make more problems – there will be more failures like this in the future. But, I mean, I hope that maybe in groups like this we can – I hope we can make fewer of those in the future anyway.

MR. TELLIS: Now I really feel compelled to defend the U.S. government.

MR. BOGGS: Oh.

MR. TELLIS: (Chuckles.) I just want to make a simple point, and that is when such decisions are made, they're made within a framework that is essentially driven by the problems that policy-makers face at that moment, and particularly in the case of the decisions that were made in the '80s. There was one assumption that shaped a lot of U.S. government decision-making, and that is that the Soviet Union would never ultimately fall and disappear, because if you didn't have that assumption, then a lot of the things that we did appeared to make sense only in a very transitory logic. But because they ended up essentially with the demise of the Soviet Union, that we are left with all the consequences.

I mean, my simple point is this: Do we expect policy-makers to think about the consequences of their actions? Three and four degrees removed I think is challenging at the best of times and it's very rare, not only in the U.S. but I think in democracies anywhere around.

Steve?

Q: I was part of that group that worked on the Soviet policy, and while there was discussion of the issue about the consequences for Pakistan in particular, you know, the possibility of tipping over the Soviet Union, or at least bleeding them, was so attractive that that's what won. And, secondly, the ISI – to comment on your remark, the ISI, that was the agreement with which we worked with the Soviets. It had to go through ISI. We had no choice on that, so the consequences were obviously painful for Pakistan, and for us in some ways also, but that was – Ashley is right – that was the framework which – some people protested about that. There was also debate about the Pakistani nuclear program but it was decided by senior policy and agreed to by Congress that in fact we'd look the other way.

I wanted to ask – I want to make another point about another intelligence agency that was a rogue intelligence agency, conducted its own foreign policy, meddled in domestic politics and did not do anything, did not know about 9/11. The difference between that and the Pakistani intelligence agency is that its director wore a dress. That's the FBI. That's another case of reform of intelligence would be our own FBI.

I have two questions for you, Frederic – at least I don't think Kayani wears a dress. I hope he doesn't wear a dress. (Laughter.) J. Edgar Hoover certainly did. Two questions for you: One, do the people who wind up in ISI, are they the pick of the crop of the Pakistan army or are they, like most other intelligence agencies, people are not really in the mainstream like armor or artillery or infantry? And secondly, is there an ISI alumni association; that is, a group of former ISI members or people that they contracted with, contract employees, who operate on their own with perhaps knowledge – not too much knowledge by ISI? Is there a membrane between ISI officially and the actions of the people they formerly supported?

MR. GRARE: Well, I didn't get the first question but to answer the second question I'll refer you to Ahmed Rashid's book, who said very clearly that this idea of an ISI alumni association was a creation of the ISI itself. You know, you use officers who are no longer serving because it allows you plausible deniability. So I don't see where the problem is really except for the nomination itself, strictly speaking, but I personally have no doubt about that unless there is evidence to the contrary, in which case I'm liable to give it.

I didn't get your first question. What was the –

Q: What are the qualities of the people that go into ISI, and particularly because Pakistan is not going to fight a major conventional war with India that – the army simply – that's inconceivable. It would be a massive war. Do people see intelligence as a more attractive career route now, that they might have seen infantry artillery in the past?

MR. GRARE: You know, there might be people in the room who are better equipped to answer that question, but let me just give two indications. I really don't know. What I do see is that for the first time the DG of ISI became chief of army staff later. We have never seen that before. On the contrary, in the past I have heard several times a former DG of ISI saying to the country that it was not a promotion to be in the ISI.

So I don't know where stand today. There seems to be an evolution. At least it doesn't seem to be an impediment to exercise your responsibility in the system later. Does that mean the quality of the people is better? Is that just an accident of history? I have no idea, but that's simply an element of answer, no more than that.

MR. TELLIS: Bob, do you want to take a crack at the first question?

MR. BOGGS: I've been told – again, remember, I'm not sure of anything on this score, but I've been told that some – in a way somewhat reminiscent of career patterns for DIA officers here in the United States, that because ISI officers do things that most people don't know about, they don't – you know, they don't command tank corps or battalions in battle, it's not considered – it's not the first choice of many professional Pakistani military people. Now, there was a notion of officers circulating through the intelligence function over time and then going back to the normal military hierarchy, but I've also been told that that often doesn't happen, that, you know, someone is seconded into the ISI from a normal command – you know, a regular career, and then, from the point of view of the officer, gets stuck there. He's sent out to – oh, I don't know, Miram Shah or somewhere and is sort of forgotten about.

I might add, though, just a little anecdote. I won't mention the name because he's well known – a well known democratically elected politician from the North-West Frontier Province, someone who certainly is not a – not a fan of ISI said – I was talking to him – this is some months ago, but he was saying – he wasn't critical of the ISI in his district as a group, but he said the problem was is that the ISI would send people out there, and they would stay for 15 years – literally, 15 years. And he said they are disgruntled. They see their careers at a dead end. And so what do they do? They establish – on their own, they establish relationships with either local militants or with smugglers, and begin their own little businesses. So they're actually operating in ways that are not condoned by the center but are basically not under any central control, so.

MR. TELLIS: Any questions on this side? (Inaudible.) Yes.

Q: I'm – (inaudible) – from the Pakistan Embassy. Certainly I would like to dispel some of the lack of understanding for the information that I believe some of the panelists have. And starting with this thing – it's very rare that somebody would get a 15-year term at one place in ISI. ISI mostly comprises – 70 percent of the people which run ISI, they get at best two-years term in ISI. And by a third time, everybody gets rotated. It is specific whether it's chief, the DG, and it is for the field operatives also. There's only a select core of civilian expose (?) and analysts, those who get an extended stay, and there is a relative permanence in that one.

Second, that the type of officer that you get, certainly you get the best, the best that you have – not the top one; it's always a mix. One of the DG can become the chief of – (inaudible) – it's simply illustrates the type of quality of officer that it gets. Third, every state has its own right to identify security – (inaudible) – and then devise mechanism and organizations. You have CIA, you have all of the organization, where India has their own. So has Pakistan. It has all the right to have an organization which should serve as first line of defense to identify the third, which emanating from outside and attacked its existence or its national security.

So if we accept it as a right, Pakistan has the right to have a viable organization that all three of you have been saying is a viable – is an effective organization. And then without having a cogent reason to doubt its role, its influence, there's a pattern to dehumanize this organization, whereas very conveniently some of us are forgetting the invaluable role that it has played, why being together with the free world and, you know, getting the Soviets' withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Then recently in this war against terror, there has been a phenomenal contribution from ISI in terms of the militants that it captures, the top al Qaeda leadership that it has – (inaudible) – and it lost many people. And it continues to be.

Now, at this time, once we are entering into the terminal phase of this war on terror, the thing that perhaps was required was to, you know, to strength and to give it more confidence, to empower it, to enhance its capabilities. But we see on the contrary, getting it demonized for no real reason. People don't have the argument and they say that – (inaudible) – it's opaque; we're not very sure, but expect. You know, you are proposing a remedy, a set of solutions without knowing the problem.

So my recommendation would be first identify is there a problem, because only then the recommendation that you will propose would make any sense. Thank you.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you.

MR. GRARE: I'd like to answer that because I think I said from the onset that precisely Pakistan has the right to have intelligence agencies. And second, as I said, this all started from conversation with Pakistani citizens. So this was not something coming from the West. It was not merely the result of differing views of the regional policies of the country. That was part of it; let's be honest, okay. But, I mean, we can differ on that and usually differ on a lot of things that we say or we do.

The problem that we're trying to address in this session, and that I'm trying to address here, is the relationship that a particular agency or a group of agencies, because it's not – there's no ISI in the title here; it's intelligence agencies – play within the political dispensation of one given country with its own citizens. Now, what we do question in this context is not so much the professionalism, is the creativity of the organization, but with precisely the kind of result that we see today, okay.

And you're asking for more cooperation. I'm all for it at a personal level. I'm all for it given one condition, that we know exactly where we stand when it comes to a number of issues. You mentioned terrorism. That was not a primary intent that I speak about. Okay, al Qaeda fine. I mean, we know that you are ready to give up a number of people, but perhaps to get some leeway somewhere else, okay. And we're constantly in that dilemma.

So we will probably not come to any agreement on that, but at least the issue that we're talking about is not exactly the ones that you're describing. One what you're describing, we can agree on many things. We can also disagree certainly on some issue, but that's normal, okay. I mean, but internally this is a complaint of many Pakistanis themselves; it started with the Pakistanis. It continues with the major Pakistani leader. And this is not to say that those very Pakistani leaders had now responsibility in the process either. But I mean, this is not coming – something which is starting from here; this is a demand from elsewhere; from your country, sir.

Q: (Off mike.) I have one comment and two brief questions. I think the whole issue of controversy about ISI role and demonizing ISI, I think the controversy is not because ISI plays intelligence gathering role, or ISI has security role; I think controversy has evolved with its political role. The different military government – General Zia-ul-Haq and Musharraf have used ISI for political role. And if you pick up Benzair's book, last book, you'll find that General Kayani was the main instrument of negotiation with the BP. So if ISI withdraws from the political domain, domestic political domain, there will be less controversy.

Now, coming to a question, you know, wherever you have intelligence agencies which become powerful, whether it's Pakistan or any other country, there's a problem of interagency rivalry. And in this case, Pakistani case, I'm – and my question is to Frederic, you have – ISI, you have MI, and General Musharraf was also MI for political role. Did you find anything – kind of interagency rivalry here?

And the second question is to both panelists. We talk about the expanded role, or expanded power of the intelligence agency. But ISI is an instrument of the army. To me, the whole question is not whether ISI is powerful; the issue is that military is the most formidable political player. And as long as military stays as the formidable political players, its instruments – that is, ISI – would also

be very powerful; therefore it's the question of civil military relations rather than intelligence agencies getting powerful. Thank you.

MR. TELLIS: Absolutely. Thank you.

MR. GRARE: Well, on the second point, as you know, I agree 200 percent with what you just said. So you're right; at the same time it makes sense to see also how it does operate because this is one thing to have, you know, an over-powerful military; it's another one to see how you decline its action in concrete – its policy in concrete actions, and look at it in more specific ways. And I think there, there is this core for looking at what the ISI or other things do. But overall, yes; I mean, this is part of the same problem.

Regarding the first question – well, I have no specific information regarding – there is nothing I can say concretely about interagency rivalry. I know it exists. I know there have been attempts in the past to start that, to define the role of each agency, both thematically and geographically and that kind of stuff. I think that even if we talk of the political process, what we have seen in Bajaur, for example, was not the responsibility of the ISI; it was clearly the role of MI. Beyond that kind of thing, I cannot go any further really.

Q: Frederic started out by mentioning Benazir Bhutto's concerns, her worries about the ISI involvement in the upcoming elections. And she had very good reason to be concerned. I think all of us who were watching the lead up to the elections had every expectation that ISI would use the whole array of its usual tools to swing the election toward President Musharraf. In the event, however, at least based on conversations I have had with people who probably know or have some claim to know, it appears that General Kayani actually called off ISI in the later weeks of the last elections so that the results of the election are certainly, by all accounts, were much more a reflection of the national will than many of us, including myself, would ever have expected.

So I think it's – I don't think – even – I was telling, apologetically I say – which I don't mean to be, but I think the ISI leadership does not really want to serve a regime, whichever it is, which is unpopular or incompetent. So I don't think – I don't think that the involvement of ISI in domestic politics is necessarily a given. I think that they – frankly, many ISI officers would rather do what they're supposed to do, which is collect information and do sort of national security projects rather than get involved in domestic politics, which is clearly a messy and controversial business.

MR. TELLIS: Yes.

Q: (Off mike) – with the Pakistani American Leadership.

MR. TELLIS: Can you use the mike please.

Q: Dal Hagai (ph) with the Pakistani American Leadership. I'm often on Capitol Hill myself, and I get the question too about the ISI's relationship. But given that the ISI, according to at least Frederic's report, reports to the military, and the military is currently engaged in Bajaur and other places, and it's lost over 1500 troops, doesn't that then become a rationale for the ISI to not be involved in these groups, and isn't that a clear enough justification that the ISI is not involved in these kinds of organizations that Capitol Hill is worried about?

MR. BOGGS: Well, again, it's hard – I think we should all be careful about speaking about ISI, as though – and this is, again, my view, as though it's a reunified organization. But clearly, if you look at the rising frequency of terrorist violence from let's say right after the Lal Masjid episode in – well, that was July '07 – how many of those – I mean, remember there was the attack against ISI employees in Lahore. I mean, ISI is increasingly becoming the target of extremists. So I can't speak for them. I would hope that this would register on the leadership that we really have a problem here in country, and it would lend them to try to carry out kind of a housekeeping, make sure that there are not elements within the organization who are not on policy.

MR. TELLIS: Yes.

Q: Alec (ph). I'm senior fellow at Joint Special Operations University. I thank you for a great discussion. For Frederic, I was just wondering if we could move towards policy recommendations, and what were your top-three dream recommendations be. And with all due respect to Bob, you keep quoting Benazir Bhutto, and it's almost – it kind of reminds me of a Democrat after Vietnam and trying to be pro-military. They've had a history, the Pakistani ISI, and the military, with the Pakistan's People Party, and they have a very tortured history and a very different view of what national security ought to be, and to some extent that still continues so maybe if – maybe a different quote – maybe perhaps GI or PML, and what would work too. And I'm sure they have some concerns of ISI meddling in the political sphere.

As far as on the military side, I think they do an excellent job, especially after General Kayani took over. They are the first line of defense. They are doing brilliant work with analysis, and coming up with creative ways. I think they get a bad name when they try to come up with short-term projects, what I would call fomenting insurgencies in other countries to have a tactical advantage in the short run. I'm talking about Indian Punjab and Kashmir, and to some degree in Afghanistan. But I think the longer term, it is an organization that should be strengthened, should be better equipped, and there is a move towards that.

I think I was reading a Newsweek story just two months ago, 140 ISI officers that were probably doing what Bob alluded to as their own little projects with – (inaudible) – primarily for financial gain if they're kind of pushed into a corner where the pay is not good enough. Might as well start working with militant groups that are collecting donations. About 140 of them were purged just in the last two months. So there is a cleanup going on. So that was it.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you. Do you want to respond?

MR. GRARE: I don't believe there is anything.

MR. BOGGS: Well, just – and Ashley may be better informed on this than I am, but I think all of the Americans here should be aware that in the – the dialogue, the very intensive dialogue that the United States is carrying on right now with the government in Islamabad on counterterrorism and in Pakistan's very central role in that, frequently the subject comes of up of intelligence sharing. And certainly the Pakistanis are not comfortable, they're not satisfied that the U.S. is providing them with all of the intelligence they need to do the job themselves.

Now, I am not aware – and I don't think this is the case, that they have ever said, including, for example, Mr. Zardari that we want your – we want U.S. intelligence. We want your help in

better targeting our counterterrorist – our operations, but we don't want you working with ISI. I don't think that's the case. So it's not as though, that even the Pakistani leadership somehow wants to marginalize ISI.

And again, I – thank you for the comment about – I won't mention Benazir again, I promise. (Laughter.) But if I may just use another a little anecdote. Anecdotes don't prove anything, but if they are – they may be indicative. A friend of mine, a Pakistani national, was once a guest of the ISI. They seized him illegally. They kept him in detention – secret detention, they tortured him. Now, here's a man, if any – he's an intellectual. He has no reason to love the ISI. But if you talk to him today, as I sometimes do – I've been trying to figure, like, what do you know about ISI, he does not think that under the present situation that's facing Pakistan with this, again, rising tide of militancy, that the ISI should be weakened or done away with, or marginalized, or – he thinks we could – (inaudible) – control, as Frederic admitted. But it's not as though any of us is arguing that somehow that it ought to be disbanded; quite the contrary.

MR. TELLIS: Thank you.

Q: Thank you, Ashley. Yeah, I'm Rajik Kadian (ph).

I did want to dispute a factual point. General Acta (ph) was raised to a four-star level after being DG ISI. So ISI is not a dead end. And General Zia was briefly raised to four stars before the Musharraf coup. So there was another instance of an ISI officer being raised to four-star rank.

My question is a little vague, but Bob, you talked about the opacity of the ISI. But the ISI has very deep institutional ties with countries like Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh. So what have we learned from them that they have learned about the ISI?

MR. BOGGS: That's right. Great question, but I'm not going to go near that one. You're really getting into – (laughter) –

MR. TELLIS: He does plan to come home tonight. (Laughter.) Club Fed (ph) is not an option. (Laughter.) Sorry.

Anybody else, please. Well, I see that we have stunned you all into silence. Let me just take the opportunity then to thank both of our presenters today for taking on what is admittedly a very difficult subject, and for doing it with, you know, finesse, and focusing on I think the real issues. I think a couple of points that I would just make by way of conclusion. I don't think anyone here should leave with the impression that the monograph either challenges the necessity for Pakistan to have an intelligence service, or makes the argument that the intelligence service ought to be disbanded or eliminated. I think the core of the monograph essentially is that if you have an intelligence service that needs to be successful, it fundamentally ought to get out of the business of surveillance and manipulation of its own domestic politics so that it can concentrate on what are its legitimate national security objectives. I think that is a point that pervades the monograph.

The second point that I would make is that there is an issue about what ISI does in pursuit of Pakistan's genuine national security. And that is also a worthwhile subject for discussion, but the monograph at least does not deal with that in any particular depth. So we might have to come back at some point to discuss that issue again.

Let me just thank both Frederic and Bob for really walking through some very difficult terrain. And both Frederic because of his government position now, and Bob because of his past government positions are in a very difficult situation with respect to being able to answer all of these questions as transparently as they might have liked. So thank you very much for your patience with the limitations that they're working under.

Thank you very much for coming, and we hope we can see you back again at the endowment at some future point. Good afternoon.

(Applause.)

(END)